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ABSTRACT 
 This study is a philosophical genealogy of the term “student engagement” as it 
has appeared in composition studies. It attempts to account for the fact that student 
engagement has become something of a virtue in educational and composition studies, 
despite the fact that the term is problematic due its lack of definitional clarity and circular 
understanding of pedagogy (explained in greater detail in chapter two). Inspired by 
Foucault, this study employs a genealogical analytic to create a counterhistory of student 
engagement, suggesting that its principles have existed long before educational theorists 
coined the term, tracing its practices back to the 1940s in composition studies. Far from 
being the humanistic and student-centered practice that it is commonly viewed as, this 
study situates student engagement practices as emerging from various discursive and 
political desires/needs, especially as a way to ideologically counter the rise of Nazism 
and fascism in pre-World War 2 Europe; in short, rather than evolving out of best 
practices in education, the concept of student engagement emerged out of an intersection 
of educational, psychological, and even medical prescriptions set against a specific 
political backdrop. This study also examines the ways that power dynamics shift and 
teacher-/student-subjects occupy new roles as engagement becomes a prominent force on 
the pedagogical fore, addressing specifically the ways teachers and their assignments 
enact a disciplinary and pastoral function, all with the intent of molding students into 
interested, interesting, and democratic subjects. This study closes by considering some of 
the implications of this new understanding of engagement, and suggests potential 
directions for the term as well as abandoning the term altogether.  
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INTRODUCTION 
My interest in student engagement began, perhaps predictably, when I started 
formally teaching in the fall of 2009. While attaining a Master’s degree, I taught two 
classes of developmental writing at a community college in Camden, New Jersey. I was 
prepared for the skill level of the students in my classroom; few knew how to write a 
cohesive paragraph by academic standards, and many had difficulty writing in 
accordance with Standard English grammar. What I was not prepared for was the attitude 
that students approached the class with. Some of them, of course, seemed interested in 
improving their writing (by academic standards). Most of them, however, seemed 
disinterested, as though they were forced to be in this classroom and wanted nothing 
more than to get out. While taking a class in composition theory, I learned that this was a 
common way to characterize students in college level writing classes. Several chapters 
from Sullivan and Tinberg’s (2006) What is College Level Writing? echoed my concerns 
about the “disinterested student.” For the culmination of my composition theory class, I 
wrote a paper that was an attempt to answer the question “how do we get students to want 
to write?” Using the idea of self-schema theory from social psychology, my solution was 
to help them identify as writers. This paper was later published the Xchanges journal of 
New Mexico University. 
 Still, a question remained: if the key to getting students to embrace writing was to 
make them see themselves as writers, how then did we go about helping them build a 
writerly identity? After two years of teaching developmental writing classes, I began 
pursuing a Master’s degree in education with dual focuses on literacy and higher 
education. During one of my higher education courses taught by Shawn Harper, I was 
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introduced to the work of George Kuh and the concept of student engagement. This word 
“engagement” had weight for me, and it seemed to better articulate the question that I had 
been perplexed by for roughly three years: how do we engage students in writing studies? 
I was also introduced to John Bean’s Engaging Ideas (2001), which furthered my interest 
in engagement and composition as well as student identity. This idea of engagement 
seemed to be the answer I was hoping for when I began my studies in literacy and higher 
education: to get students to embrace writing, they need to be engaged in writing.  
 At the time, I did not realize how broad a term student engagement was. It had a 
particular meaning for me, one that I simply assumed all researchers shared. I understood 
it as a positive emotional reaction or association with a particular phenomenon, one that 
led to personal engrossment. I entered my PhD program with dreams of building on 
Bean’s (2001) work, of articulating what it is that engages students when they are 
writing. Little did I know that I would spend hours simply attempting to define the term 
engagement, and I would discover that few agree on what it means or how exactly it 
operates in student learning. The more I began to immerse myself in engagement 
literature, the more I began to suspect that its weight comes from its undefined character, 
its ability to conjure a personal, connotative meaning for each individual that interacts 
with the term. As important and innovative as the term originally seemed to me, it 
became problematic; it seemed void of any inherent meaning.  In The Birth of the Clinic, 
Foucault accuses the signified in language as always resting beyond the signifier: “there 
is always a certain amount of signified remaining… while the signifier is offered to us in 
abundance that questions us, in spite of ourselves, as to what it means” (1973, p. xvi). 
Such a problem certainly lies in the signifier engagement, and this problem is reflected in 
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the literature around the term (I explore this issue in greater depth in the second chapter 
of this work).  
 Even so, student engagement is often seen as the greatest predictor of student 
success; indeed, it is sometimes used synonymously with success (Kuh, 2009; Kuh, 2010; 
Quaye & Harper, 2015). It is a construct that has emerged to designate and explain a 
condition and develop/justify practices, in the same way that different beliefs about the 
roots of insanity, sickness, and delinquency led to various techniques and institutions to 
address those issues. Engagement is, itself, a kind of knowledge that has real 
consequences in that it informs the ways students and teachers interact (Quin, 2017) even 
while it seems to be a moving target with no inherent meaning.  
 This study, a genealogy of student engagement in composition, reflects my 
current stance on the topic of engagement as well as my interest in writing studies. Of 
course, there are many directions this work could take. I could attempt to develop a more 
coherent definition of student engagement. I could attempt a more experimental study to 
determine what is engaging to students of writing. This would follow my line of thinking 
years ago, when I wanted to know how to engage my own students better. However, 
rather than develop or determine, I have chosen an approach that helps me to dismantle. 
Genealogy, particularly a Foucauldian genealogy, is an attempt to problematize those 
practices and beliefs which are taken for granted (Koopman, 2013), to call into questions 
that which is most natural (Foucault, 1977/1995). But why choose this approach as 
opposed to the others?  
 In The Genealogy of Morals (1956), Nietzsche refers to his own “a priori,” that 
is, his disposition, his way of coming to and understanding the world. His disposition is 
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to subvert convention. While I do not claim that my disposition necessarily requires that I 
subvert, I am drawn to question what is denoted and implied by constructs. One of my 
peers sometimes teases me by interrupting me to say “what do you mean by…”? She 
does this as a playful mockery of myself, as I often interrupt people with this phrase. 
While I recognize that this is probably an annoying trait, it is also constructive in that it 
serves to deconstruct. Often, when I ask individuals what they mean when they refer to a 
particular idea, it turns out that there is no strong signified behind the signifier in 
question. Thus, this project stands as a testament to my a priori, an interruption of the 
fields of educational and composition studies to ask what, exactly, is meant when we 
refer to this thing student engagement?  
 Additionally, I am personally drawn to critical theory. This is potentially also a 
result of my a priori, or my defacto way of viewing. I am often concerned by the ways 
that individual buy wholesale into the metanarratives around them. I have written 
critically on a number of topics, ranging from who exactly is served by a digital 
revolution in education to why people develop beliefs about what counts as fashionable 
and beautiful. In general, I am interested (and often critical) of why humans come around 
to certain beliefs or knowledges, and under most manifestations of critical theory, the 
simple answer is power.  Foucault in particular is also interested in this topic, so much so 
that he often uses power and knowledge interchangeably. Thus, by adopting a 
Foucauldian lens for this project, I am offered the potential of discovering what powers 
and discourses have operated to build a belief in engagement as a necessary force in 
education and writing studies. 
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 Moreover, the idea of student engagement allows us to stratify students into those 
who are engaged and those who are not. It allows a new kind of knowledge to exist about 
what constitutes a “good” student and why other students flounder. It is not an issue of 
intelligence, comprehension, or motivation, necessarily, but of level of engagement. A 
student who is a failure is a student who is unengaged. Thus, the very existence of the 
concept of engagement allows for a new kind of subject production as well as a new slew 
of strategies to normalize (engage) student subjects. While Foucault is typically not seen 
as a humanistic philosopher, I believe that his critical stance toward subjectification and 
his thinking of individuals as ongoing works of art (1983) helps us to undo polarizing, 
limiting thought regarding humans. Subjectification comes about as a result of knowledge 
about people and does not provide them possibility. A disengaged student in an academic 
setting is, in many ways, a delinquent student (Finn & Rock, 1997). I try my best not to 
typify students in this way, and see a project like this as in-line with my own humanistic 
tendencies.  
In sum, this project stems from a number of interests: my frustration with the term 
engagement; my curiosity about from where the term originates and why it emerged as 
such a powerful force in writing and educational research in general; and an interest what 
powers and discourses operate to create such knowledges and beliefs about students and 
engagement. These interests invite a genealogical approach. Guiding my research are 
four questions: Research questions 
1.     How have practices associated with student engagement come to be 
privileged in the present moment? 
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2.     How have practices of engagement in the freshman college 
composition course worked to produce a compositional subject? 
3.     How has a history of the present of the practices of engagement come 
to be used particularly in the discipline of composition studies, with 
attention to pedagogical considerations for students and teachers? 
4.     What does a history of engagement tell us about the schooled subject 
in the present moment? 
Foucault characterizes his histories as a history of discourses (1973). Here, I aim to 
examine what discourses came together to give rise to the idea of engagement in 
educational studies with attention to its use in writing. I will attempt to describe the 
shapes that engagement took in the past to show how it has emerged into the present. 
More specifically, I focus on the decade of the 1940s, which I pinpoint as an area of 
swirling discourses in composition studies that gave rise to the current day 
conceptualization of engagement.  
Outline 
 Chapter 2: In the following chapter, the review of literature, I problematize the 
current conception of student engagement in college composition, drawing on current 
theories and studies of engagement to show that despite its prominence in educational 
and writing research, it holds little meaning for researchers or stakeholders in education. 
In particular, I show that the findings from many of these studies amount to a tautology 
(students are engaged when they are engaged), and spell out how disparities in 
conceptions of engagement have led to more confusion and clarity. The purpose of the 
second chapter is to present engagement in such a bewildering way that it leads my 
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readers to wonder along with me as to how the term came to educational prominence and 
what purposes it succeeds in serving. This establishes a need for a historical approach to 
understand how student engagement emerged as a concept—particularly, I argue, that of 
a genealogy. 
 Chapter 3: The third chapter, methods, reiterates my research questions, and then 
describes the genealogical approach and highlights how I plan to use genealogy in my 
study. Drawing primarily from Foucauldian philosophy, I describe the hallmarks of 
genealogy and the ways that it differs from other modes of historical inquiry, explaining 
what it is that a genealogist does and why this method is appropriate for my study. In this 
chapter, I also provide reasoning as to why the 1940s is the focus of the study. 
Additionally, in the third chapter, I provide an initial archive composed of journal articles 
and books that I plan to use for the purposes of my genealogy. I close by considering the 
affordances of genealogy and explain why this work is important.  
 Chapter 4: The findings chapter is broken into five sections. The first section, 
though brief, establishes the basis for a counterhistory within composition beyond that of 
Hawk (2007). Foucault argues that all histories are fictions based on the interests, beliefs, 
knowledges of the discourses that construct them (Simon, 1971). Thus, I examine what 
knowledges have already been produced about the history of composition and suggest a 
different reading. It is in the first section where I juxtapose a general conceptualization of 
the writing instructor form the 1800s with the writing instructor now, suggesting that 
somewhere in the last century, a shift has taken place in how the role of writing instructor 
is conceived. While a number of scholars suggest that this shift has taken place relatively 
recently, I suggest that this cannot be the case, and suggest a history that goes deeper will 
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complicate the way that compositional history is understood as well as provide a more 
detailed look at the ways that pedagogy was conceived, even before current histories 
suggest pedagogy was a concern in composition.  
The second section begins to look at how, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, 
composition pedagogy was beginning to be driven by student interest. This section lays 
out how the new “pedagogy of interest” emerged and drove instruction; this is in contrast 
to histories that suggest the period of the 1940s was bereft of strong pedagogical 
considerations, being driven by the product-centered current traditional rhetoric. Further 
consideration is given to the kinds of subjects that this pedagogical move created in 
students, teachers, and assignments. Students are now judged not solely on their writing, 
but on their capacity for interest in the subject of writing as well as their capacity to 
produce interesting writing. Further, this pedagogy begins to insist on reflective writing, 
wherein students expose something about themselves to both themselves and their 
instructors.  
Then third section examines the ways that the compositional discipline did not 
develop a pedagogy of interest on its own. Instead, the pedagogy of interest developed as 
a composite of various discourses. From a genealogical perspective, no discipline exists 
on its own (Foucault, 1980; 2006). When we look at the works of Foucault that examine 
specific institutions, such as the prison in Discipline and Punish (1977/1995), we see that 
he turns his attention to what was occurring in other institutions, such as schools, 
asylums, and the military. This is because under Foucauldian philosophy, discourses are 
always in dialogue with one another as well as the larger episteme of the time, that is, the 
way that knowledge is organized and defined in a given time period (Foucault, 
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1966/1989). Section three begins to lay out the dispositif of composition, or the gridwork 
of discourses within which composition situated itself, including psychology, education, 
and to a lesser degree, medicine, especially the prescriptions that these disciplines 
produced regarding the pedagogy of writing and student interest/engagement.  
The fourth section of chapter four addresses the ways that World War 2 affected 
compositional pedagogy, especially with regard to student interest. This section examines 
how, more than ever before, it was in the interest of students to become politically active 
and to develop as democratic citizens. Many scholars used interest as justification for the 
development of a “democratic subject.” Further, a special subject was emerging during 
the 1940s: the returning soldier-student. During the 1940s, we see a returning population 
of veterans that formed a growing topic of discussion in composition studies. Literature 
in composition characterized these veteran students as different from civilian students, 
and began developing a curriculum specifically for them around their own interests.  
The final, fifth section of chapter four analyzes the powers that reveal themselves 
in the interactions between composition and its subjects, using Foucaudian demarcations 
of different types of power. It begins by looking at pastoral and disciplinary powers that 
existed between student/teacher interactions as the pedagogy of interest began to take 
hold, which I argue are micro power relations, concerned mostly with individual-to-
individual interactions. I move on to a macro analysis of power, examining how the 
Foucauldian concepts of bio-power and governmentality are active, guiding the 
emergence of the pedagogy of interest. 
Chapter 5: The final chapter examines how the past emerges into the present. If a 
genealogy is, as Foucault claims, a history of the present, then we must determine how 
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the past bleeds into current practices. This chapter shows how current markers of student 
engagement are present in the pedagogy of interest that was developing nearly 80 years 
ago, and provides parallels between then and now to suggest that despite changes in 
name, many of the practices of the 1940s largely guide the composition curriculum even 
today. This chapter also suggests new directions for the idea of student engagement, 
including changing the way that engagement is conceived as well as jettisoning the term 
altogether.  
 This study is significant because I believe a particular kind of knowledge exists in 
compositions pedagogy that blindly accepts and embraces the idea of student 
engagement. A genealogy forces us to confront such knowledge, and allows us to realize 
that no one pedagogical approach is natural. Rather, naturalized pedagogies are the result 
of various power/knowledges coming together and to define and develop strategies for 
various (potentially anachronistic) goals. Genealogy sheds light on the powers that 
underlie naturalized and apparently progressive practices, problematizes them, 
denaturalizes them, and makes way for new knowledges and practices to develop. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 In this chapter, I show how the concept of student engagement, despite its 
prevalence in recent academic research, is poorly understood. To use a Foucauldian term, 
I “problematize” engagement. Specifically, I explore the ways that it has historically been 
operationalized as a function of behavior, cognition, and affect. I then deconstruct each of 
these frames of understanding, showing that even when researchers use such theoretical 
frameworks to approach the phenomenon of student engagement, they produce little 
substantive information regarding the phenomenon. I will further show that much of the 
research on the topic of student engagement thus far offers little more than tautological 
statements regarding the engagement of students, amounting often to the conclusion that 
“students are engaged when students are engaged.” By the end of this review, readers 
should understand that student engagement is an unclear and ultimately unstable term, 
one which actually does littler to further educational research or practice due to its 
similarity to other extant constructs in educational discourse, its conceptual haziness, and 
the circular reasoning that underlies the apparent substance of studies on student 
engagement. 
Afterward, I pay special attention to how student engagement has (or has not 
been) conceived in college composition. I focus my study on engagement in college 
composition because it is a class that nearly every American college students must take. 
If engagement is a positive force in education, the college composition course offers an 
entry point for students to become engaged in their college careers. Much literature in 
composition reflects this idea, even if student engagement is not well theorized in 
composition or educational literature. I finally explore how a historical approach to the 
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topic of student engagement may help elucidate the concept, explain how and why such a 
poorly understood term has taken such prominence in research in composition education, 
and offer future directions for the conceptualization of student engagement. I argue that 
based on the treatment of engagement and the histories of composition studies that exist, 
the field of composition is ripe for a genealogy of student engagement. In the third 
chapter of this work, I describe more fully the scope and uses of a genealogy. At this 
point, however, I believe it suffices to say that a genealogy is useful in exploring how a 
construct becomes naturalized knowledge. Student engagement in education and 
composition is certainly a “natural” idea at this point, albeit poorly understood or 
operationalized. Genealogy will be useful in showing how this term has emerged into the 
fore. First, however, I attempt to problematize the term, showing how it is a term that, 
due to its inherent meaninglessness, never should have emerged as it did in the first place.  
What is Student Engagement? 
Cultivating student engagement is seen as a virtue in education; it has been linked 
to college completion (National Survey of Student Engagement, 2012; Quaye & Harper, 
2015; Kuh, Kinzie, Buckley, Bridges, & Hayek, 2006) and preventing school dropout 
(Astin, 1999; Christenson, Reschly, & Wylie 2008; Nguyen, 2011). Further evidence 
suggests that student engagement is particularly important for school completion of 
minority students (Quaye & Harper; Zhang & Kelly, 2011). Fredericks, Filsecker, and 
Lawson (2016) claim that there has been an “explosion of research on student 
engagement because of its potential in addressing persistent educational problems” (p. 1) 
and according to Quin (2017), student engagement has become “an overarching 
educational ethos” suggesting “that it is desirable for all students to be psychologically 
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engaged” (p. 345). At first face, it certainly would seem that student engagement is the 
answer to many long standing educational problems. 
However, despite claims regarding the usefulness of engagement in education, a 
review of literature suggests that there is no one agreed-upon notion of engagement. 
Indeed, the term is often used without being clearly operationalized (Trowler, 2010). 
Christenson, Reschly and Wylie (2012) bemoan the lack of definitional clarity 
surrounding the idea of student engagement, claiming that this lack of clarity has 
“hindered efforts to synthesize results of studies, understand effects of interventions, and 
more accurately detail what is needed for future research” (p. 813). Baron and Corbin 
(2012) similarly state that “ideas about student engagement… are often fragmented, 
contradictory, and confused” and “the meaning of the term ‘student engagement’ is 
uncertain” (p. 759). Trowler (2010) notes that much research “on student engagement 
[does] not contain explicit definitions of engagement,” and researchers of the topic make 
“the (erroneous) assumption that their understanding is a shared, universal one” (p.17). 
This, she notes, has led to a confusion around how to measure the idea of engagement in 
empirical studies. Fredericks, Blumenfeld, & Paris (2004) attempt to give direction by 
operationalizing engagement via The Oxford and Meriam Webster dictionaries, 
describing engagement as a kind of participation in and commitment to something. 
However, participation and commitment are ideas already in use from motivation theory, 
and it is probably for this reason that Fredericks et al. (2004) admit that “the definitions 
used in engagement studies are much less elaborated and differentiated than those used in 
the motivational literature” (p. 63). Immediately, we see a problem as we review the 
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literature on this term engagement: namely, it is difficult to say with certainty what 
student engagement actually is.  
Some have tried to define student engagement by describing what it is not. 
Skinner and Belmont (1993) define student engagement by placing it against the idea of 
“disaffection.” They set up a kind of scale between the two terms, suggesting that these 
extremes “[refer] to the intensity and emotional quality of children's involvement in 
initiating and carrying out learning activities” (p. 572). In this case, engagement might be 
likened to the idea of enjoyment, set in opposition to the idea of disaffection or dislike. 
Mann (2001) also attempts to capture the idea of engagement by defining it via a 
counterpart: alienation. Mann claims that students enter school occupying a particular 
subject position, and they experience alienation when they are forced into a pre-
established subject position by more powerful authority figures such as lecturers, who 
now see them as “a type rather than an individual” (p. 10). Students are thus objectified, 
which Mann states leads to estrangement from their studies because they feel voiceless 
and ineffectual in the broader field that they are studying. For Mann, engagement is tied 
to the idea of student subject position and identity. However, both of these pieces offer a 
circuitous definition of engagement; one must infer what engagement is by conceiving of 
engagement’s opposite. Neither of these pieces provide an exact definition of the term, 
instead offering extreme examples of what it is not.  
I begin my review in this way to highlight the fact that “student engagement” is 
an ambiguous and slippery term. If it is useful at all, the term derives at least some of its 
usefulness from other fields, such as motivations studies. Many researchers use the term 
assuming others know what it means, however initial findings suggest that nearly no 
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researchers have provided a precise and widely accepted definition of the term. Those 
that do provide definitions speak of engagement in terms of its opposites, which leads 
one to wonder why engagement itself cannot be defined. As we begin to search for what 
it is that makes the stuff of engagement, we realize that the word itself seems to have no 
center, and it can only be defined by what it is not. Why, then, has the term engagement 
has taken such a prominent role in academic research and why it is fetishized as a 
solution to persistence and college completion? 
Despite the fact that it is not well defined, student engagement is often conceived 
of as a function (or combination) of one of three processes: behavior, cognition, and 
affect (Appleton et al., 2006; Fredericks, Blumenfeld, & Paris, 2004; Reschley & 
Christenson, 2012; Trowler, 2010; Yibing & Lerner, 2013). While some have argued that 
student engagement might incorporate all of these processes simultaneously (Fredericks 
& McColsky, 2012; Reschly & Christenson, 2012), a review of engagement literature 
suggests that engagement is often theorized exclusively under one of these three 
frameworks. Trowler (2010) claims that each of the dimensions provides certain 
limitations and affordances when used with the lens of engagement. Herein, I describe 
how behavioral, cognitive, and affective camps understand student engagement. I also 
describe an empirical study for each category of engagement to illustrate how these 
particular frameworks of engagement have individually been applied in research practice. 
In this section, I will highlight the affordances, addressing limitations in a later. 
The behavioral approach to engagement. Researchers often view engagement 
as a function of behavior. Indeed, behavior is the most common way of theorizing 
engagement (Appleton et al., 2006; Reschly & Christenson, 2012), likely because 
  
16 
 
behavior is much more easily measured than cognition or affect (Reeve, 2013). Under 
this conception, engagement is manifest in “the amount of time and effort students put 
into their studies and other educationally purposeful activities” (National Survey of 
Student Engagement, 2013). This is similar to how Kuh (2010) and Chikering and 
Gameson (1987) conceive engagement. Kuh, echoing Chickering and Gameson, provides 
a list of institutional practices that engage or are engaging to students, which includes 
“student-faculty contact, cooperation among students, active learning, prompt feedback, 
time on task, high expectations, and respect for diverse talents and ways of learning” 
(2010, p. 8). While Kuh refers to these as institutional practices, upon closer inspection, 
many of these criteria are not so much institutional practices as they are behaviors that we 
hope students might adopt as they move through their studies. Similarly, engagement has 
also been conceived of as students following the rules and adhering to classroom norms 
(Finn & Rock, 1997). Finally, Quaye and Harper (2015) see student engagement “as 
participation in educationally effective practices, both inside and outside the classroom, 
which leads to a range of measurable outcomes” (p. 2). For both Finn and Rock and 
Quaye and Harper, engagement is seen as an action (or inaction), specifically an action 
that leads to educational achievement. It is how students comport themselves when 
traversing the educational environment, especially in regards to behavior that has been 
shown to produce academic achievement. The behavioral model of engagement may be 
summarized thus: students are engaged when they participate in activities that are 
educationally productive, and disengaged when they participate in other activities. 
The National Survey of Student Engagement (2016) is easily the largest research 
project that conceptualizes engagement as a behavioral concern. The Survey was 
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developed as an accountability measure to improve student learning at the college level 
(Kuh, 2009). It is given to students at over 700 institutions yearly, asking students about 
their participation in “student behaviors highly correlated with many desirable learning 
and personal development outcomes of college” (Kuh, 2009, p. 8). Many of the survey 
items measure student participation in the seven institutional practices (Kuh, 2010; 
Chickering and Gameson, 1987) referred to above. Student engagement in these practices 
become a proxy for learning outcomes, and institutions may use the data gleaned from 
the Survey to learn how to better engage students and provide greater learning outcomes 
for their students (Kuh, 2009). The National Survey of Student Engagement displays how 
conceiving of student engagement as a set of discreet behaviors simplifies measuring the 
construct of engagement. Such measurability allows for institutions to quickly respond to 
perceived student needs and institutional shortcomings.  
The cognitive approach to engagement. Cognitive engagement has been defined 
as “the quality of students’ psychological engagement in academic tasks, including their 
interest, ownership, and strategies for learning” (Davis, Summers, & Miller, 2012, p. 22). 
It refers, simply, to learning management strategies, and the desire to employ those 
strategies in different scenarios. Kahn (2014), enacting a model of cognitive engagement, 
considers students as reflective processors within their environments. For Kahn, engaged 
behavior such as that measured by the National Survey of Student Engagement (2016) 
only emerges after students have enacted cognitive engagement. Students must take in 
and deliberate upon information, constructing potential benefits and drawbacks of their 
behaviors, as well as considering the ways that they conceive of themselves in relation to 
the tasks at hand. Students thus determine what in the environment is relevant to/for 
  
18 
 
themselves (Appleton et al., 2006) and perform behaviors based on this determination. In 
this way, the cognitive model focuses much more on executive decision making than 
does the behavioral model. When they are engaged cognitively, students perform a 
constant, recursive processing in which they take in and process stimulus from their 
environment, deciding what behaviors to take only after such processing occurs.  
Some might argue that conceptions of cognitive engagement overlap with 
motivation theory. Trowler (2010) describes cognitive engagement as the desire to 
exceed expectations, noting that “cognitively engaged students would be invested in their 
learning, would seek to go beyond the requirements, and would relish challenge” (p. 5). 
Trowler does not state specifically why this is an example of cognitive engagement, but 
one might surmise that this represents an intrinsic desire to succeed or a need to impress. 
Mann (2001) “locates control for [students’] engagement in the perceived demands and 
criteria for success of external others” (p. 7), suggesting that engagement springs for a 
desire to please or impress others, or to appear a certain way to others. In much of the 
literature on cognitive engagement, there appears to be a balancing between others’ 
desires and perceptions of the student and the student’s own adopted identity, which are 
both motivational factors in task completion. The fact that students must consider what is 
relevant to themselves (Appleton et al. 2006; Davis et al., 2012) and their own identities 
(Kahn, 2014), suggests that there must be an underlying level of personal motivation for 
students to transmute cognitive engagement to behavioral engagement (action). This is 
likely why Fredericks et al. (2004) see the line between engagement and motivation as 
thin at best.  
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 A prime example of this conceptualization of engagement can be found in 
Walker, Greene, and Mansell’s (2006) study of predictors of cognitive engagement in the 
college classroom. Specifically, these researchers were interested in the determining if 
there was a connection between among factors, such as identification with the writing 
topic; intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation; and self-efficacy and cognitive engagement. In 
their study, they operationalized two different forms of cognitive engagement: 
meaningful and shallow. In their study, “Meaningful cognitive engagement has been 
defined as strategy use that combines meaningful processing and self-regulatory 
strategies such as planning and checking one's work” (p. 3). Meaningful processing, in 
this case, refers to actively attempting to connect one’s existing knowledge to newly 
learned material. On the other hand, shallow engagement refers to strategies such as rote 
memorization of information that do not connect information to pre-existing information 
schemata. 
 In their study, they used four 6-point Likert-type scales to survey 191 college 
students (roughly equal numbers of freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors) to 
measure students’ experiences with intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, self-efficacy, 
identification with academics, and cognitive engagement (measuring specifically 
students’ meaningful and shallow processing strategies) in their college studies. Their 
results indicated that when student identify with a particular academic study, they are 
more likely to cognitively engage in a meaningful way with that study. Such academic 
identification was also predictive of students’ self-efficacy and intrinsic motivation. On 
the other hand, extrinsic motivation was linked to more shallow engagement strategies. 
Overall, this study shows how engagement, when conceptualized as a cognitive function, 
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becomes an extension of cognitive processing, understood as how deeply students 
personalize and connect new information to their existing identities.  
 The affective approach to engagement. A third common way to conceive of 
student engagement is to think of it as a function of emotion. This idea is prominent is 
Skinner and Belmont’s (1993) work, as they place the idea of student engagement against 
“not disaffection.” If this is true, then engagement must logically be conceived of as 
affection. Trowler (2010) describes affective engagement as an experience of “affective 
reactions such as interest, enjoyment, or a sense of belonging” (p. 5). Typically, affective 
engagement refers to an affinity toward an activity; in fact, Yibing and Lerner (2013) 
suggest that student engagement should be conceptualized as the positive feelings that 
arise within students when confronting a particular topic or activity. These positive 
feeling cause students to engage in the behaviors that Kuh (2010) and Chickering and 
Gamson (1987) note as being educationally important to student success. Elements of this 
affective conception of student engagement also arise in Kuh (2008) and Quaye and 
Harper (2015), as they both discuss cultural affirmation and feelings of inclusion as 
important to student engagement. Kuh and Quaye and Harper argue that it is incumbent 
upon institutions to foster affective engagement by building environments where students 
feel included and valued. When student’s emotions are attuned positively and oriented 
toward an activity, they are able to become more absorbed in that activity. 
 This idea of absorption also appears in flow theory (Csikszenmihalyi, 1990), 
which has also been used to conceptualize student engagement (Shernoff, 
Csikszenmihalyi, Shneider, & Shernoff, 2003; Whitson & Consoli, 2009; Shernoff et al., 
2016). Csikszenmihalyi elaborates on flow, claiming that reaching a state of flow does 
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not happen often, but on “the rare occasions that it happens, we feel a sense of 
exhilaration, a deep sense of enjoyment” (1990, p. 3). Flow is a kind of hyper-focusing 
on an activity that produces these feelings, resulting in inattention (or complete 
obliviousness) to other activities or phenomena, including even the passage of time. 
Shernoff et al. argue that affective absorption such as that brought on by a state of flow in 
an activity is a usefule way to conceive of the idea of engagement. Under their model, 
Csikszenmihalyi’s idea of flow and the concept of affective engagement may even be 
synonymous. Thus, engaging students means presenting them with challenges that pique 
their interest in such a way that they lose self-consciousness and sense of time while 
feeling intense joy (Shernoff et al., 2003; Whitson & Consoli, 2009). 
An example of how engagement has been seen as affective flow can be found in 
Shernoff et al. (2003). They sought to understand when students felt the most engaged in 
school. Data were collected over the course of five years from thirteen randomly selected 
high schools across the United States, resulting in a total of 526 participants. Shernoff et 
al. used an electronic sampling method to collect data: specifically, students were paged 
randomly over the course of the study and asked to fill out a 45 item questionnaire which 
reported their location, activity, and self-reported feelings of engagement toward their 
activity. Findings suggested that students feel much more engaged when actively 
performing, whether individually or in a group, rather than when involving themselves in 
passive, one-way information transfer (e.g. watching movies, being lectured). 
Additionally, students were more engaged and enjoyed themselves when activities were 
challenging rather than simple. Further, this study showed that sometimes, engagement 
does not occur when students perceive activities as being relevant to themselves. For 
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instance, Students rated art as a subject with low relevance, but saw it as a highly 
enjoyable experience. This indicates that internal enjoyment can occur even with 
rportedly “irrelevant” activities, however Shernoff et al. do not discuss this finding at 
length.  Regardless, the affective conception of engagement helps to show even more 
deeply why students might engage in specific behaviors. Instead of only relevance, it 
looks at how students are disposed to certain activities. Buckley, Hasan, and Ainley 
(2004) have, in fact, argued that the affective approach to engagement is the most 
“person-centered.” By exploring this personal aspect of engagement, it is easier to 
intervene when students seem disengaged and to create more meaningful and enjoyable 
coursework for students. 
Criticizing Extant Conceptions of Engagement 
 It should be noted, though, that none of these categories operationalize 
engagement per se. Rather, they describe how engagement might manifest. This leaves us 
unsure of what engagement is, were it begins, or where it ends. A series of questions 
come to mind: for instance, should engagement be synonymous with behavior, cognition, 
and affect? Is one only engaged once these are enacted? Or does one “being engaged” 
have to already have happened to say that one is behaviorally, cognitively, and/or 
affectively engaged? The problem is that these terms do not actually tell us anything 
about the nature of engagement itself. In many ways, the introduction of behavioral, 
cognitive, and affective engagement begs the question: if one is engaged in such a way, 
how did one get to that state of engagement? Making engagement a function of action, 
the brain, or feelings still tells us little about where engagement comes from or why has 
reached a state of engagement.  
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Further, while each of the three primary manifestations of engagement may be 
useful for guiding research, they each have their own limitations. Here, I describe how 
the behavioral, cognitive, and affective approaches of understanding student engagement 
may contribute to confusion rather than clarity regarding the term. Ultimately, the largest 
pitfall of each of these approaches to engagement is that the construct of engagement 
itself does nothing to further research or understanding of education.  
 Limitations of the behavioral approach. While the behavioral framework for 
understanding engagement is the most prominent in engagement literature (Appleton et 
al., 2006; Reschly & Christenson, 2012), it is also the most reductive. Here, the term 
“engagement” is simply a stand-in for activities that students do that are educationally 
productive. One might ask why the construct of engagement is needed for this project at 
all. Reschly and Kim (2012) argue that student engagement should be considered in a 
more layered and complicated way. Reducing student engagement purely to behaviors 
seems to ignore the connotations that the word “engagement” itself carries—as long as 
one is doing an activity, regardless of motives or interest, one is engaged. Under this 
model, one is engaged in doing taxes in the same way that one is engaged in playing a 
game or sport. In both cases, one is doing these activities and is thus engaged. However, 
nothing about this theory of engagement tells us why students might perform one activity 
over another, and thus, research using a model of engagement as behavior is limited to 
description and possibly superficial observation. Reschley and Christenson (2012) 
suggest that observing the time students spend doing academic activities is not enough to 
accomplish the goals of schooling. Kuh (2006) also notes that student behaviors under 
this engagement model become only “proxies” for learning. There is no way to tell if, 
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when students are engaged under the behavioral model, they are actually learning or 
developing knowledge. Under this model, we may simply say that certain activities lead 
to greater educational achievement as Kuh (2010) and Quaye and Harper (2015) do; the 
term “engagement” itself need not be introduced, because it does not help us to elaborate 
on the idea of why certain kinds of doing approximate educational achievement.  
Limitations of the cognitive approach. The cognitive approach to engagement 
appears to go beyond the surface-level treatment of the behavioral approach. However, as 
Fredericks et al. (2004) note, cognitive engagement is not strongly differentiated from the 
idea of motivation. Indeed, Trowler (2012), Greene et al. (2004), and Buckley et al. 
(2004) use engagement and motivation almost interchangeably, and it is difficult to see in 
their research where the idea of engagement begins and motivation ends. Corno and 
Mandinich (1983) equate cognitive engagement to self-regulation, again, a major 
component of motivation theory. If this is the case, the construct of cognitive engagement 
does not contribute anything new to educational theory, as it simply coopts what has 
already been investigated under motivational research. Indeed, much research has been 
performed on self-regulation and motivation without the construct of engagement, and it 
would seem that cognitive engagement, in its current manifestation, is unnecessary to 
further our understanding of how students act and regulate in the classroom.  
Further, just because cognitive engagement is a form of engagement that moves 
beyond surface level behaviors, it may also fall into the same descriptive trap as 
behavioral engagement; in this case, students are not necessarily engaged when they are 
behaving in a certain way, but they are engaged when they are thinking in a certain way. 
Walker et al. (2006) attempt to differentiate two different levels of cognitive engagement 
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by referring to it as meaningful or shallow, but it is unclear what this distinction does for 
further engagement as a concept. How to get students to think in a meaningful (read: 
desirable) way versus a shallow way is never made clear in their study. Students do think, 
but why they think what or how they think is never considered. We are left with 
observations similar to those offered by the behavioral model, albeit at a less observable 
and perhaps more personal level for the student. What is more, the term “processing” 
might just as well take the place of “engagement” in their study, and nothing would be 
lost while invoking a term already much more established in cognitive studies.  
Limitations of the affective approach. The affective approach, although it has 
been called the most person-centered approach to engagement (Buckley et al., 2004) is 
not without its own limitations. A large criticism rests in the fact that affective 
engagement only occurs when students feel positive emotions toward a particular topic 
(Yibing & Lerner, 2013). However, it is not difficult to imagine a student becoming 
absorbed in a topic because of negative emotions; it is possible to imagine, for instance, a 
student becoming both horrified and intrigued when learning about the holocaust of 
World War 2. However, under many conceptions of affective engagement, because the 
students’ emotions were not positive, the student would not be considered engaged. 
Trowler (2010) claims that engagement can occur in positive and negative ways, and that 
both can be productive. The hypothetical holocaust example illustrates the idea of 
negative engagement—that is, engagement wherein a student is impassioned enough to 
reject an idea, such as Hitler’s final solution. Even so, this does not appear to be a 
common way of thinking about affective engagement. Instead, overwhelmingly under 
this model, students are engaged if and when they feel positive emotions as they 
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approach their schoolwork. While it is possible to tailor assignments to students’ 
emotions, this model still seems superficial, as there is no exploration of how instructors 
may begin to understand student emotions. Additionally, like the cognitive model of 
engagement, the emotional model has been used in conjunction with motivational theory 
(e.g. Pintrich & Schrauben, 2009; Skinner, 2016; Skinner, Pitzer, & Brule, 2014). When 
this is the case, as with the other categories, it is not clear what an engagement theory 
contributes to our understanding of student learning. Indeed, it is not clear why 
engagement is a necessary construct at all. 
Measuring Engagement 
 Given the variety of ways that engagement has been conceived, engagement has 
been measured both qualitatively and quantitatively using an assortment of instruments 
(Fredericks & McColskey, 2012). Rather than contribute to a more comprehensive way 
of understanding engagement, however, these various measures have fragmented the 
idea, making it nearly impossible to speak about it comparatively from study to study 
(Fredericks & McColskey; Reschly & Christenson, 2012; Trowler, 2010). Fredericks et 
al. (2016) and Sinatra, Heddy, & Lombardi (2014) suggest that the fact that engagement 
borrows from so many other theoretical traditions has led to problems in its conception 
and measurement, because often researchers are not well versed in the theoretical 
frameworks and constructs that they borrow from to give engagement its legs. Quin 
(2017) notes that regardless of how engagement is conceived, there is often “delineation 
between levels of engagement that is not obvious” (p. 346), meaning that even within 
studies that conceive of engagement in the same way (behaviorally, cognitively, 
affectively), there is no agreed-upon scale that establishes students’ levels of engagement 
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(indeed, some might argue that a scale to measure degrees of the experience of 
engagement would be absurd).  
Some methods of collecting information about student engagement include 
student self-reports, experience sampling, and interviews (Fredericks & McColskey, 
2012). However, all of these methods carry with them potential problems in measuring 
engagement. Sometimes, for instance, survey items for self-reports may be overly broad 
(e.g. “I feel that I work hard in school”), telling very little about the students’ disposition 
toward schooling or what exactly the student works hard to accomplish. This further 
ignores the extremely subjective nature of “working hard” or the potential for self-
reporting participants to want to present in a particular way for researchers (as a hard 
worker, regardless of actuality). Further, Fredericks et al. (2016) found that often, even in 
these scales, constructs vary from study to study, meaning that self-reported survey items 
cannot be compared from study to study. Experience sampling may catch students at a 
bad moment, or, if experience sampling is to measure the level of a student’s engagement 
in a given moment, it may even break the student’s level of engagement (however it is 
conceived) with whatever task the student was engaged in. Thus, experience sampling 
may actually disengage students from an otherwise engaging moment. Interviews about 
school specifically may invite students to fabricate information depending on the 
interviewer, and in general, interviews may not lead to reliable or stable data (Fredericks 
& McColskey; McCaslin & Good, 1996).  
In some instances, student engagement is not measured based on students as the 
data source. Rather, teacher perceptions of student engagement are taken as reliable 
measures. For instance, teachers of students may be asked to determine how engaged 
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they feel students are (Skinner & Belmont, 1993). On a broader scale, such as the NSSE 
(2016), student engagement may be measured at an institution by determining “how the 
institution deploys its resources and organizes the curriculum and other learning 
opportunities to get students to participate in activities… that are linked to student 
learning” (n.p.). In these cases, such measurements circumvent the student in student 
engagement, assuming that other indicators may speak on behalf of the student 
experience. The fact that so many methods are used to reach this idea of student 
engagement is not positive. In other cases, these assorted methods might help to 
triangulate information or data gleaned from other studies. However, in the case of 
student engagement, the different methods are a result of competing definitions and 
conceptualizations of the construct; thus, the more methods used in studies, the more 
fragmented the idea of engagement becomes in the larger corpus of research. Eccles 
(2016) likens this fragmentation as blind men describing different parts of an elephant. 
She say of researchers: 
…they are trying to identify the various possible meanings of the concept 
of engagement through qualitative and quantitative descriptions, followed 
by factor analytic methods to try to isolate the various subcomponents. 
Like the three blind men, they have produced a set of descriptive 
indicators. But do these indicators capture the emergent property of 
engagement? This is less clear. (p. 71) 
Engagement as Tautology 
 In sum, engagement is not a well-defined construct in educational research. 
Further, to say that engagement is the same as one’s behavior, thinking, or feeling 
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reduces the idea of engagement to a trite buzzword that offers little in terms of 
instructional direction. Indeed, thinking of engagement in these ways seems to place the 
concept of engagement into pre-existing theoretical frameworks, whether these 
frameworks are behavioral, cognitive, motivational, or affective.  However, these 
frameworks have all existed well before engagement came to the educational fore, and it 
is not clear that the introduction of student engagement advances these theories. Perhaps 
engagement should exist on its own terms, its own theory, not necessarily embedded into 
other educational theories. When treated on its own, however, engagement is still ill-
defined, and I argue that educational theorists have a difficult time describing how 
engagement exists and what engagement does. Often, when treated on its own terms, 
engagement becomes circular, and it is unclear where or how engagement begins or is 
enacted by students. To illustrate this point, I draw upon two theories of engagement, the 
first from Kahn (2014), the second from Quaye and Harper (2015) to show how 
engagement has been reduced to little more than a tautology in theoretical research, 
something to the tune of “engagement is when students are engaged.”  
Kahn (2014) sees student engagement as a confluence of affect and cognition, a 
dialogue between students’ emotions, self-conceptions, and the school topic at hand. He 
elaborates that engagement occurs when students come into contact with uncertainty in 
their education and are faced with making a decision as a result of this uncertainty; in the 
face of uncertainty about consequences or futures, students must rely upon personally 
motivating factors to engage with materials, activities, and projects. In this case, Kahn 
suggests that prior existing student interest plays a significant role in engagement. When 
students desire to master material or a practice, their reflexive deliberation leads to 
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engagement. At first, this appears to give students control over their engagement, but I 
suggest that such a claim does not tell us much. Students who were already interested in 
and motivated to learn certain material might be said to be already engaged by that 
material, particularly if we consider engagement either a cognitive or an affective 
concern. It is difficult to locate the origins of engagement in this case or to say when 
exactly a student became engaged in material. If they are engaged in a topic or activity 
prior to coming to school, this leaves little room for instructors to modify their lessons to 
promote engagement, as engagement might be said to be characteristic of the student, 
rather than something to create, cultivate, or inspire.  
Further, as with the concept of cognitive engagement, is not clear in Kahn’s 
(2014) piece how engagement significantly differs from interest or motivation. Early in 
his piece, Kahn provides a definition of student engagement as referring to the student’s 
contribution or commitment to a task. The term “commitment” invokes, at least in part, a 
level of interest and motivation, given that it takes a pre-existing interest and/or 
motivation to commit. If we hold this to be true, that commitment is comprised of 
interest, then it means interest leads to commitment, which is being used synonymously 
with engagement. Interest is already a kind of engagement, however, that leads to 
commitment, also engagement. We are left with an equation: 
Interest = engagement 
Commitment = engagement 
Interest  commitment 
Engagement  engagement  
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Admittedly, definitions for all of these terms—commitment, interest, and motivation—
are unclear in Kahn’s piece. However, when we strip all of these terms to constituent or 
reflexive meanings, one interpretation of Kahn’s conception of engagement amounts to a 
tautology: students engage in things that engage them, or students are engaged when they 
are engaged. 
In sum, Kahn’s (2014) conception of engagement falls upon itself. It attempts to 
explain how engagement is student driven, however close scrutiny prevents this reading. 
Instead, engagement fosters engagement. Closer scrutiny reveals that the construct of 
engagement under his model is not even well developed. Unfortunately, he is not the only 
one to rely on such circularity to conceptualize engagement. Quaye and Harper (2015) 
also attempt to theorize student engagement, but rely on similar circular reasoning to get 
at what student engagement is. In contrast to Kahn, they describe engagement as an entity 
that occurs through interaction, rather than within the student. Kahn claims that Quaye 
and Harper’s “primary emphasis on diverse populations of students draws one away from 
the agency of the individual student” (Kahn, p. 1006), unlike his own In this way, they 
provide a convenient contrast to his own theory of engagement. For them, student 
engagement is “simply characterized as participation in educationally effective practices, 
both inside and outside the classroom, which leads to a range of measurable outcomes” 
(p. 2-3). They further differentiate engagement from involvement, noting that 
involvement can occur passively—a student can attend a class or study groups with 
minimal interest and not be engaged: instead, “action, purpose, and cross-institutional 
collaboration are requisite for engagement and deep learning” (p. 5). Student 
engagement, then, is a kind of active involvement. While this may sound similar to 
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Kahn’s definition of engagement, Quaye and Harper move away from the idea that 
students are responsible for garnering their own engagement. Instead, they state that 
“weak institutions are those that expect students to engage themselves” (p. 6), and 
quoting Pascarella (2001), claim that “excellent undergraduate education is likely to 
occur at those colleges and universities that maximize good practices and students’ 
academic and social engagement” (p.22). The college itself becomes an engaging space, 
and educators/schools need to provide opportunities for students to become engaged. As 
Kahn notes, this suggests that engagement originates outside of students and their agency. 
Unfortunately, there is immediately a problem with Quaye and Harper’s (2015) 
definition of student engagement. It is measured by participation in educationally 
effective practices that students do, particularly those that lead to positive educational 
outcomes. However, this move begins to create a circularity in their argument, which 
after some dismantling, resembles Kahn’s (2014). According to Quaye and Harper, 
engagement in educationally purposeful activities leads to “deep levels of learning and 
the production of enduring and measurable gains and outcomes” (p. 6). The problem with 
this becomes an issue of causality; Quaye and Harper have already, by definition, 
identified engagement as leading to educationally effective outcomes.  They use 
educational success (deep learning, measurable gains) as an indication of pre-existing 
engagement in the activities that led to such success (engagement  educational 
success), but by their definition, they already know that engagement causes such 
outcomes. It is these outcomes that can be used to determine that engagement occurred 
(educational success  engagement). Student engagement and educationally effective 
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outcomes simply refer back to one another in a circularity game. This equation looks 
something like:  
Engagement  educational success.   
While it initially seems that Quaye and Harper are making a substantial claim about 
engagement, they actually succeed in dancing around the term, never truly indicating 
what it is or where it begins. Engagement leads to success because success is an indicator 
that engagement happened.  
Another way of saying this is that by the definitions and reasoning of Kahn (2014) 
and Quaye and Harper (2015), engagement must already be in place to be enacted. 
Students engage in certain activities that are engaging, and we know that they are 
engaging because students engage in them. The circularity of their treatment of 
engagement causes any seemingly stable definition of student engagement to break down. 
Both Kahn’s and Harper and Quaye’s description of engagement attempts to place 
engagement within and outside of students, respectively. However, the logic breaks into a 
kind of “engagement is engaging because it is engages,” or “engagement is effective 
because effectiveness is indicated by engagement.” When this is the case, where 
engagement begins, and by extension what it is, quickly becomes aporetic, constantly 
referring to itself or other similarly unclear terms. We must then begin the work of 
defining engagement by what it is not, as we saw at the beginning of this review. 
Engagement is an extension of educational activities just as educational activities are an 
extension of it. We know that it is not involvement, motivation, or commitment, but it is 
like these terms, even though it is still different. Perhaps this is why, in a recent 
systematic review of student engagement (Quin, 2017), an indicator of student 
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engagement is psychological engagement. In this case, we explicitly have engagement as 
a measure of engagement. In engagement literature, this is the closest we have come to 
defining what student engagement actually is. And as such a hazy concept, it becomes 
unclear what the exactly student engagement has done for education research. As 
Fredericks et al. (2016) note, it can be used to explain almost everything that students do 
in school, and by explaining everything, it truly explains nothing at all. This is 
remarkably similar to Foucault’s (1989) criticism of certain “barbarous” words: “many 
familiar words are barbarous because they say many things at once or they say nothing at 
all” (p. 413). Foucault would certain criticize engagement of such barbarity. And by 
mentioning Foucault, I anticipate the approach that I will use to understand how 
engagement has emerged over the years as a term at once of such import and such 
emptiness.  
Engagement in Composition 
 The fact that student engagement is a rather empty concept has not prevented 
composition studies from adopting and employing the term in various ways. Engagement 
is one of the essential habits of mind identified by the Council of Writing Program 
Administrators (WPA) (2011) for successful college writing. The WPA offers a vague 
and short definition of engagements, suggesting that it is “a sense of investment or 
involvement in learning,” which arguably offers some synonyms of the word 
“engagement,” (note that Quaye and Harper (2015) explicitly claimed that engagement 
was not involvement) but says very little about what engagement actually is. Even so, 
engagement has been used in composition since at least 1991, one of the earliest uses 
appearing in Phelps’ Composition as a Human Science (1991). Phelps describes 
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introducing students to theory, claiming that “the problem … is… how to do so according 
to the principles of kairos: specifically, what knowledge is appropriate at given moments 
of development and process; how to introduce it most productively; how to engage 
students in a dialogue about it rather than impost it as a rule” (p. 234). It is possible that 
Phelps’ use of the word “engage” might simply mean “get students to talk,” however I 
suspect that engage means something more here. Phelps wants students to internalize 
theory, to understand that different lenses can be used to understand literature and 
writing. If this is the case, then Phelps offers one of the first examples of student 
engagement appearing in composition literature. 
More recently, 2008, the WPA paired with the NSSE and developed 27 writing-
related questions to investigate “how student writing experiences related to their 
engagement and learning” (Anderson, Anson, Gonyea, & Paine, 2009, p. 1). Clearly, 
since 1991, the idea of engagement had permeated composition studies, shown simply in 
the fact that the WPA created such a collaboration with the NSSE. The 27 questions that 
they developed specifically addressed student involvement in “interactive writing 
activities” such as peer reviews and visits to writing centers; “meaning-constructing 
writing,” which includes synthesizing information and writing for specific audiences; and 
how well students felt their instructors explained expectations for writing assignments. 
These areas were determined through a confirmatory factor analysis. Anderson et al.’s 
findings “show that more work in these areas are associated with more engagement in 
deep learning activities and greater self‐reported gains in practical competence, personal 
and social development, and general education” (p. 1). There is thus an immediate 
assumption that writing is in some way related to student engagement.  
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 Anderson, Anson, Paine, & Gonyea (2015) elaborate these findings to establish 
the idea that writing can is a “high impact educational practice” (p. 201). Unfortunately, 
in pairing with the NSSE to glean this information, Anderson et al. (2015) fall into a trap 
that engagement researchers in education have already fallen into. A high impact or 
evidence based practice leads to certain positive educational outcomes, and therefore it is 
engaging. Engagement is synonymous with positive educational outcome, and we may 
level the same criticism against Anderson et al. (2009; 2015) as we have already levelled 
against Quaye and Harper (2015). In effect: 
Evidence based practice = student engagement = positive educational outcome 
However, through the transitive property, we may simply do away with the middle term 
and achieve the same results: 
Evidence based practice = positive educational outcome 
It is possible simply to erase student engagement and nothing is lost from research. 
Indeed, Anderson et al. (2015) seem to slowly erase the construct of student engagement 
from their study, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Despite the fact that they use 
an instrument of student engagement to measure writing practice, the term does not 
appear in their 40 page report as often as one might expect. As with the behavioral 
understanding of engagement, “engage” is often used as a stand-in for the word “do.” For 
instance, in defining the construct of integrative learning, Anderson et al. refer to it as a 
“measure of students’ engagement in combing ideas from various sources” (p. 211). This 
does not invoke the earlier WPA definition of engagement that refers to interest and 
investment; it only refers to students’ participation in a particular activity.  
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The WPA’s affiliation with the NSSE suggests that student engagement is an important 
construct in composition studies, but like in educational research (indeed, perhaps 
because of the WPA’s reliance on educational research) student engagement is equally 
poorly operationalized. 
Perhaps the greatest example of student engagement in composition studies exists 
before the WPA/NSEE collaboration in Bean’s (2001) Engaging Ideas. Bean’s entire text 
centers on offering pedagogical suggestions and lesson plans to make composition more 
engaging to students. Interestingly, however, over the course of the entire text, he never 
actually tells us what student engagement is. The purpose of his book, he states, is “to 
create a pragmatic nuts-and-bolts guide that will help teachers from and discipline design 
interest-provoking writing and critical thinking activities” (p. xi). He further argues that 
writing assignments must be both challenging and “interesting” if teachers intend to 
“engage students in a sometimes transforming intellectual experience” (xiii). It seems, 
then, that interest has something to do with this idea of engagement, as does critical 
thinking and challenge, but how these ideas are incorporated into the broader idea of 
engagement is left untouched. Without firmly establishing what this thing engagement is, 
his book may offer good suggestions for practice, but it is unclear as to how or why these 
suggestions are ultimately “engaging ideas.” 
Shortly after Bean’s publication, Light (2003) released a report on the relationship 
between college writing and student engagement. In his study, he surveyed 365 
undergraduate students, asking about their time commitment to the courses that they were 
taking, the level of intellectual challenge the course offered, and the level of personal 
engagement to the course (although he does not mention this explicitly, we see shades of 
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the behavioral, cognitive, and affective dimensions of engagement, respectively, in these 
three questions). He found that when students are assigned more writing, they spend 
more time on the class and feel a greater level of personal engagement with that class. If 
engagement is strictly seen as time on task, then this would be telling, however it does 
not tell us anything about whether or not students embrace the writing that they are doing 
or what they learn through writing. While Light notes that students write more when they 
are interested in what they are writing about, the bulk of his article focuses on the amount 
of writing that students do. Further, we might expect courses that assign more writing to 
be more challenging, upper division courses. If this is the case, it is likely that students 
already had a vested interest in the course, and thus personal engagement, and happened 
to be assigned more writing as an effect of the course level. Ultimately, he falls into the 
same trap as many educationalists—seeing engaging as a stand-in for “doing,” (in this 
case, “doing writing”) not allowing the term to become as rich or complex as it might.   
Thus far, it would seem that student engagement has simply been taken from 
educational studies by composition, as the same problems with definition and 
measurement appear in composition literature. However, engagement in composition has 
been conceived in a way beyond that of educational literature. Bowen (2005) argues that 
one kind of student engagement is “engagement with the human condition,” engagement 
that brings students closer to understanding the societies and cultures of which they are a 
part. In particular, he notes, the humanities and social sciences adopt this view of 
engagement. Certainly, composition studies has adopted this view of engagement. 
Indeed, roughly half of results for the term “engagement” in the CompPile database 
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(there are currently 89 articles) returns results that refer to “civic,” “political” or 
“community engagement.” 
An excellent example of such community engagement is Rose and Weiser’s 
(2010) Going Public, an edited volume that describes ways that the composition 
curriculum might more readily offer students community engagement opportunities. Rose 
and Weiser align themselves with a report from the Kellogg Foundation which describes 
engagement as a function of institutions that have “redesigned their teaching, research, 
and extension and service functions to become even more sympathetically and 
productively involved with their communities, however community may be defined” (p. 
9). According to this report, the engaged university should strive for three goals: 
1. It must be organized to respond to the needs of today’s students and 
tomorrow’s, not yesterday’s.  
2. It must enrich students’ experiences by bringing research and 
engagement into the curriculum and offering practical opportunities for 
students to prepare for the world they will enter.  
3. It must put its critical resources (knowledge and expertise) to work on 
the problems the communities it serves face. (p. 10).  
This is a rather different conception of engagement from the NSSE (2013), and Rose and 
Weiser are aware of this. In fact, they ultimately reject the NSSE definition of student 
engagement, suggesting that under that model, it becomes simply a tool to academic 
success, whereas their own definition of community engagement “philosophically… 
becomes an underlying principle of higher education, not simply a contribution to student 
success” (p. 2). Thus, in Rose and Weiser’s conception of engagement, there is a degree 
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of deviation from the various ways that it has been conceived in educational studies, and 
this deviation seems to have taken hold in compositions studies. 
Genealogy in Composition: A Gap in the Literature 
 Despite my protestations against the term “student engagement,” it cannot be 
denied that it is a term often used in educational and composition literature. If 
engagement is so poorly operationalized that it tells us nothing, as I argue, then the next 
question is “how has it come to be used so ubiquitously?” I propose to develop a 
Foucauldian genealogy of student engagement in composition studies. To date, I could 
find neither a history of engagement nor a Foucauldian genealogy in college composition 
studies. Even so, Licastro, Miller, and Belli (2016) argue that “we are currently in the 
midst of a kairotic moment in the history of writing studies, when we have both the living 
memory of the field’s development and the technological memory to gather and query 
large amounts of information” (n.p). As such, they suggest that the time is ripe for a 
genealogy of writing studies, although their use of genealogy differs from that of 
Foucault. They see genealogy as a kind of family tree, one that traces academic 
relationships within the writing studies discipline. The purpose of their “writing studies 
tree” is to trace a direct lineage of the field, to determine what figures in the field were 
influential in moving writing studies into its present moment and to articulate how these 
figures had influence. This project differs drastically from a Foucauldian inspired 
genealogy, both in purpose and epistemology. For instance, Licastro et al. do not move 
outside of the discipline of writing studies to trace the emergence of the field; they are 
more interested in how scholars within writing studies have influenced each other and 
passed on ideas. Additionally, there is no discussion of power dynamics in their writing 
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studies tree. While I describe Foucauldian genealogy in greater depth in chapter three of 
this study, it suffices to say that such an examination of power as well as a broader focus 
are necessary in Foucauldian genealogy.  
 This is not to say that some histories in composition do not, at least to some 
degree, draw upon Foucault. Goggin (2000), for instance, invokes Foucault in her history 
of the professionalization of composition when she asks “who is speaking?” (p. 147). Her 
book is a history of the silencing and reemergence of composition studies, examining 
what forces led to composition and rhetoric becoming a discipline in its own right, 
beyond the limited freshman English class. Her book certainly draws upon a Foucauldian 
epistemology, and she comes closer to a Foucauldian genealogy than most works in 
composition studies, although she does not refer to it as such. She acknowledges that 
“disciplines are social products, born of political struggles for both intellectual and 
material spaces” (p. xxi). Goggin further recognizes various ideological forces and sites 
of knowledge production that have shaped composition studies into its present form, 
citing the formation of committees, conferences, and scholarly journals as manifestations 
of such forces. Additionally, she notes that historians of the field hold similar power, 
referring to them as “discipliniographers,” those who write the discipline. These are 
certainly ideas that Foucault would agree with. However, the only mention of genealogy 
in her work is used in a similar way to Licastro et al. (2016). Goggin notes that journal 
editors are networked, often advisees of previous journal editors. She suggests that a clear 
lineage of editorship helps to build a “genealogy of the discipline” (p. 153). However her 
use of the term “genealogy” does not harness the full force of disciplinary power 
dynamics and “unearthing” that Foucault would strive for in his own genealogies. 
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Instead, her genealogy refers to a kind of person-based lineage and suggests a kind of 
top-down, hegemonic reproduction.  
Goggin (2000) is not the only historian of composition to acknowledge Foucault 
when developing a history of the discipline. Hawk also uses Foucault in his counter-
history of composition (aptly titled A Counter-History of Composition). Hawk’s primary 
contention in his counter-history is with the idea of vitalism in composition, and while he 
does not set out to establish a new episteme, he offers a “counter” conceptualization of 
the idea. He argues that vitalism has been historically misread in composition, being 
thought of as an individual, autonomous, internal drive for invention. While composition 
prides itself in complexity, he argues that vitalism is not an essentialist concept, and 
should be brought back to composition from a lens of complexity; he sees vitalism not as 
a possession or inherent trait of an individual, but as a relation between agent and 
ecology: “humans combine with many… elements in the environment to create 
conditions of possibility that suggest potential futures” (p. 172). He uses Foucault as a 
way to suggest that is argument is not groundbreaking or, itself, an autonomous 
construction. Rather, it is an extension of an already existing episteme, that of the 
modern, which sees vitalism as a constellation of abstraction that give life to non-life, a 
“fundamental co-productive relationship that produces a new [Modern] epistemic 
constellation” (p. 135). Such a constellation of the complex and abstract, he argues, is a 
productive way to see rhetorical creation.  
 Hawk’s (2007) work falls much more comfortably into a “counter-history” than a 
genealogy. It does not explore power relations or talk across discourses. Even so, he pays 
homage to the Foucauldian idea of the Foucauldian episteme, and uses Foucault to build a 
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historical understanding of the idea of vitalism in composition. The final, and perhaps 
most notable composition theorist to invoke Foucault in a history of composition is James 
Berlin (1987). Berlin refers to Foucault in his history of American writing instruction 
between 1900 and 1985. In his first chapter, Berlin recognizes his own subjectivity or 
“terministic screen” from which he writes his history. He further acknowledges his 
indebtedness to “Foucault's discussion of the relationship between knowledge and power 
in discourse communities, and of the role of discursive and nondiscursive practices in 
shaving consciousness within these communities.” (p. 18). Despite the fact that he 
describes Foucault as an influence, Berlin’s history is fairly linear, and draws primarily 
from major journals in the field. The history itself is not particularly Foucauldian.  
 It seems, then, that while histories of composition might borrow from Foucault—
indeed, they may even be Foucauldian in spirit—they fall sort of being Foucauldian 
genealogies. In general, there is little attention paid to student subjects in histories of 
composition. Thus, perhaps Licastro et al. (2016) are correct when they claim that the 
time is right for a genealogy in composition. In the section that follows, I develop the 
driving research questions of the present study, describe a Foucauldian genealogy, and 
lay out a plan of action for a genealogy of engagement in composition studies.  
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Method 
 
To do the work of better understanding the “why?” of student engagement in 
composition or, perhaps to be more precise, the “how come?” I have developed a 
Foucualdian genealogy. Genealogy is an historical method of understanding a 
phenomenon. In this section, I describe what genealogy is, providing an overview of the 
aims of genealogy as a method. I then broadly describe how one might perform a 
genealogy, focusing specifically on the techniques that Foucault employed in his own 
genealogical analytic, and, using this description, close this chapter by laying out how I 
plan to achieve my genealogy of engagement. I begin, however, with my research 
questions and a brief justification for choosing genealogy as my approach. 
Research questions  
The major guiding questions of this research are: 
1.     How have practices associated with student engagement come to be 
privileged in the present moment? 
2.     How have practices of engagement in the freshman college 
composition course worked to produce a compositional subject? 
3.     How has a history of the present of the practices of engagement come 
to be used particularly in the discipline of composition studies, with 
attention to pedagogical considerations for students and teachers? 
4.     What does a history of engagement tell us about the schooled subject 
in the present moment? 
These questions immediately lend themselves to an historical analysis. In 
particular, they invite a “history of the present” (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 30), or a 
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genealogical approach. All of these questions require us to look at the present 
manifestations of student engagement and to trace backwards, through history, the ever 
shifting factors that have contributed to its development into the present. According to 
Prado (1995), a genealogical approach helps us to answer “how and why we hold some 
things true, how and why we deem some things knowledge, and how and why we 
consider some procedures rational and others not (p. 10). Moreover, Prado describes 
genealogy as “concerned with how the development of discursive practices and 
interactive conventions produce truth and knowledge and so shape and define subjects 
and subjectivity” (p. 11), as well as how “truth” is historically contingent upon “the 
conglomeration of blind forces” (p.40). In the case of my own research, a genealogical 
approach may be used to understand the trajectory of this thing, student engagement, 
illuminating how/why it has come to be understood as a pedagogical value, a kind of 
producing power/knowledge tied to various artifacts and subjects, including the 
successful-student subject, the engaging-professor subject, assignments, lesson plans, and 
even nationally prevalent institutional analyses such as the NSSE. 
Genealogy: An Overview of Foucault and his Analytic 
Foucauldian genealogy differs radically from other common forms of history, 
including empirical accounts, progressivist, Whig accounts, or Marxist accounts of 
history (I address this more fully in the “epistemology/historiography” subsection).  is 
rooted in Nietzschean philosophy (Foucault, 1983; Garland, 2014; Koopman, 2013; 
Prado, 1995). In Genealogy of Morals (1956), Nietzsche explains his beliefs of historical 
evolution: 
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The actual causes of a thing’s origin and its eventual uses, the manner of 
its incorporation into a system of purposes, are worlds apart; that 
everything exists, no matter what its origin, is periodically reinterpreted by 
those in power in terms of fresh intentions; that all processes in the 
organic world are processes of outstripping and overcoming, and that, in 
turn, all outstripping and overcoming means reinterpretation, 
rearrangement, in the course of which the earlier meaning and purpose are 
necessarily either obscured or lost (p. 209).  
Here, Nietzsche suggests that genealogy is not a history of any particular phenomenon, 
per se (I use the term phenomenon here not to suggest a phenomenological approach of 
study, but simply to indicate an item of investigation). A genealogical history, rather, 
examines how a phenomenon is intersected with, acted upon, and appropriated by various 
discourses over the course of history. A “history of the present,” then, is one that 
examines how a phenomenon developed into its current state as it came to use within 
various socio-political discourses, and how it was influenced by/influenced those 
discourses based on the ever-changing powers and knowledges that existed within those 
discourses. In the words of Visker (1995), a genealogy “does not shed light on the past 
from the present, but rather illuminates the present from the past” (p. 12). 
 However, Foucault suggests that his understanding of genealogy differs from 
Nietzsche’s in that he sees genealogy as both a move to problematize current practices 
and to trace the very history of the ways that problems have been conceived (Foucault, 
1983). Nietzsche, he claims, saw history too statically, attributing ethical movements too 
linearly to Christian influences, not examining in depth the problems that Christianity 
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developed too address and the larger social influences that colluded for Christianity to 
emerge in the way that it did. Despite Nietzsche’s influences for Foucault, his approach 
falls into one of Foucault’s (1984a) larger critiques of historical methods: that history is 
dissociative, it “severs its connection to memory, its metaphysical and anthropological 
model, and constructs a countermemory” (p. 93), attempting to create a view of history 
that claims to be divorced from personal interpretation and the historian’s subjectivity. 
This view creates a division between “types” of genealogy, which Koopman (2009; 
2013) further develops. Nietzsche’s genealogical approach was subversive; it acted as a 
way to debunk common practices and values, attempting to show how these values 
became codified but were, in fact, harmful to the human condition. Foucault’s 
genealogies, though potentially subversive, make no overt claims of harm. Rather, 
Foucault genealogies of problematization are driven by a more inquisitive nature, 
attempting to understand what was at work to allow for common practices and beliefs to 
develop. Koopman further identifies a third type of genealogy that is not deeply discussed 
by Foucault, which he refers to as a vindicatory genealogy. Genealogies of vindication 
historically analyze practices and beliefs in order to justify them. My research questions 
are Foucauldian in nature: they invite a problematizing approach to genealogy, as I 
attempt to understand what the concept of student engagement is designed to address and 
how the emergence of student engagement creates its own problems in the 
educational/compositional landscape. 
I am careful not to ask where student engagement began. Rather, I am interested 
in its emergence. For Foucault, there is no demarcated “beginning” of any phenomenon 
under research. The purpose of a genealogy is twofold: genealogy analyzes the 
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emergence of a phenomenon in an effort to understand that phenomenon’s “catalytic 
coming-to-be,” (Prado, 1995) which Foucault (1984a) referred to as “emergence.” 
Genealogy also offers an analysis of descent (Foucault, 1984a), showing the “miscellany 
of [a phenomenon’s] beginnings” (Prado, 1995, p. 36). The analysis of descent shows 
that there is no definitive originating point of any phenomenon—it is an examination of 
“shifts and displacements” rather than a “search for the origin” (Foucault, 1972, p. 203). 
A phenomenon rather emerges as the result of a series of “happy and unhappy accidents 
and coincidences united by interpretation” (Prado, p. 34). In showing how an item has 
emerged as a result of discursive appropriations, accidents, and coincidences, a genealogy 
also shows how that item existed in myriad ways prior to its generally accepted 
beginnings. A useful metaphor is the formation of a star. Stars form in nebulas, which are 
astronomically large clouds of gas, dust, and other particles. Sections of the cloud begin 
to collapse in on themselves as a result of gravitational forces, becoming more dense and 
hot. Eventually, these sections become hot enough to initiate nuclear fusion, and a star is 
born. Now, it is simple to say that the star formed once fusion began, however, the 
elements (gases and particles) of the star were present long before the star’s inception, 
working upon one another in minute yet important ways. If the star represents a 
phenomenon under investigation, a genealogy seeks to show how the particles existed 
prior to the star’s inception (analysis of descent) and how the particles moved and 
combined to contribute to the formation of the star (analysis of emergence). Important to 
note is that even when undergoing genealogical analysis, there is no zero-point of a 
phenomenon (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Foucault, 1984a; Garland, 2014; Prado, 1995); 
in the star metaphor, even the nebula predates itself, forming as a result of countless 
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cosmic forces, including gravitational pulls, other stars being born, and other stars dying. 
In sum, a major assumption in genealogical analysis is that nothing ever simply 
appears—the existence of any phenomenon is always the result of some combination of 
constituting forces and items that existed before it.   
I earlier felt the need to note that when using the word “phenomenon,” I did not 
mean to imply a phenomenological investigation, but simply an item for study. To further 
differentiate, I believe it necessary to describe Foucault’s relationship with 
phenomenology and hermeneutics. Indeed, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) suggest that to 
truly understand Foucault, it is important to   “pin down precisely” these philosophical 
branches (p. xix). Beginning with the idea of phenomenology, despite himself often using 
the term “phenomenon” (much in the way that I do—as an object of study), Foucault 
(1966/1989) clearly sees it as an inadequate philosophy, especially Husserlean 
phenomenology: “if there is one approach that I do reject, however, it is that (one might 
call it, broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach) which gives absolute priority 
to the observing subject, … which, in short, leads to a transcendental consciousness” (p. 
xv). For Foucault, as we shall see, the observing subject has no primacy or agency. 
Rather, the analysis should rest in why the subject observes as it does, why the observing 
subject is what it is. In phenomenology, there is a true meaning within objects under the 
subject’s observation, one that is interpreted through this transcendental consciousness. 
History may be treated this way as well, as an empirical and transcendental, if still 
interpreted, object of study. Foucault’s project is to “free history from the grip of 
phenomenology” rather than to establish a continuity, a story of origins, a true meaning 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 203)As the idea of phenomenology emerged into the 20th century and 
  
50 
 
was taken up by Heidegger, we see some consideration of one’s cultural and historical 
position as affecting one’s ability to interpret and give meaning to the phenomena around 
them; this becomes Heidegger’s brand of hermeneutics (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).  
While Heidegger gives credit to contextual factors in determining the subject’s 
capacity to and way of observing, he suggests that an analysis of these factors in toto is 
not possible; that is, such contextual factors “form a background which can never be 
made completely explicit, and so cannot be understood in terms of the beliefs of a 
meaning-giving subject” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. xxi). However, we may still 
attempt to the meaning that we ascribe to these factors, or as Foucault (1972) puts it, 
“[rediscovering] what is expressed in them” (p. 162). Foucault further (1966/1989) calls 
hermeneutics “the totality of the learning and skills that enable one to make the signs 
speak and to discover their meaning” (p. 33). The problem with such an analysis for 
Foucault is that it is, for lack of a better term, too anodyne. Further, it does not take into 
account the reason that certain backgrounds and practices produce the meaning that they 
do. Within hermeneutics, the problem is similar to that of phenomenology; the social 
world which comprises meaning is taken for granted, as a simple and neutral backdrop 
upon or through which we develop meaning making habits. For Foucault, the social is not 
take for granted; instead, his genealogical analysis is concerned with what allows the 
conditions for meaning to be constructed in the way that it is, with what allows a social 
world to emerge in such and such a fashion. His is not a philosophy of meaning implicit 
in phenomena and actions, but a philosophy of why certain meanings are understood as 
existing in phenomena and actions in the first place.  
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Power/Knowledge 
One of the larges factors that shows us the difference between Foucault and his 
phenomenological/hermeneutic predecessors is his interest in power. Indeed, one of the 
major points (perhaps the primary point!) of genealogy is to examine the forces, or 
powers, that allowed a particular phenomenon under investigation to emerge in the 
particular way that it does (Foucault, 1976/1978), especially at the level of the institution 
(Foucault, 1982). As Foucault states, a genealogy is “the ‘how’ of power” (Foucault, 
2003, p. 23). He has further stated that every one of his questions regarding the social 
sciences might be boiled down to two words: power and knowledge (Foucault, 1980, p. 
109). Power in the Foucauldian sense is not simply domination—not a “group of 
institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given 
state… [or] a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the 
rule” (Foucault, 1976/1978, p. 92). Instead, power exists in terms of relations between 
entities, as well as ways of knowing, that is, knowledge about something (Foucault, 
1976/1978; Foucault, 2003; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). This is why Foucault often 
combines power and knowledge as a single entity. Indeed, in Discipline and Punish, he 
argues that “we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that 
knowledge can exist only where power relations are suspended” (1995/1977, p. 27) They 
exist in a circular relationship, power leading to particular ways of thinking, and 
knowledge creating normalized practices. Prado (1995) describes the tracking of subtle 
power relations specifically as being central to the genealogical conception of history, 
more so that major events such as battles, elections, or assassinations—those events in 
history that are most apparent. Such major events, Foucault would argue, are 
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crystallizations of larger, already-instantiated forms of power/knowledge in play. Instead 
of focusing on the apparent in history, the genealogist looks for smaller, particular 
moments in history that suggest new trajectories for extant power structures or nuanced 
shifts in power relations.  
Foucault further elaborates on the ways that power/knowledge exists, particularly 
within the social sciences. He states that there is consistent historical discontinuity within 
them, creating different and often conflicting regimes of “truth” as they develop 
(Foucault, 1980). Examining these regimes of truth requires examining what governs the 
movements in what counts as knowledge within these disciplines. However, when 
referring to this concept of government, he does not refer to a particular ruler or position 
that designates knowledge within a field: it is “not so much a matter of knowing what 
external power imposes itself on a science, as of what effects of power circulate among 
scientific statements, what constitutes their internal regime of power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 
112). Within the social sciences, there is a perpetual battle occurring over what should 
constitute the best methods, the correct knowledge, the truth. As certain knowledges 
emerge and take on the veneer of truth, they become the guiding principles within a 
discipline.  
But why the social sciences? One of Foucault’s major criticisms was the 
developing science of the human being, or the concept that the human could be 
understood empirically (Paden, 1987). The human sciences for Foucault differ from other 
sciences. Physical sciences have existed a priori, regardless of human beings’ presence or 
interest (Foucault, 1966/1989; 1980). However, the concept of “man” (as Foucault uses 
it) is not an a priori; it has only existed since humans have been interested in the social 
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and psychological aspects of humans and a need to understand those aspects: “the 
emergence of the human sciences was occasioned by a problem, a requirement, an 
obstacle of a theoretical or practical order” (Foucault, 1966/1989, p. 376). And we 
certainly see the concept of the human changing under different orders of humanism, 
from the concept of the human during the Enlightenment, to the concept of the human 
within religion, to the concept of the human within Marxist readings (Foucault, 1984a). 
In this way, humanism and the human, just as other social phenomenon, are subject to 
change given changes in times, discourses, and conceptions of truth. Foucault 
(1966/1989) contends that this study of the human is a fairly recent invention, being “no 
more than a kind of rift in the order of things, or, in any case, a configuration whose 
outlines are determined by the new position [the human] has so recently taken up in the 
field of knowledge” (p. xxv). Foucault takes comfort in the idea that this particular 
conception of humanity “will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a 
new form” (p. xxv). 
However, human sciences attempt to provide an empirical, timeless examination 
of the human being, as though such examinations are not temporally, contextually 
motivated, despite the fact that, for instance, the concept of what determined insanity 
changes several times over the course of the last three centuries (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1983; Foucault, 1965/1988; Foucault, 2006). This is the issue with labelling the study of 
humanity a science. Science carries the veneer of truth with it, and thus ascribes a power 
to any study that may call itself a science. The human sciences may then forget their 
deeply contextual roles, seeing “truth” as a universal and fixed matter. Foucault (2006) 
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personifies human sciences, providing a voice which characterizes their relationship with 
truth and power. In short, a human science need not concern itself with truth because it is  
…already a science. And if, as science, I have the right to question what I 
say, if it is true that I may make mistakes, it is in any case up to me, and to 
me alone, as science, to decide if what I say is true or to correct the 
mistake. I am the possessor, if not of truth in its content, at least of all the 
criteria of truth. Furthermore, because, as scientific knowledge, I thereby 
possess the criteria of verification and truth, I can attach myself to reality 
and its power and impose upon … bodies the surplus-power that I give to 
reality. I am the surplus power of reality inasmuch as I possess, by myself 
and definitively, something that is the truth… (p. 134).  
By calling these studies “sciences,” we agree that they represent some kind of truth, or at 
least a kind of knowledge that is true, and they are then allowed powers to classify, to 
diagnose, to investigate, to cure, what have you. However, as a science, studies of 
humanities also exclude other kinds of knowledge. It is by the science’s own standard 
that something is true or false. Thus, any way of knowing that does not follow the 
science’s standard of verification becomes understood as a non-knowledge.   
As we begin to look at knowledges that take pre-eminence over others (I will 
address “subjugated knowledges” later in this piece), it is important to note that Foucault 
further differentiates between two types of knowledge: savoir and connaissance. He 
states that connaissance is “the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules 
that govern it” whereas “savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular 
period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that 
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enunciation to be formulated” (Foucault, 1972, p. 15). He typically uses disciplinary 
knowledge, especially those in the sciences, to describe connaissance. For instance, we 
know that the earth circles the sun. However, it took a shift in a broader way of 
thinking—one which did not rely on God to prescribe a terracentric universe—to 
reconceptualize planetary movements and positions. In fact, there was no question 
(indeed, we were not allowed to question) the truth of a terracentric universe as long as 
humans were the pride and joy of all of God’s creations. It took a gradual change in a 
broader kind of knowledge (savoir), one that allowed us to reconstruct the way that 
science was performed, to allow us to rethink disciplinary beliefs about gravity, the solar 
system, and Earth’s place in the broader scheme of things (connaissance). While the two 
kinds of knowledge go hand in hand, connaissance cannot exist without a some savoir to 
situate it, and it is savoir, the “domain in which the subject is necessarily situated and 
dependent, and can never figure as titular (either as a transcendental activity, or as 
empirical consciousness)” in which Foucauldian history “finds the point of balance of its 
analysis” (Foucault, 1984, p. 183). While a genealogy may investigate instances of 
connaissance, it is in the service of determining what larger structures were in play at a 
given time, what general, normalized structures of knowledge (savoir) allowed specific 
instances of knowledge (connaissance) to emerge. How,  do we know when we have 
found instantiations of power in the Foucauldian sense? Rather than examining major 
historical events, we find power hidden in “dispositions, manoeuvers, tactics, techniques, 
functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, 
in activity” (Foucault, 1995/1977, p. 26). Power is not a thing to be held or possessed: 
“power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
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endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a 
particular society” (Foucault, 1976/1978, p. 93)Rather, we might think of it as what binds 
different relations together, the playing field under which actions between players are 
executed. Foucault (1976/1978) describes power as 
“the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, 
through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or 
reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one 
another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the 
disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and 
lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or 
institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the 
formulation of the law, in various social hegemonies. (p. 92-93) 
We see power crystalized in hierarchical relationships, however its fluid form is exposed 
during usurpations, discourses coalescing or dividing, relationships being renegotiated, 
and vocabulary developing, taking on new meanings as various institutions or 
governments change meanings within discourses, within the relationships and actions that 
occur between entities, institutions, and competing/converging discourses. These events 
are moments in history that suggest points where ways of knowing begin to shift, creating 
specifically shifts in conceptions of the genealogical phenomenon under investigation 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Prado, 1995). Further, no phenomenon exists outside of 
some sort of power/knowledge: “There is no escaping from power… it is always already 
present, constituting that very thing which one attempts to counter it with” (Foucault, 
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1976/1978, p. 82). One form of power/knowledge might have a corresponding counter-
power/knowledge, but the even when paradigm shifts occur, they only represent one way 
of knowing and believing being trumped by another: out with the old power, in with the 
new.  With all of this in mind, it becomes possible to discuss technologies of power and 
governmentality. For Foucault, power is always exercised intentionally. In A History of 
Sexuality (1976/1978), he describes the how sexuality has been repressed via broad 
“defenses, censorships, and denials,” which are all “component parts that have a local and 
tactical role to play in a transformation into discourse, a technology of power, and a will 
to knowledge that are far from being reducible to the former (p. 12, emphasis mine). He 
uses this term again in Discipline and Punish (1977/1995); Foucault explains that prison 
revolts have occurred for seemingly contradictory reasons depending on what was 
occurring within prisons at a given time: revolts happened for overcrowding as well as 
isolation practices, for corporal punishment as well as psychological therapy, both 
because prisoners were ignored and receiving too much attention. The issue at hand, the 
one which leads to revolt, is then not any one specific practice, but punishment in 
general, the “very materiality as an instrument and vector of power; it is this whole 
technology of power over the body that the technology of the ‘soul’… [which] fails either 
to conceal or to compensate, for the simple reason that it is one of its tools” (p. 30, 
emphasis mine). Finally, Foucault (1988a) states that technologies of power “determine 
the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an 
objectivizing of the subject” (p. 18).  Based on his examples, we might say that 
technologies of power are the combined efforts of different strategies and techniques 
designed to produce in individuals a normalized way of thinking and behaving, whether 
  
58 
 
that be a secrecy and modesty surrounding the idea of sex, or disciplined subservience in 
prisoners. A technology of power is not any one activity or specific technique, but an idea 
which justifies various, potentially even competing strategies or techniques, to reach a 
particular end, namely that of producing a specific kind of subject.  
 Guiding the creation of technologies of power is the concept of governmentality, 
which Foucault describes as both the “ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political 
economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument” (Foucault, 1978, p. 144), as well as “the tendency, the line of 
force,” that leads to a governmental power which can then develop technologies of power 
and guide the creation of savoir. Governmentality is the playing field, the way of 
thinking, the normalized rules and procedures that a government produces. We should not 
think of government simply as those in an overt political position, however. Referring to 
it as a complex ensemble of institutions certainly implies that a more traditional 
government (i.e. legislators, judiciary members, political executives) may help to develop 
these political technologies and knowledges (savoir), but it does so in concert with other 
disciplines as actors as well, including psychology, education, medicine, and so on. These 
institutions establish the bounds of normalcy, that which is sayable, knowable, and 
doable for those subjects who are governed. Once normalcy is established, once we 
“know” what behaviors are correct or incorrect, what will make us more or less secure, it 
becomes possible to designate those who fall within the norm and without, those who are 
“dangerous” to the system as it stand, those who are criminal, those who must be 
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corrected or put away for the security of the government but also for the security of the 
individuals that comprise our population more generally.  
A final note on the idea of power is that Foucault describes his take on power as 
an analysis rather than a theory (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). We might refer to it as a 
“living theory” of power. Foucault encourages us to “move less toward a ‘theory’ of 
power than toward an "analytics" of power: that is, toward a definition of the specific 
domain formed by relations of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that 
will make possible its analysis” (Foucault, 1976/1978, p. 82). Thus, just as a history is a 
fiction born of the historian’s own subjectivity, so is this analytic situated within the 
genealogist’s world, designed to analyze the movements of power as they appear to the 
genealogist. To be clear: there is no concern for replicability within genealogy. It is a 
highly personalized take on history, and each genealogy will differ based upon each 
genealogist’s subject positions.  
Subject Production 
 But what is meant, exactly, by one’s subject position? Foucault, as much as he is 
interested in power/knowledge and ideas, behaviors, attitudes, etc. that become 
naturalized, is also interested in the ways that power can “transform human beings into 
subjects” (1982, p. 777) (although none of these topics are completely isolated from one 
another). Much of his genealogical analysis focuses on “procedures, which no doubt exist 
in every civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their 
identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through 
relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge” (Foucault, 1994, p. 87). For Foucault, as 
discourses gain or lose legitimacy in line with extant epistemes and government 
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rationalities—as they become sciences—they establish that which is “normal” in terms of 
thought and action. As individuals think and act, it becomes possible to classify them into 
type, or a “scientific objectification” (Foucault, 1977/1995 p. 101). As individuals are 
subject to a “scientific” system, they become potential objects of study—and within this 
objectification is the production of a composite of beliefs about this object, a composite 
that comprises the subject. Foucault (1994) suggests that Madness and Civilization 
(1965/1988) act as prime examples of this. As psychology emerges as a mode of 
explanation, a “human science,” it begins to create a view which allows for specific 
divisions between the mad and nonmad, and within the mad category, we fined even 
more specific ways of diagnosing madness. Beyond creating divisions, however, this also 
creates a desired way of being within those subjected to these forms of power/knowledge. 
Thus, we also see the creation of roles designed to help others attain a status of normalcy, 
including institutions, therapists, doctors, and counsellors. There is no autonomous 
subject that exists outside the governmental designs which produce the subject—even 
when we self fashion, begin a project of knowing the self or try to better the self—it is 
within a constrained system that has always already determined how one should better or 
what is important to know about oneself (Foucault, 1994).  
Further, it is important to note that the designation “subject” by no means refers to 
a fixed identity (Foucault, 1994). When shifts in power/knowledge occur, different kinds 
of subjects are produced. We see this playing out in certain roles (e.g. prisoners, guards) 
described in Discipline and Punish (1977/1995). For instance, when certain knowledge is 
developed about what causes a criminal to break the law (e.g. nature, a “bad” soul, 
education, upbringing, personal need, personal desire), it changes the way that a criminal 
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is understood. The criminal is now a new kind of subject in the eyes of the penal system. 
However, this means that the role of the system, including other subjects in the system, 
such as police, judges, juries, or guards, must change in relationship to the prisoner. A 
penal system that adopts a psychological lens must begin to include therapists, 
psychologists, and a different mode of rehabilitation than one based on simply punishing 
criminals. New figures gain legitimacy and power when the discourse—knowledge 
surrounding/about a subject/topic shifts. In this new system, and psychologist may have 
more power than a guard, and the guard’s initial powerful role, that of physical 
disciplinarian, may be reduced to one of intimidator and peacekeeper. The guard may 
even begin to take orders from the psychologist when beforehand, the guard was able to 
act with less direction from higher figures. At the same time, the guard may find other 
ways to maintain the power that is lost in a penal system based on criminal psychology, 
perhaps by abusing prisoners when no one is watching, perhaps by quitting the guarding 
job, or perhaps by finding some new form of empowerment outside of work. Here, the 
point is that power circulates and changes as new knowledges develop, and this affects a 
various networks of individuals (subjects) as they are complicit in the system(s) that 
produce their subjectivity. 
 As such, an analysis of power/knowledge is not complete without determining 
how and where power is directed (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Foucault, 1984a; Foucault, 
2003): what kinds of relations between entities does power produce, how are individuals 
made into certain kinds of subjects within power systems, and what kinds of knowledge 
circulates around/about those subjects? Just as Foucault (1976/1978) claimed in The 
History of Sexuality that a genealogy tracks power relations, he also claims in “The 
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Subject and Power” (1982) that his project “has been to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (p. 777). In this work, 
he claims that subjects exist in two overlapping ways:  “subject to someone else by 
control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. 
Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to” (p. 781). 
Sometimes, subjectivities are thrust upon us, in the way that a criminal becomes a 
prisoner after a series of institutional happenings that define one as a prisoner. The 
prisoner takes on the role of the prisoner as one subjected to the prison system, outside of 
personal control. In this way, subjects are “caught up in a system of subjection” 
(Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 26). The prisoner may rail against this identifier, but the fact is 
that a system of rules of practice identify the prisoner as such. Ideally, under the 
governing system that defines “prisoner” in one way or another, the prisoner will fall in 
line by taking on the role of prisoner, behaving and believing in the way that knowledge 
prescribes a prisoner should, just as those prisoner-subjects in Zimbardo’s notorious 
Stanford prison simulation. 
On the other hand, the prison guard elects to be a guard, and may have personal 
investment in identifying as a guard. The guard is not outside of the systems of 
power/knowledge that determine the subjectivity of a guard—the guard is taught to think 
about the job in a particular way, about prisoners in a particular way, about the role of the 
penal system in a particular way (indeed, this discourse may well have been at work on 
this guard before ever taking the job; certainly, other connected examples of 
power/knowledge were to merit the guard’s taking of the position)—and in this way the 
guard is still subject to a system; however, the guard has not likely been physically 
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coerced into becoming a guard, opting instead to be willingly (proudly!) subjectified by 
the system. This subjectivity is internalized by the subject. Regardless of whether one 
opts to be subjected to/in a system of practice or one is coerced into that system, 
subjectivity is connected to power/knowledge in that knowledges about individuals 
produce those individuals: how a criminal should become a prisoner, how a guard is 
supposed to act and be as a guard. Ultimately, power “[disciplines] individuals to believe 
themselves to be persons having a certain nature” (Prado, 1995, p. 88). The correct ways 
of acting, as prisoner, guard, or any other subject position, become habituated knowledge. 
Genealogy examines how power/knowledge constitutes the subjectivities of those 
entangled in certain discourses, all the while examining how that power/knowledge has 
historically fluctuated, causing the subjectivities of those acted upon by such 
power/knowledge to, in turn, fluctuate. In looking at a phenomenon, genealogy does not 
simply examine at how power fluctuates and comes to be; it also examines who is 
affected in what ways by those power fluctuations.  
An important point to make here is that power, in the Foucauldian sense, is not 
hierarchical; it is not a tool that some (the powerful/rich) necessarily hold over others (the 
weak/poor) as in Marxist philosophy, although individuals can use power to gain 
leverage over others at certain times. Power (and the knowledge that guides and is guided 
by power) emerges as various discourses develop to create new ways of understanding in 
the world. At any moment, a change in cultural or political knowledge, or the episteme, 
may delegitimize some positions, such as the guard, while legitimizing other positions, 
such as the prison psychologist. Further, in Foucauldian theory, power is not seen as a 
negative, entity; on the contrary, power produces. Power produces knowledge and 
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subjects, but this is not necessarily the result of a select few conspiring to maintain 
power, as in Marxism (Prado, 1995). Power may be used sympathetically, with the best 
of intentions, as in the case of changing the penal system from one of punishment to one 
of reform. The important point to note is that knowledge and subjective creation is simply 
a byproduct of power, however it may be used.  
While genealogy offers a social critique, it is not set for or against a particular 
phenomenon (Koopman, 2013). A genealogy simply describes. The reason this is 
important for Foucault is that while power is neither inherently good nor bad, power is 
always potentially dangerous (Garland, 2014; Foucault, 1980). As much as it produces, it 
also establishes limits. Power both produces and delimits ways of being in the world. In 
an interview in 1971 (Simon), Foucault suggested that his historical approaches show 
how we are always constrained in our ways of thinking as a result of power/knowledges 
in play. Further, he stated in this interview that such histories helped him to “place 
[him]self at a distance from [systems of knowledge] and to show how one could escape” 
(p. 201). This is not to suggest that Foucault believes that escape is always desirable, and 
he certainly would not say that one can escape from systems of power/knowledge entirely 
(Koopman; Prado, 1995). However, by being aware of what dominant power/knowledge 
structures (epistemes) are in play, we become more aware of alternate ways to think and 
be in the world, and potentially more susceptible to other discourses and modes of 
power/knowledge (Garland, 2014). Power/knowledge and the subjects that emerge 
through extant epistemes are not problematic in themselves; rather, “the problem speaks 
more to the conditions of possibility for being, acting, and thinking in the present than it 
does to any normative judgement about what we are, think, or do” (Koopman, p. 97). 
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My genealogical analysis of student engagement is designed to examine the 
discourses that have apprehended, modified, and made use of the idea of student 
engagement. Further, I seek to understand who has been affected by engagement—that is, 
how subjective roles in composition studies (students, instructors, administrators) have 
shifted in turn with shifting ideas about what it means for students to be engaged. I do not 
see the deployment of engagement necessarily as a strategy to hold power over students 
in a writing class; however, I am curious as to why student engagement became 
perceived as a needed strategy in educational and composition studies to begin with; what 
problem does it serve to solve? Such an analysis will better show us how engagement 
came to be, which, I suggest, will offer much needed perspective on student engagement, 
which is used with abandon in educational and writing studies. This genealogical 
perspective will allows us to gain a better idea of how we might think about the uses of 
student engagement, including the types of subjects it produces. Further, we might place 
some limitations on this term that is at once the end-all-be-all of pedagogy and, I argue as 
a result, meaningless.  
Performing Genealogical Analysis 
 Herein, I highlight a number of “moves” common to Foucault’s genealogical 
works in an effort to better describe how a genealogy might be performed. Much of these 
moves come from The History of Sexuality (1976/1978) one of Foucault’s few works that 
provides a “method” chapter. Afterward, I suggest ways that these moves may be 
included in my own analysis of student engagement. 
Epistemology/Historiography. Foucauldian history differs radically from other 
common forms of history, including empirical accounts, progressivist, Whig accounts, or 
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Marxist accounts of history. To begin to understand Foucault’s conception of history, I 
contrast his approach to these major conceptions of history. For instance, an empirical 
approach to historical analysis rests on the assumption that certain truths exist throughout 
history; by linearly studying and laying out those truths, one can create a true account of 
what occurred in history (Green & Troup, 1999). Foucault on the other hand, would 
claim that there is no access to truth—all “brute reality” is subject to human 
interpretations. The belief that there is a “truth” to be accessed in history is, itself, a result 
of power/knowledge at work, various discursive regimes that have shaped subjects to 
believe in a truth and inform the way that an empirical historicist might approach doing 
history. Foucault (1980b; 1984a) himself has suggested that genealogy must be set 
against the scientific methods that have established themselves as dominant and powerful 
discourses. As such, genealogy cannot operate under the same epistemological 
assumptions as positivistic, empirical approaches that parse out a “true” history; for 
Foucault, all histories, including his own, are fictions (Foucault, 1979). 
A Whig account of history is one both in search of “both a historical pedigree and 
a political justification” (Macauley, 1968, p. 7) Butterfield (1931) has said of Whig 
history that those who write in its tradition “write on the side of Protestants and Whigs, to 
praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of 
progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the glorification 
of the present” (p. 2). In short, a Whig history is one which seeks to understand history as 
justifying the present, one driven by the idea that at any given point, the present is the 
most progressive outcome of the history that has preceded it. For Foucault, progress is 
replaced with the ideas of discourses and power/knowledge. When we see the resolution 
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of a war, for instance, it does not jettison us into a newly found era of peace and 
enlightenment. Rather,  
Following traditional beliefs, it would be false to think that total war 
exhausts itself in its own contradictions and ends by renouncing violence 
and submitting to civil laws. On the contrary, the law is a calculated and 
relentless pleasure, delight in the promised blood, which permits the 
perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously 
repeated scenes of violence. (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85). 
History, states Foucault (1984a), is a repetition of dominations, one after the other. The 
idea of progress is what takes hold when we see different discourses, different 
conceptions of power/knowledge, different governments bring about apparently new 
laws, ideas, and/or ways of living via domination. We must be careful to note, however, 
that even the idea of domination as Foucault uses it here does not imply complete 
annihilation of one belief over another. It may simply mean that the limits of what might 
be thought and done have changed, have gradually shifted to address newly perceived 
problems as new discourses take precedence over old ones. History may show change, 
but it is the result of which discursive regimes hold weight at a given time—under 
Foucault, change does not occur because progress is inevitable. Change, rather, is the 
result of a confluence of discourses, each with its own notion of “truth,” constantly 
interacting with one another, gaining leverage over others, defining and redefining the 
notion of progress.   
In his critique of progressive accounts of history, Foucault (1984a) states that the 
concept of “class domination generates the idea of liberty” (p. 85). This may initially 
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sound like a Marxist statement; however, in this particular statement, he simply means to 
highlight the fact that a way of thinking (in terms of class domination) creates a certain 
understanding of progress (liberty). While Foucault was interested in analyzing power’s 
machinations through historical readings, he did not see power in the same kind of top-
down structure that Marxists typically did. A Marxist history sees the history of society 
as a struggle for material goods, and “the driving force in Marx’s conception of history 
are classes, which arise from different economic roles in the productive process” (Green 
& Troup, 1999, p. 36). In Marxism, power is determined by those who have the means to 
produce material goods. Foucault (1976/1978) has suggested that historical readings of 
power are too centralized and reductive, stating that “in political thought and analysis, we 
still have not cut off the head of the king” (p. 88-89). Here, the meaning is that we have 
not developed a nuanced view of power, attributing power to individuals and giving it an 
“ownable” property, rather than seeing it as the dynamic and fluid thing of Foucauldian 
theory. While Foucault would not argue that power relations exist where money is 
present, he would certainly reject the idea that it is reducible to monetary ownership and a 
linear hierarchy, ultimately suggesting that another theory of power must be developed if 
we are to do justice to social analysis (1976/1978; 1980a).  
A final school of historical thought that we may contrast to Foucault’s own view 
of history is the Annales School. The Annales school also sought to undermine the 
empirical, positivistic approach to history, seeing history as comprised of all aspects of a 
given society, including its economy, relationship with surrounding geography, as well as 
the visible politics occurring in that society at a given time (Green & Troup, 1999). This 
was a radically different way of conceiving of history, as it moved agency away from 
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human actors to non-humans, such as mountains or the sea, and one that attempted to 
account for a totality of history, divorced from the progressivism of Whigish history or 
the power dynamics associated with Marxist history. However, in the beginning of The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault criticizes the heavy emphasis on the 
structure of history that such a totalizing approach creates, which seeks to create 
definitive periods, unities, and series within history. However, he notes, that such 
periodization is not necessarily reflective of “the great ages of the world, or to the 
periodization dictated by the rise and fall of civilizations; it is the effect of the 
methodologically concerted development of series” (p. 7-8). That history can be totalized 
in the approach of the Annales school of thought and divided into definite historical 
periods is not the way that history necessarily operates or proceeds. Rather, it is the result 
of one method, an approach that insists upon the seriation of history.  
Foucault (1972) notes, however, that a newly emerging approach to history, a 
history of thoughts or different disciplines, begins to suggest that there are ruptures 
within this total approach to history. The history of thought problematizes traditional 
periods, showing where periods have overlap, are overly simplistic, and not necessarily 
linear. When such discontinuities make themselves present, “the theme and the 
possibility of a total history begin to disappear, and we see the emergence of something 
very different that might be called a general history” (p. 9). The purpose of a general 
history, he states: 
is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described 
between these different series; what vertical system they are capable of 
forming; what interplay of correlation and dominance exists between 
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them; what may be the effect of shifts, different temporalities, and various 
rehandlings; in what distinct totalities certain elements may figure 
simultaneously; in short, not only what series, but also what 'series of 
series', or, in other words, what 'tables' it is possible to draw up. A total 
description draws all phenomena around a single centre - a principle, a 
meaning, a spirit, a world-view. An overall shape; a general history, on the 
contrary, would deploy the space of a dispersion. (p. 10)  
Jumping off from the history of the Annales, Foucualt take the concept of seriation and 
suggests that we begin to look for counterpoints to the totalizing narrative of seriation. 
Rather than be satisfied with clear distinctions, we may see where ideas cross over from 
period to period, how they relate to one another, and other ways that we might consider 
stratifying fixed series of history. We must examine the criteria used to create the series 
in the first place, and question what happens to historical seriation if we use different 
criteria from which to measure historical events.  
Foucault, then, radically reconceptualizes the project of history with the concept 
of genealogy. It should be noted, first, that there is no single method of performing 
genealogy. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) refer to it as an “interpretive analytic” rather 
than a method, and they claim that Foucault’s genealogical method “can only be guessed 
at if one uses Foucault's own books as exemplars” (p. 127). It is fair to say, however, that 
genealogy, as far as it can be called a method, differs strongly from an empirically 
“objective” approach to history (Dreyfus & Rabinow; Prado, 1995). To begin 
understanding a genealogical approach, it may help to turn back to the idea that histories 
are fictions (Foucault, 1979a).  What might Foucault mean by this? Certainly, he does not 
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mean that there is no value in doing historical analyses because they amount to nothing 
true. Instead, he means to caution readers of history: because all information is filtered 
through subjective interpretation, there can be no access to an objective truth in history, 
only idiosyncratic, highly situated truths (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). For instance, that 
the French Revolution happened is not a question. However, the amount of focus that it is 
given in history, the cultural significance ascribed to the French Revolution—even the 
choice to highlight it as an important moment in history—is a matter of interpretation, a 
matter of how one chooses to construct, foreground, ignore, and build a meaningful story 
around this historical event. Foucault (1976/1978) refers to this as “the rule of 
immanence;” Speaking of sexuality, he claims that if it “was constituted as an area of 
investigation, this was only because relations of power had established it as a possible 
object… if power was able to take it as a target, this was because techniques of 
knowledge and procedures of discourses were capable of investing it” (p. 98). History is a 
fiction for Foucault because it always involves a commitment to a particular, personal 
invention of the organization of events, informed largely by discourses that have already 
determined what counts as “knowing” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). In the same way that 
a fictional novel is a constructed, potential reality, so too is our understanding of the 
events of history. History is not a series of events for Foucault, but in is words, “a series 
of interpretations” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 151). A close examination of those those 
phenomena that have become “immanent” offers us an understanding of our own 
subjective stances, a history of interpretations, as much as it offers us a history of 
anything else. 
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 Foucault further reconceptualizes history by allowing accidentality to play a role 
in historical shaping. Just as much as “reason” is a reasonable approach to understanding 
history, so too is chance (Foucault, 1984a). Foucault states that his approach to history is 
intended to “cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be 
scrupulously attentive to their petty malice; it will await their emergence, once unmasked, 
as the face of the other” (Foucault, 1984, p. 80). He further says of history 
to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in 
their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute 
deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false 
appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that 
continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being 
does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the 
exteriority of accidents. (p. 81)  
The study of history has thus far attempted to reason out events, attributing specific and 
generally human centered causality to the chronology of the past. According to this 
version of history, what we have now—laws, governance, economic structures, social 
norms and mores—have been carefully crafted for the betterment of humanity (or the 
betterment of some classes of humanity). Due to the deliberate nature of this crafting, 
Western society is the best of all possible worlds. And, since we have invoked the idea of 
the best of all possible worlds, Foucault would call this view of history utterly 
Panglossian. We cannot calculate all that has occurred to create the world of normalcy 
now, and we cannot suggest that every aspect of our history is marked by careful 
planning. Discourses emerge and interact with one another outside of any individual’s 
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control; chance meetings lead to alliances or wars; deeply entrenched beliefs and values 
that drove thought during a particular time period could just has well have been other 
beliefs and values driving thoughts in a different direction. As such, it is impossible to 
account for all of history’s happenings. Indeed, the particularities that we turn attention to 
when doing a history, those accidents that we decide have made history what it is, cannot 
amount to more than one’s circumstantial interpretation, or, as Foucault would have it, a 
fiction.  
What, then, does this mean for genealogical method? Foucault did not provide a 
strict methodology for developing genealogies. Indeed, he left it to researchers to 
determine exactly what it might mean to write a genealogy. In a meeting with Sawicki 
(1991), he implies that genealogy is something one simply does as they attempt to write 
history. When Sawkicki asked about his genealogical method, “He suggested that [she] 
not spend energy talking about him and, instead do what he was doing, namely, write 
genealogies” (p. 15). Implicit in his “advice” to Sawicki is the idea that there is no 
singular method for doing genealogy. This is consistent with his statement that all 
histories are fictions. Just as any historical writing is idiosyncratically aligned 
with/created by the writer’s discursively situated subjectivity, so too is genealogical 
method. Even if Foucault had written a “how to” piece on genealogy, I suspect he would 
argue that even the reading of such a hypothetical step-by-step would inevitably be 
colored by individuals’ readings of it. What we deem worthy of genealogical study, what 
counts as a “problem,” how we understand discourses as interacting with one another 
would still be a matter of subjective interpretation. Thus, there is some degree of futility 
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in developing a “how to” of genealogy. Still there are some general guidelines that may 
be useful to follow when beginning a genealogical analysis.  
Problematizing. Given that history is largely a product of established, dominant ways of 
knowing, the first goal of genealogy is to problematize that which is taken for granted 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Prado, 1995). Foucault (1989) has suggested that 
problematization is central to nearly all of his work. Indeed, in an interview with Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, Foucault (1983) explains that he saw his work as “not the history of 
solutions” but “genealogy of problems, of problematiques (p. 231).Koopman (2013) 
claims that problematization is the cornerstone, or “master concept that ties together the 
other core conceptual elements of [Foucault’s] mature genealogical critique” (p. 132). 
Indeed, problematization may be the first “recognizable” step in beginning a genealogy. 
 However, problematization can take two forms in Foucauldian genealogy. The fist, and 
perhaps easier to recognize of the two, is a kind of deconstruction of an extant 
phenomenon. Foucault describes this type of problematization in a second interview with 
Rabinow, referring to problematization as “the development of a domain of acts, 
practices, and thoughts that seem … to pose problem for politics.” (Foucault, 1998, p. 
383). It is a questioning of the politics that surround one’s topic of investigation, which 
Foucualt suggests politics have never sufficiently answered. One must recognize a form 
of power/knowledge that has taken hold in dominant discourses and begin to explore how 
it emerged, creating questions of emergence: how and why was such and such a 
phenomena able to emerge in the way that it did? This necessarily problematizes that 
phenomenon. The second way that genealogy problematizes, however, is to become a 
history of problematization itself. In a different interview, Foucault explains that in his 
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history of insanity, his driving “question was how and why, at a given moment, madness 
was problematized through a certain institutional practice and a certain apparatus of 
knowledge.”   In the second case, genealogy examines how “emergent practices render 
problematic certain other conceptions that are no longer capable of effectively 
performing the work they once achieved. This is the sense in which an emergent practice 
makes problematic certain other practices” (Koopman, 100). Phenomenon emerge when 
other phenomenon (practices or conceptualizations) become seen as problematic. Each 
emergent practice is built on the negative problematization of a previous practice in the 
name of progress. This is why shifts are able to occur in power/knowledge.  
To perform a genealogy, then, means beginning with a problematization: first, one 
must identify a commonly held, perhaps unquestioned narrative phenomenon produced 
by dominant discourses at a given time period. After identifying a particular phenomenon 
to investigate, one must find an example in history of its emergence: a moment, an event, 
an item. This item allows the genealogy to become manageable—instead of determining 
the history of an abstract idea (be the idea prisons, asylums, or engagement) it is possible 
to use a tangible item or event as a proxy for the idea, an example of a point of 
emergence of the idea. Then, before delving into the history of that narrative, one must 
also determine upon what such a narrative is built. What “problems” were perceived that 
this particular phenomenon was designed to solve? Starting a genealogy means 
identifying narratives, or current conceptualizations of the world, and asking what those 
narratives serve. One must explore the creation of the problem, problematizing how the 
phenomenon under investigation, itself, exists as the antidote to its own problematization. 
In practice, this means examining the uses of the phenomenon under genealogical 
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investigation while bearing in mind that these uses only ever solve what is 
perceived/constructed to be problematic under a particular set of values or rationalities. 
Analyzing “across.” For Foucault, no discourse exists independent of other discourses. 
Foucault was interested not in how any particular phenomenon appeared in isolation, but 
in how phenomenon were expressions of synchronic patters that occured across 
disciplines over a period of time (Foucault 1976/1978; Garland, 2014). In his histories, 
Foucault describes ways that institutions not only develop, but about how they are in 
conversation with each other in a “tactical polyvalence of discourses” that comes together 
to form strategies and practices in line with constructions of knowledge (p. 100). This is 
why in each of his works, regardless of the “topic” or “subject matter,” be it insanity or 
sexuality or discipline or health, he describes a network of institutions working together. 
Foucault (1976/1978) was concerned with “search for instances of discursive 
production… of the production of power… of the propagation of knowledge,” and 
genealogy shows “coagulation, support, reciprocal reinforcement, cohesion, and 
integration… the bundle of processes and the network of relations” (p. 12). Garland 
explains this idea in greater depth, stating that 
In each historical era, a powerful ‘‘episteme’’ or generalized structure of 
thought, imposes its patterning onto discourses of that period, and does so 
in ways that are more powerful than the topic or subject matter – life, 
language, labor – that links each of these distinct discourses as they each 
develop over time. The distinctive task of the archaeologist, as Foucault 
describes it, is not to trace out processes of change – the task of the 
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conventional historian – but instead to distinguish these historical epochs 
and trace the differential logic of each of their structures.” 
We have already seen this idea expressed in the subsection 
“Epistemology/Historiography” The idea is that individual items do not develop 
individually, autonomously, through history. Rather, items, institutions, and discourses 
are networked with one another, taking cues from one another, driven by similar goals, 
beliefs, and assumptions. Koopman (2013) suggests that a genealogy investigates points 
of intersection of various discourses; these intersections “give rise to problematizations 
that operate as both obstacles to certain older forms of practice and vases for the 
elaboration of newer forms of practice” (p. 105). We see how various discourses come 
together to problematize extant practices, construct assorted subjectivities, and push 
toward new forms of power/knowledge. At the same time, this analyzing across 
disciplines also shows how the topic under investigation may become fragmented. For 
instance, Foucault (1976/1978) describes how sex, as it was taken up by different 
discourses such as medicine, psychology, and biology, became a “strangely muddled 
zone,” plagued by “incongruity” (p. 54). As different discourses weigh in on a 
phenomenon, they approach that phenomenon with their own traditions and values, 
which may create radically different understandings, problematizations, and 
interpretations of that phenomenon. Aspects of knowledge from one discipline may 
inform another, and an entirely new kind of knowledge may emerge around a topic as a 
hodgepodge of knowledges informed by various disciplines. While we would think 
incongruity would undermine knowledge regarding a particular object, this incongruity 
can also become a strategy in knowledge production. Foucault claims that such 
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disparities allow certain truths (and non-truths) to emerge regarding a particular topic. 
Picking and choosing from various discourses, “evading truth, barring access to it, 
masking it” (p. 55) and creating incongruities allows interested individuals to create 
different types of knowledge about a given topic. Borrowing from different discourses 
allows new influences to be held over the topic at hand and new kinds of knowledge to be 
constructed.   
 As we perform this cross analysis of disciplines, and as we discover the 
incongruities between such disciplines, we might expect there to be disagreements, 
arguments, and dismissals. Each discipline may have its own peculiarly constructed 
definition of knowledge or normalcy. As this is the case, certain kinds of beliefs, of 
knowledge, take prominence over others. This is how subjugated knowledge develops. 
Foucault describes subjectified knowledge in two ways. In one way, subjugated 
knowledge simply refers to “historical contents that have been buried or masked in 
functional coherences or formal systematizations” (Foucault, 1997, p. 7). In a way not 
entirely divorced from the first, subjugated knowledge may also refer to “a whole series 
of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently 
elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, 
knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity” (p. 7). Within 
any network of discourses, there are ways of knowing that do not pass epistemological 
muster, that are understood as inadequate by the normalizing structures of the disciplines. 
Within medicine, a drug with a pedigree of clinical trial is given more merit than a 
homeopathic remedy; it is “known” that the drug works whereas the homeopathic remedy 
may simply operate as a placebo. Within education, evidence based practices may take 
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precedence over the intuition or experience of a teacher; like the drug, there is a reliance 
on what has been shown, through “unbiased” trial, to work. This combination of 
knowledges, that which has taken prominence and that which has been subjugated, is an 
important point for genealogy. Genealogy is fueled by this combination and conflict of 
knowledge. Foucault (1997) refers to genealogies as a “combination of erudite 
knowledge and what people know. They would not have been possible—they could not 
even have been attempted—were it not for one thing: the removal of the tyranny of 
overall discourses, with their hierarchies and all the privileges enjoyed by theoretical 
vanguards (p. 8). A genealogy exists as a kind of counter-knowledge. It is subjectified 
knowledge unearthed.This means that in the cross-analysis of disciplines involved in the 
emergence of a particular subject, there must be consideration of the discourses or 
particular ideas that are dismissed in relation to that subject. We thus receive a better idea 
of how that subject has emerged, especially the power/knowledge that has gone into the 
formation of that subject.  
 From the concept of subjugated knowledge, we may look again at the phrase 
“tactical polyvalence of discourses” (Foucault, 1976/1978, p. 100). The word “tactical” 
implies the idea of strategy and intention in the deployment of knowledge, and certainly 
Foucault would agree with this idea: Foucault (1980) notes that  
There is a battle 'for truth', or at least 'around truth' - it being understood 
once again that by truth I do not mean 'the ensemble of truths which are to 
be discovered and accepted', but rather 'the ensemble of rules according to 
which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power 
attached to the true', it being understood also that it's not a matter of a 
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battle 'on behalf' of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and 
the economic and political role it plays. It is necessary to think of the 
political problems of intellectuals not in terms of 'science' and 'ideology', 
but in terms of 'truth' and 'power'. (p. 132) 
The movement of discourses is not a neutral happening. There are always stakeholders 
with something to lose or gain by adopting a certain conception of “the truth” (thus, the 
subjectification of certain knowledges). Foucault is interested in analyzing much more 
than discourse or even the episteme within which a discourse falls. As we begin to shift 
to a discourse analysis that considers the shifts in power/knowledge that pronounce truths 
and subjugate others, we must look at the particularities of the battle occurring within and 
among discourses to develop a sense of the dispositif, or “disciplinary organization” 
(Foucault, 2003, p. 49). We may think of the dispositif as a gridwork, or the arrangement 
of discourses, as well as the actions, actors, and power plays that come together to 
establish that which is normal practice or conventional knowledge (Foucault, 1980). 
 Thus, an important move for genealogical study is to determine what disciplines, 
discourses, or institutions have come together or intersected to develop the 
conceptualization of the phenomenon under study, as well as to track the discrepancies, 
those knowledges within certain disciplines and from various angles, that have been 
subjugated. Within a discipline, and the discourse being adopted by that discipline as it 
borrows from other, we begin to see how knowledge comes to be defined as well as what 
shifts, tactical moves, or forces allow for certain knowledge to take precedence over other 
knowledge. All of this requires an “analyzing across” disciplines, determining how a 
concept received its shape not from any one particular discourse, but how different 
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discourses borrowed from and influenced one another to allow a particular concept to 
emerge, imbued with certain connotations and associations, in the way that it did. In 
practice, this means including more material than a different historical perspective might, 
to look for associations where a standard history might see a break. For instance, two 
disciplines may use the same term to mean radically different things. The job of the 
genealogist is to examine these terms and to see how, at some point, they may have 
diverged from a singular meaning, and further, to see where there might be similarity in 
what initially appears disparate.  
Temporal Juxtapositioning. A common stylistic move in many of Foucault’s 
works is that of opening with a juxtaposition between the current understanding of a 
particular phenomenon and a radically different understanding of that phenomenon from 
the past. In Madness and Civilization (1965/1988), for instance, Foucault begins by 
discussing a time when madness was not seen as something needing to be confined—
rather it was associated with an esoteric, even godly kind of knowledge and freedom. 
Rather than confining the insane, they were sent away in ships. While this kind of exile 
may seem a punishment, Foucault notes that the sea “is the freest, the openest of routes” 
(p.11), and thus madness is also associated with freedom, a stark contrast to the 
confinement of rooms and straightjackets that we now associate with madness. He 
similarly opens Discipline and Punish (1977/1995) by recounting the intense bodily 
torture of a regicide in 1757, a far cry from the prison rule of the penile system only 100 
years later. Yet again, in The History of Sexuality (1976/1978), his first paragraph 
describes the 17th century, wherein “sexual practices had little need for secrecy” (p. 3), a 
fact which would change during the Victorian Era, when sexuality became highly 
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regulated and often prohibited (although, Foucault would argue, never outright 
repressed). 
The purpose of such juxtapositions is certainly rhetorical: it introduces the reader 
to the topic at hand, and it points to the historical nature of the study. However, I argue 
that such juxtaposition serves a useful purpose in the genealogical analytic. First, while 
there is no zero-point in genealogy, such a juxtaposition acknowledges a temporal 
limitation on the analysis. It points to a different episteme than that under investigation 
and provides a “jumping off” point for the analysis. Second, such a juxtaposition reminds 
us that no phenomenon is natural, and that any particular subject, particularly the 
knowledge surrounding that subject, is malleable across time.  
 Search for Silence. Foucault argues that silences “are an integral part of the 
strategies that underlie and permeate discourses” (1976/1978, p. 27), and a genealogy 
“must define even those instances when they are absent, the moment when they remained 
unrealized” (Foucault, 1984, p. 76). These lines come from a recognition that throughout 
the course of history, certain knowledges are subsumed within and silenced by others. 
Further, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) note, power operates within silence. Disciplines 
develop, determine, subjectify and objectify quietly in a relatively undetected way. 
However, like a counterhistory, a genealogy disrupts or sheds light upon such a silence 
(Foucault, 2003). One way to begin examining silence is “to understand power by 
looking at its extremities, at its outer limits at the point where it becomes capillary; in 
other words, to understand power in its most regional forms and institutions” (Foucault, 
2003, p. 27). Foucault tells us to look at local, minor, “quiet” instantiations of power and 
trace them along to find how it has radiated from other, rawer locations: he tells us to 
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begin an analysis of power by examining its “infinitesimal mechanisms, which have their 
own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then look at how 
these mechanisms of power, which have their solidity and, in a sense, their own 
technology, have been and are invested, colonized, used, inflected, transformed, 
displaced, extended, and so on by increasingly general mechanisms and forms of overall 
domination” (p. 30). This means that we must give our attention to that which might at 
first seem innocuous—perhaps a fact of everyday life (that which hides in plain sight), 
perhaps a phenomenon or history which a discourse encourages us to take for granted and 
thereby ignore. What has been written off in history? What is generally agreed upon 
uncritically by scholars of a particular discourse? Such agreement represses the potential 
for alternate ways of knowing, and Foucault (1976/1978) encourages us to speak, to 
transgress against the repression, to “pronounce a discourse that combines the fervor of 
knowledge, the determination to change the laws, and the longing for the garden of 
earthly delights” (p. 8).  
Analysis of power/knowledge. Foucault describes various forms of power throughout 
his ouvre, including sovereign, pastoral, disciplinary, and bio-powers. Indeed, it is this 
analysis of institutions and power that begins to set his later, genealogical work apart 
from his earlier, archaeological work (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Prado, 1995), and it is 
the analysis of these kinds of powers that help us understand how naturalized thinking 
and behaving develops in those subjected to various discourses.  Herein, I provide a 
description of each. Demarcating these types is useful in determining how power and 
authority are conceived and operationalized during particular historical periods.  
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Sovereign power. Sovereign power appears prominently in both Psychiatric 
Power (Foucault, 2006) and Discipline and Punish (1977/1995), and in both pieces is 
juxtaposed to disciplinary power. Sovereign power is that type of power exhibited by 
kings, “expressed through the symbols of the dazzling force of the individual who holds 
it” (Foucault, 2006, p. 22). Sovereign power operates as clear displays of authority or 
control, and is often located in a specific authority figure such as a king or religious 
leader (O’Farrell, 2005). We see this kind of power play out in the example of a king 
publicly punishing transgressors. Such a punishment acts as a means of warning the 
general population not to transgress against the king’s crimes, exercising the extent of 
authority vested in him, and claiming the right to possess such power. While this type of 
power exists in an overt and top-down manner, it is also the most difficult to maintain. 
Due to its overt and obvious nature, it invites subversion and rebellion. Its transparency 
allows it to be most easily confronted. Further, the attempt to dominate through the 
machinations of sovereign power is ineffective due to the fact that only a select few are 
designated authoritarians when sovereign power is in play; one cannot be in all places at 
all times, and therefore the reach of these designated authoritarians is highly localized. 
This is not to say that sovereign power no longer exists, but that there are examples of 
power structures that are much more efficient for reaching different aims.  
Disciplinary power. One such example is disciplinary power. Whereas sovereign 
power maintains itself through gross displays of authority and “dazzling force,” 
“disciplinary power is a discreet, distributed power; it is a power which functions through 
networks and the visibility of which is only found in the obedience and submission of 
those on whom it is silently exercised” (Foucault, 2006, p. 22). Disciplinary power, rather 
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than punishing and commanding as in sovereign power, surveys, corrects, trains, and 
educates individuals, producing certain kinds of subjects (Foucault, 1977/1995; O’Farrell, 
2005). While disciplinary power is like sovereign power in the sense that it controls, it 
differs in that it controls without calling attention to itself as an external force exerting 
such control. Instead, the control comes from within the individual upon whom 
disciplinary power operates. We see this kind of power operating in schools, the military, 
and prisons. Subjects within these institutions are expected to act in certain ways, and the 
institutions themselves are designed in such a way as to produce this behavior—indeed, 
to invite the subject to behave. Perhaps the greatest example of disciplinary power resides 
in the panopticon, an idea that Foucault (1977/1995 explores deeply in Discipline and 
Punish. The panopticon is a prison in which all cells are arranged in a half circle. At the 
center of the half circle is an observation post where guards may sit and observe, 
although those occupying the cells are not able to see if a guard is present. In this case, 
any time a prisoner misbehaves, the prisoner runs the risk of being seen and punished. 
Therefore, a prisoner must enact and internalize the brand of discipline prescribed by the 
prison, even if no guard is present to dole out punishment.  
Pastoral power. In “Omnes et Singulatim,” Foucault (1979b) explicitly describes 
pastoral power as a power “whose role is to constantly ensure, sustain, and improve the 
lives of each and every one” (p. 235). Invoking the image of the Cristian “good 
shepherd,” he explains that this type of power is pastoral because the shepherd leads the 
flock of sheep to salvation. For this leading to occur, the shepherd must have extensive 
knowledge of the flock’s whereabouts, an account “not only of each sheep, but of all their 
actions, all the good or evil they are liable to do, all that happens to them” (p. 236). For 
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the shepherd to lead the flock to salvation, the flock must be willing to submit to the 
shepherd. The shepherd takes an authoritative role, but it is in the service of improvement 
for the individual sheep in the flock. As such, the flock is grateful to have the authority of 
the shepherd in its presence, and will follow the shepherd’s will to achieve this 
improvement. While he does not name pastoral power explicitly in The History of 
Sexuality (1976/1978), this piece provides perhaps the strongest example of this type of 
power. As bodily desire became an increasing concern, confession became a means for 
the pastorate to better know the members of the congregation. It was a device for 
salvation, but it was also a convenient surveillance technique that allowed preachers to 
“know” individuals, to create an account of each sheep’s experiences. Such knowledge 
would allow the shepherd to create a personalized salvation plan for the sheep in the form 
of advice and penance. We see this type of power at work when any kind of “salvation” is 
at stake, when members of a community strive to reach a higher place and must trust in 
another individual, usually provided institutional authority, to help them attain their 
elevated status.   
Biopower. Biopower differs from disciplinary and pastoral power in that it 
considers large groups of individuals, rather than individuals. This is not to say that 
biopower ignores individuals entirely, as it is individuals that comprise groups, but it is 
concerned with laying out governing principles for the ways that humans function, 
especially in terms of their biology. O’Farrell (2005) claims that the focus of such 
biopower is “the life, death, and health of entire populations… forms of knowledge and 
practices related to hygiene, public health, and control of reproduction and sexuality” (p. 
106).  We certainly can see how disciplinary and pastoral power become useful in 
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contributing to this larger idea of biopower. Disciplinary power, which seeks to control 
individuals through means of rules, surveillance, and instilling within them a desire to 
behave in a particular fashion, was also concerned with how individuals conducted their 
bodies, which might be used in determining how armies might be made to march and 
fight in a particular style or students to always wash their hands before lunch (e.g. 
Lunchroom manners with Mr. Bungle). The best example of pastoral power is concerned 
with humanity’s relationship to intercourse. Knowing each individual allows pastors to 
create a larger set of rules for populations to follow regarding sexuality. Biopower 
operates when we begin to find behavioral practices for large groups of individuals, 
particularly concerning bodily and biological functions. Further, given that the focus of 
biopower is the biological functioning of entire populations, it anticipates the idea of 
governmentality.  
 Governmentality and technologies of power. A further consideration of power 
within a genealogical analysis is governmentality. For Foucault (1978), governmentality 
is a “whole battery of multifarious techniques” that display a “wider and more overall 
perspective that we can broadly call a technology of power” (p. 162). Foucault has 
suggested that an understanding of governmentality is essential (and even primary) for 
doing the work of genealogy, as well as understanding the techniques and strategies used 
to govern individual conduct: “the first methodological principle is to move outside the 
institution and replace it with the overall point of view of the technology of power” (p. 
163). What is it that guides the instantiation of certain technologies of power? 
Governmentality, we might say, describes a macro-level of power relations, which helps 
to establish the limits of what is sayable, knowable, and doable (Gordon, 1991). It is the 
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knowledge and justification of that knowledge which in turn justify the manifestations of 
the other types of power for a larger project. If certain subjects are being produced among 
various institutions, it is to fulfill the purposes of a broader sense of what is “correct” 
conduct within the limits of an established governmentality. As such, it has also been 
referred to as the “art of government” (Foucault, 1991, p. 89) or the ways that a 
government designates “the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might 
be directed” (Foucault, 1982, p. 790). Foucault (1979b) has also described it as the 
rationalizations that surround governmental practices and decisions. It is the rationale that 
governments draw upon to produce and justify the art of governance in place at a given 
time. An examination of governmentality begins to focus on broader social desires that 
may determine or lead to shifts in practice, looking at why certain subjects might be 
produced and what problems they were designed to solve. It requires looking at broader 
social and political factors occurring during the time period under investigation, including 
economics, pandemics, social production, and wars, as well as governmental 
rationalizations for such practice (Foucault, 1978; 1979b).   
 What we get from genealogy. In Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History (1984), 
Foucault argues that the task of genealogy is to “expose a body totally imprinted by 
history and the process of history’s destruction of the body.” Genealogy shows that what 
is imprinted on us, what seems so natural to us, is actually historically contingent. 
Normalization allows knowledge to become naturalized (Foucault 1995/1977), and we 
therefore forget that knowledge is contingent. That which is normalized becomes “the 
only way” of doing and being. Genealogy helps to upset normalization/naturalization, to 
reconstruct possibility. Koopman (2013) argues that the purpose of a genealogy is 
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twofold. First, he agrees that it does succeeds in denaturalizing the knowledges that we 
possess, but he argues that other historical and philosophical methods do this as well. For 
him, the value of genealogy lies in showing not that but how such knowledges and 
practices became naturalized. This “how,” Koopman states, “equips us with some of the 
tools we would need for beginning the labor of remaking our future differently” (p. 130). 
By seeing how a phenomenon has developed in a way that is not necessarily natural or 
inevitable, it becomes possible to orient oneself in a new way toward that phenomenon. 
In changing our understanding of the way that history is imprinted on our bodies, we may 
also change the value/knowledge that is inscribed on the various phenomena that inscribe 
themselves upon us.  
A Genealogy of Student Engagement in Composition or: How I Do This 
Below, I describe the ways that I took the above rhetorical and analytic moves by 
Foucault and personalized them for this project.  
Descent and problematization. I believe that I have already suggested that the 
term “student engagement” operates problematically via my literature review; the term 
itself is unclear, used in a way that says little, despite being a nationally recognized, 
nearly ubiquitous term in educational studies. However, I must designate a place to begin 
analyses of emergence and descent. I believe that Bean’s (2005) Engaging Ideas: The 
Professor’s Guide to Integrating Writing, Critical Thinking, and Active Learning in the 
Classroom offers a kind of “crystallization” of the idea of engagement in college writing 
in the present. It is arguably the most emergent extension of the idea of student 
engagement—a kind of “how to” engage students guide—for teachers of college English. 
As such, this text offers an inroad to literature on engagement in composition, making the 
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analyses of emergence and descent manageable. Instead of asking “how did engagement 
come to be,” it becomes possible to ask “how is Bean’s emergent conception of student 
engagement reflected in past iterations of the idea?” From Bean, it is possible to see how 
engagement is not simply an original concept, but one that has been in the making for 
years.  
Engaging ideas. An immediate difficulty with this project is that student 
engagement is a relatively recent invention. Trowler (2010) suggests that it did not come 
to the educational fore until the early 1990s, and it is rare to see engagement literature 
reference pieces written before the mid-1980s (e.g. Astin, 1984; Chickering & Gameson, 
1987). Thus, it is fair to anticipate that as I delve into literature before the 90s, it will not 
name student engagement per se. However, it is possible to look for commonalities 
across current practices labelled as engaging and past practices that may have been 
designed with similar effects in mind. Conveniently, Bean (2005) provides a set of 
“engaging ideas” for writing that may serve as criteria for determining if past pieces 
discuss what could now be referred to as practices for student engagement. While he does 
not explicitly define student engagement, hit is possible to look for elements of his 
conception of student engagement in pedagogical pieces spanning decades prior to its 
naming.   
Critical thinking. Bean (2005) is insistent from the first chapter of his book that 
good writing is synonymous with good thinking. Thus, he suggests that one way to 
engage students in writing is to help them understand that writing is a way of thinking 
through problems. Specifically, he advocates for a writing-across-the-curriculum 
approach in which students can become “engaged with a problem and, once engaged, 
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formulate, develop, complicate, and clarify their own ideas” (p. 20). Thus, concepts such 
as critical thinking, analytical thinking, and problem solving are, at least according to 
Bean, indicative of student engagement. He suggests the use of both formal and informal 
write-to-learn activities in schools, which he terms “microthemes” (p. 79), as well as 
assigning essays that address a clearly defined problem or purpose. For Bean, students 
are engaged as long as they are engaged with a particular problem (here, “problem” is 
used loosely) that requires a reasoned solution. Such concepts become markers to search 
for in the discourse surrounding writing pedagogy in pre-war America if we are to engage 
in an analysis of descent.  
Making writing personal. Bean (2005) does not attempt to undercut the 
importance of teaching students to write professionally in different disciplines; however, 
he also advocates breaks from professional templates and genre styles in favor of more 
exploratory, expressive, and personal writing. In fact, he argues that such writing can 
help to personalize writing that is generally considered “objective” or transactional. Thus 
he advocates the use of “journals, in-class free-writes, thought letters, e-mail 
conversations” as well as “essays written in other styles and forms that stand against 
conventional academic writing and create different ways of seeing: autobiographical 
essays, interviews, experimental pieces, personal reflection pieces, dialogues, magazine 
articles… satires, short stories or poems” (p. 52). For Bean, engaging students in writing 
does not necessarily mean scrapping a traditional curriculum for more poetic or artistic 
language (although he certain advocates using such forms in the classroom), but making 
writing personally relevant for students by “linking course concepts to students’ personal 
experience of previously existing knowledge” (p. 123). Thus, another point of analysis in 
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literature 1939-1952 becomes the pedagogy of personalization. In one way or another, 
past literature speaks to engagement when it speaks to concepts of relevance and 
personalization in student writing.  
Teacher as coach/mentor. Under the engagement model, the role of the writing 
teacher becomes one of a guide, mentor, or coach. In addition to developing models and 
assignments that develop critical thinking and personal connections to/through writing, 
the teacher “coaches their performance through encouragement, modeling, helpful 
intervention and advice, and critiquing of their performance” (Bean, 2005, p. 121) Bean 
does not speak deeply about how a professor might embody such an attitude (opting 
instead to describe yet more activities that foster critical thinking), but it seems that to 
engage students, the professor must be both instructive and approachable. This is in the 
service of keeping the student amenable to development, helping them to understand the 
reasons behind assignments, writing practices, and grades.  The idea of teacher as coach 
seems also to surface in Mann’s (2001) position that engagement stands opposed to the 
idea of alienation, wherein students “shut down” or resist ideas presented by the 
professor. Engaging students is not simply about providing the right assignments, but 
adopting a demeanor and philosophy of teaching that students perceive as inviting as well 
as authoritative. Thus, another indicator of engaging ideas prior to the invention of 
engagement is discussion about coaching, openness, helpfulness, or approachability on 
the part of the writing instructor, so that students will internalize a deeper understanding 
of the material being presented. 
Groupwork and audience. Bean (2005) suggests that one of the most difficult 
problems for a writer is understanding what their “role” as a writer is, which is typically 
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determined by the author’s audience and purpose. As a result, a final means of engaging 
writing students according to Bean is the use of audiences, particularly in the form of 
small groups in the classroom. He claims that “having students work independently in 
small groups on purposefully designed and sequenced tasks… produces significantly 
higher levels of thinking” (p. 151) than other methods of teaching, and that it can lead to 
discussion and productive conflict in writing, as well as greater self-monitoring. In short, 
Bean argues that asking students to work with or consider others while writing is an 
engaging pedagogical strategy. This means that pieces in my archive that describe 
groupwork or authentic audiences in writing address the concept of engagement. 
 Thus, we have four broad criteria for assessing the existence of engagement in 
writing. But what does engagement do? Who is it for, and why? It is important to note 
what has been problematized by the emergent construction of student engagement 
discourse—what problem did the emergence of engagement solve? Here, it is relevant to 
turn to Heilker and Vandenberg’s (1992) Keywords in Composition, an edited collection 
of words and phrases commonly found in composition in the early 90s. For each word, 
they include a short literature review that suggests how the word has been used in 
composition over the course of 30+ years. The term “student” is particularly interesting 
for my study. Words that they use to describe such students include self-centered, 
disinterested, hedonistic, formless, scatterbrained, unpredictable, failed, irresponsible, 
glowering, brooding, and scheming. While there are redeeming qualities ascribed to 
students in research, students are largely constructed as “problematic” in the writing 
class, as hating what they are doing, as completely disengaged from the task at hand. 
Over the course of 30 years, there is a clear construction of a “student problem.” There is 
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a story created in this research about a problematic student subject, one that demands 
some sort of response to turn them into interested, open-minded, responsible, engaged 
subjects. Only a decade after Heilker and Vandenberg’s articulation of the student-subject 
attention/interest/engagement problem in college writing, Bean published his text on 
“integrating writing, critical thinking, and active learning” in college writing classrooms. 
This idea of the student subject, then, becomes a crystallization of the problem that 
student engagement is designed to fix. It takes its head as we read through Heilker and 
Vandenberg, who synthesize thirty years of research to create such an articulation. This 
genealogy, in addition to being a history of student engagement, is necessarily also a 
genealogy of the student.  
 Finding the silent. Thus, we have a problem—the student—and a proposed 
solution, namely engagement, expressed through Bean’s (2005) four primary criteria. 
Where does this problem begin? Does it begin thirty years prior to 1992, as Heilker and 
Vandenberg’s work suggest? If genealogy is an analysis of descent, we must determine 
where this “problem” begins its formation, and as a genealogy of student engagement, we 
must see where engagement becomes the proposed solution to this problem. The question 
then becomes “when does composition studies begin to focus on ideas such as student-
centeredness and pedagogy?” The short answer regarding the construction of a 
problematic student subject is that this construction has existed since the beginning of 
composition as a study. In 1885, students of the first composition class taught at Harvard 
were surveyed about their experience. One student felt that the class was rudimentary and 
stifled his creativity. Those who reviewed the surveys said of that student that if nothing 
else, he had learned to complain more effectively (Copeland and Rideout, 1901). 
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However, at the turn of the century, there does not yet exist a question of how one might 
engage the problematic student. Goggin (2000) claims that one of the earliest 
instantiations of the question of pedagogy occurred in the first issue of College English in 
1939, condemning the way that composition was taught, as composition teachers 
essentially received no training to teach it. In this case, we see some attention to 
pedagogy—a question of how to teach composition. However, it could be argued that the 
issue of student engagement was not given substantial attention until 1952, when the 
Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC) formally issued a 
mission statement focusing on uniting teachers of English in “pedagogical and 
professional needs” (Goggin, 2000, p. 53). Thus, another new question emerges. What 
occurred between 1939 and 1952 that led to a movement toward instruction and 
pedagogy, and by extension, engagement?  
 This period, between 1939 and 1952, falls into the larger period-movement of 
current-traditional rhetoric. This movement in rhetoric, which began in the late 1800s and 
is supposed to have lasted until approximately 1970 (Berlin, 1982; Crowley, 1996; 
Fleming, 2009; Young, 1980), is often characterized lacking consideration for the 
student; rather, writing was a routinized, linear, stimulus-response activity, and 
composition was simply a course that students had to take to determine if they could 
move on to upper division classes (Berlin & Inkster, 1980; Petraglia, 1999; Pullman 
1999). However, the pieces that Goggin (2000) references from College English suggests 
that this was not always the case, and that even in the late 1930s, there was concern for 
students and, at least to a degree, their engagement. She references Dudley’s “The 
Success of Freshman English” (1939) wherein he proposed a pedagogical model of 
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composition with topics that allow the student to be “interested” (p. 23). Certainly, these 
are early instantiations of a form of engagement, one designed to draw the student into 
the subject of composition. He himself was responding to a 1939 piece by Campbell 
entitled “The Failure of Freshman English.” This suggests that even in 1939, amidst the 
current-traditional paradigm of composition, there was a conversation regarding students, 
pedagogy, with some consideration for student engagement (even if it was not referred to 
as such at the time).  
Thus, the range of dates for this study is 1939-1952. 1939 marks the development 
of a discourse with the appearance of the College English journal, and 1952 marks the 
professionalization of composition with the formation of the CCCC. Despite the 
importance of this time period, historians of composition have thus far seemed to gloss 
over this period, characterizing the process movement as the first serious instantiation of 
student-centeredness and engagement to arise in the study of composition and rhetoric. 
Varnum (1992) argues that no composition history adequately addresses the pre-war 
period of composition pedagogy. Indeed, Elliot (2005) devotes approximately 15 pages 
of a 300 page book to this time period in a history of writing assessment. Berlin (1984) 
devotes far more attention to the post-1960s era in his history of writing instruction in the 
American college. Goggin’s (2000) Authoring a Discipline focuses primarily on post-war 
developments in the field, and Stephen North locates the birth of the field of composition 
at 1963. However, preliminary evidence suggests that a discussion of composition 
pedagogy existed even before the 1950s, that it was more than simply “the dark ages” 
(Connors, 1986) or “the stone age” (Stewart, 1988) of composition and current-traditional 
rhetoric. We might argue, then, that this has been a period silenced. It is important to 
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explore silence, that which has not been said, to discover how such a silence fits into 
broader discourses overall. In this case, it is clear that the area under my investigation has 
been silenced, if not entirely dismissed. What might be found in that silenced period? 
To explore voices that have been repressed within this silenced period, I propose 
to build a database of articles from prominent English journals that take part in the 
conversation of students and pedagogy to determine how engagement was present even at 
a time when it has been characterized as virtually absent. Specifically for this study, I 
drew on The English Journal, College English, the two major English journals present 
during the time of my study, as well as a number of composition textbooks that appeared 
between the years of 1939 and 1952. The four areas of content described by Bean above, 
helped to show how engaging students was a concern during the time that has been 
largely ignored as current-traditional rhetoric. Thus, the criteria for the pieces chosen in 
this study included the timeframe; as well as how the pieces spoke to the idea of the 
formation of a student/teacher subject; and/or the development of a pedagogy that 
encompasses what we now would consider to be, in Bean’s “engaging ideas.” A final 
inclusion criterion was that the piece must relate explicitly to composition or writing, not 
literary study or reading skills, both of which were also common topics in the chosen 
journals during my designated time period. Below is a table of preliminary readings that 
comprised what I refer to as my “initial archive.” 
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Table 1. Initial Archive 
Author Title Journal Year; Volume; 
Issue 
Dudley The Success of Freshman 
English 
CE 1939; 1; 1 
Weingarten The Use of Phonograph 
Recordings in Teaching 
Shakespeare  
CE 1939; 1; 1 
Ringnalda Colleges Belong to Students CE 1939; 1; 2 
“A School 
Principal”  
A Contrast in College 
Professors 
CE 1939; 1; 3 
Fountain The Problem of the Poorly 
Prepared Student 
CE 1940; 1; 4 
Digna We Investigate Together CE 1940; 1; 4 
Maddox Review: For the Class in 
Composition: Introductory 
English Composition for 
College Students by Joseph M. 
Bachelor; Ralph L. Henry; 
Robert B. Sinclair 
CE 1940; 1; 4 
Williams Who Should Teach English? CE 1940; 1; 5 
Wykoff Teaching Composition as a 
Career 
CE 1940; 1; 5 
Tilley Composition by Critical 
Analysis 
CE 1940; 1; 6 
Smith Learning to Write in College N/A 1938 
Hendricks Exemption from Required 
Composition 
 1940; 1; 7 
Spencer Responsibility of the English 
Teacher 
CE 1940; 1; 7 
Garnett & Griebling The Freshman Intellect CE 1940; 1; 8 
Green Significant Theme Content CE 1940; 1; 8 
Mulder An Editor Looks at Freshman 
English 
CE 1940; 2; 1 
Shaw A Complete Course in 
Freshman English 
N/A 1940 
Colby Laboratory Work in English CE 1940; 2; 1 
Inlow Differentiation in Freshman 
Composition 
CE 1940; 2; 2 
Hogrefe Self-Exploration in Creative 
Writing 
CE 1940; 2; 2 
Smith Problems of Articulation in the 
Teaching of English 
CE 1940; 2; 2 
Rice Articulation of the Secondary 
School and the College 
CE 1940; 2; 2 
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Roberts & Trelease Student Prose Models N/A 1940 
Buckner English Composition in 
Practice 
CE 1940; 2; 3 
Halvorsen Two Methods of Indicating 
Errors in Themes 
CE 1940; 2; 3 
Wagner Articulating the Program in 
English in College 
CE 1940; 2; 3 
Boothe English for Midwesterners CE 1941; 2; 4 
Scudder & Webster The New Hampshire Plan for 
Freshman English 
CE 1941; 2; 5 
Bernbaum  Are we Downhearted CE 1941; 2; 6 
Green  The Reform of Freshman 
English 
CE 1941; 2; 6 
Weisinger A Subject for Freshman 
Composition 
CE 1941; 2; 7 
Green, Hutcherson, 
Leake, & McCarter 
Complete College Composition N/A 1947 
Morrison A Philosophy for Required 
Freshman English 
CE 1941; 2; 8 
Fleischauer A Solution for the Teaching of 
the Investigatory Paper 
CE 1941; 3; 1 
Olney Freshman English N/A 1940 
Jefferson & 
Peckham 
The College Writer N/A 1941 
Haber Vive Freshman Composition CE 1941; 3; 3 
Aiken & Carleton Freshman English at the 
University of Vermont 
CE 1941; 3; 3 
Blackmur The Undergraduate Writer as 
Writer 
CE 1941; 3; 3 
Campbell The Evolution of a Writing 
Laboratory 
CE 1942; 3; 4 
Mulder Benjamin Franklin: Teacher of 
Composition 
CE 1942; 3; 5 
Hard, Kirk & 
Marcoux 
Writing and Reading English 
Prose: A Complete Course in 
Composition  
N/A 1942 
Colodny Usage for College Freshmen CE 1942; 3; 8 
Brower Problems of High-School 
English and College Freshman 
English 
CE 1942; 3; 8 
Diel A Portrait of the ‘Typical’ 
Instructor of English in the 
Junior College 
CE 1942; 4; 1 
Ford The Menace of the Freshman 
English Workbook 
CE 1942; 4; 1 
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Gullette & 
McCrimmon 
Writing Effectively N/A 1941 
Landis Freshman Composition N/A 1940 
Henderson Democratic Procedure in 
Freshman English 
CE 1942; 4; 3 
Eels A Portrait of the ‘Typical’ 
Instructor of English in the 
Junior College—A Comment 
CE 1943; 4; 4 
Hooper Freshman Courses in English in 
the United States and in South 
Africa 
CE 1943; 4; 5 
App Old Ben Jonson on ‘Grading’ 
Compositions 
CE 1943; 4; 5 
Stanley This Game of Writing: Studies 
in Remedial English 
CE 1943; 4; 7 
Sanders, Jordan, 
Limpus, & Magoon 
Unified English Composition N/A 1946 
Arms The Research Paper CE 1943; 5; 1 
Baker The Value of Writing 
Philosophies of Life in 
Freshman English Classes 
CE 1943; 5; 3 
Watt, Cargill, & 
Charvat 
New Highways in College 
Composition 
N/A 1947 
Hatfield English for Men in Uniform CE 1944; 5; 4 
Marshall Predicting Success in Freshman 
English 
CE 1944; 5; 4 
Coon The Freshman English Situation 
at Utopia College 
CE 1944; 5; 5 
Weigle Teaching English in an Army 
Air Force College Training 
Program 
CE 1944; 5; 5 
Thurston A Deferred Course in Freshman 
English 
CE 1944; 5; 6 
Crawford Reading and Composition as 
Related Problems of Freshman 
English 
CE 1944; 5; 6 
Holmes The Ideal Student (poem) CE 1944; 5; 7 
Baker Composition on the College 
Level: A Case Test 
CE 1944; 6; 1 
NCTE Proposed Constitution of the 
NCTE 
CE 1944; 6; 1 
Pooley Achieving Continuity in High-
Scool and College English 
CE 1944; 6; 3 
Hamilton Let’s Teach Composition! CE 1944; 6; 3 
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Mirielees Teaching Composition and 
Literature  
N/A 1943 
Wykoff  Army English Experiences 
Applicable to Civilian Postwar 
English 
CE 1945; 6; 6 
Buckley & Wiley The Technique of the 
Roundtable in College 
Composition 
CE 1945; 6; 7 
Miller Some Unexpected Results of 
College Military Programs 
CE 1945; 6; 8 
Woolley & Scott Handbook of College 
Composition 
N/A 1944 
Saul Suggestions Toward a Revised 
Program in College English 
CE 1945; 7; 1 
Wright What Freshman English Cannot 
Do 
CE 1945; 7; 2 
Elliott Again—Freshman Readings CE 1946; 7; 5 
Guest & Randal Report on a Missouri 
Conference on Freshman 
English 
CE 1946; 7; 5 
Dunn A New Freshman Approach CE 1946; 7; 5 
Grey Improving In-College and In-
Service Education of Teachers 
CE 1946; 7; 7  
Firebaugh On Being Unacademic  CE 1946; 7; 7 
Bond A Post-war Program for the 
Remedial English Student 
CE 1946; 7; 8 
Stabley Newspaper Editorials and 
College Composition 
CE 1946; 7; 8 
Snowden Some Suggestions for the 
College Course in Vocabulary 
CE 1946; 8; 1 
Cervney Facts and Judgements: A New 
Approach to College Writing 
N/A 1947 
Davidson & 
Sorensen 
The Basic Communications 
Course 
CE 1946; 8; 2 
French The New Curriculums of 
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton 
CE 1946; 8; 2 
Wykoff The Eleventh Theme CE 1946; 8; 3 
Bailey Remedial Composition for 
Advanced Students 
CE 1946; 8; 3 
Falk International Understanding: 
An Experiment in Freshman 
English 
CE 1947; 8; 4 
Parks Source Materials for a Course 
in the Teaching of Composition 
CE 1947; 8; 5 
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Perrin Maximum Essentials in 
Composition 
CE 1947; 8; 7 
Benardete A Practical to take the 
Drudgery out of teaching 
freshman composition… 
CE 1947; 8; 7 
Montgomery Communications Work for 
Freshmen at Talladega College 
CE 1947; 9; 2 
Middlebrook English 1 in Cellophane CE 1947; 9; 3 
Angus Avoiding the Pseudo-Research 
Paper 
CE 1948; 9; 4 
Cline The New Plan of Freshman 
English Advanced-Standing 
Examinations at the University 
of Texas 
CE 1948; 9; 4 
Briggs College Programs in 
Communication as Viewed by 
and English Teacher 
CE 1948; 9; 6 
Dow A Speech Teacher Views 
College Communications 
Courses 
CE 1948; 9; 6 
Eikel A Theme Project for Freshman 
English 
CE 1948; 9; 7 
Westerfield Limiting Research Paper 
Subjects 
CE 1948; 10; 1 
Weaver To Write the Truth CE 1948; 10; 1 
Sams Composition in the New 
Curriculum 
CE 1948; 10; 2 
Wiles What We Face in the Field of 
English 
CE 1948; 10; 2 
Ogden On Teaching the Sentence 
Outline 
CE 1948; 10; 3 
McCrimmon The Composition Instructor: 
Priest or Scientist 
CE 1949; 10; 4 
Perrin Sample Trends in the College 
of English 
CE 1949; 10; 5 
Wykoff Toward Achieving the 
Objectives of Freshman English 
CE 1949; 10; 6 
Hotchner A Research Exercise for 
Freshman English 
CE 1949; 10; 6 
Baker Freshman Theme Reader CE 1949; 10; 7 
Jacobs A Modest Proposal CE 1949; 10; 7 
Diederich The Use of Essays to Measure 
Improvement 
CE 1949; 10; 7 
Farrar The Condition of American 
Writing 
CE 1949; 11; 1 
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Reeve One View of Freshman English CE 1949; 11; 1 
Hatfield A Basis for Grading Themes CE 1949; 11; 1 
Buckingham Ends and Means in 
Composition for Adults 
CE 1949; 11; 2 
Osborn The College Freshman CE 1949; 11; 2 
Wright Faculty Responsibility for 
Student Writing 
CE 1949; 11; 3 
Wykoff Suggestions for the Reading of 
Themes 
CE 1950; 11; 4 
Warfel, Matthews, 
& Bushman 
American College English NA 1949 
Osenburg “Tests” of “English 
Fundamentals” 
CE 1950; 11; 5 
Kennan Our Freshmen Wrote a Book CE 1950; 11; 5 
Moore The Writing Clinic and the 
Writing Laboratory 
CE 1950; 11; 7 
Edland What College Students Want to 
Learn in Freshmen English 
CE 1950; 11; 7 
Prosser English as she is Wrote EJ 1939; 28; 1 
Biaggini The Reading and Writing of 
English 
NA 1946 
 
 This archive provided an overview of the “conversation” that was occurring 
around composition pedagogy between 1939 and 1952. Such a conversation helps us to 
understand what discursive constructions were being built at the time around students, 
teachers, and composition as a whole. Even in the development of this archive, I began to 
see an unexpected subject emerge: the veteran student. A question that we might ask, 
then, is how this new kind of student-subject enters the conversation of composition, 
pedagogy and engagement. As a new conversation around pedagogy develops, I found 
changes in discourse and a series of divergent voices. What voices becomes silenced over 
the course of these years, and what voices were raised to prominence? Answering such a 
questions helped me to write a history of the present; this archive allowed me to see were 
the present exists in the past, and vice versa, where the past emerges into the present. 
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Analyzing “across.” Typically, one delimits the materials that will be used to 
conduct a study, restricting those materials to a range of years published, strict definitions 
of terms used in those materials, methods utilized by those materials to produce 
information, and (whether explicitly stated or not) discourses from which those materials 
emerge. Above, I limited myself to a timeframe and definitions. However, the theoretical 
orientations of a genealogy do not allow for such restrictions to be placed on a discipline. 
An analysis of descent can continue indefinitely, as there is no originating point of a 
phenomenon. Further, genealogy is concerned with how phenomena emerge as the result 
of various discourses in conversation with one another, all guided by a broader episteme. 
This means that genealogy does not remain within one particular discipline. For my 
genealogy of student engagement in composition, it was necessary simply to explore the 
field of composition, but to determine how other disciplines in academia affected and 
influenced composition. Genealogy forces us to confront the fact that all limitations are 
artificial and that any study has the possibility of extending indefinitely; genealogy 
embraces the reality of the indefinite.  
From a practical standpoint, however, there must be limits on any study so that it 
can be completed. As for analyzing across disciplines, I provide here a list of disciplines 
that spoke to the emergence of student engagement in composition: education, 
psychology/sociology, and to a lesser degree, business. I base this list off of an initial 
search for the term “engagement” in EBSCOHost Academic Search Complete, limited to 
pieces published in the past ten years. Examining the first 50 search results, I developed a 
table (shown below) that describes which fields are represented by this search.  
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Table 2. Frequency with which Engagement Appears by Discipline 
Education 18 
Communications 2 
Business 6 
Mechanics/Engineering 5 
Psychology/sociology 14 
Medicine 4 
Political Science 1 
 
Clearly, education, psychology/sociology, and business feature most prominently. 
While five articles also came from engineering and mechanics journals, all of these 
articles referred to “engaging brakes.” While the job of the genealogist is to look for 
commonalities and evolution in terminology, I suspected that “engagement” as used by 
mechanics differs too drastically from “engagement” as it was conceived in this study. 
Given these three fields, it was my intent to determine the differences and commonalities 
across literature and to see how all of the different manifestations of engagement gave 
way to the emergence of engagement as it exists in composition, as epitomized by Bean’s 
(2005) text, where I began my problematization of this term, by examining how the term 
was used across disciplines in contemporary times. I suspected that the conversations in 
my archive set a stage for the emergence of the idea of student engagement in 
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composition; how, then, does the use of this term in other disciplines establish a dispositif 
of composition that pushes student engagement to the forefront? 
Additionally, I was aware that I had to pay attention to political historical contexts 
as I move through the descent of student engagement. Engagement appeared across 
disciplinary literature because it served a purpose for each discipline and responded to a 
need established a governmentality, the sayable, knowable, and doable at a particular 
time. By examining the larger political and historical contexts of engagement, I gained 
clearer understanding of the uses of engagement as well as why and how it existed both 
within and outside of composition studies. An example of such a historical context which 
immediately appeared in my archive is World War 2. A number of articles addressed the 
idea of the returning soldier student. Such a subjective construction could not occur 
without the historical event of the war, as well as various power/knowledge constructions 
of soldiers: how soldiers differ from normal students, what soldiers need to be engaged, 
how soldiers learn, etc. Every discipline represented in the above table was, in some way, 
affected by the war. If these disciplines contribute to the body of knowledge on 
engagement, this means that the war, in affecting such disciplines, also affected 
engagement, if only in a subtle or nebulous way.   
What we get from my genealogy. A genealogy is a history of the present. It 
traces how we have gotten to a particular point in discursive constructions of knowledge 
and subject. While a Foucauldian genealogy is a historical approach designed to show 
what occurred in the past, it is also meant to show how traces of the past occur in the 
present. It shows a movement that allows problematic constructs to emerge in the present 
as natural and unquestioned. The first point of this genealogy is to show where and how 
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the present is reliant on the past, specifically the time period between 1939 and 1952, 
with attention to past, nebulous manifestations of engagement. 
Additionally, a genealogy is designed to examine power/knowledge structures. As 
described in the previous chapter, student engagement is understood as a virtue, a kind of 
altruistic approach to teaching that somehow makes the student unquestionably 
successful. It is apparently egalitarian device. However, power/knowledge underlies all 
of our relations, guiding in subtle and overt ways the beliefs we hold and the interactions 
we have, and a genealogy seeks to understand how power “undercuts the theoretical 
equality positioned by the law” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 185) and other institutions 
that hold political force and sway. This means that even student engagement, which 
immediately seems to serve students, is not neutral, and in fact may serve a variety of 
purposes. Indeed, that which constitutes “success” is driven by a particular, already 
existing belief that precludes other possibilities of success. This is an example of 
power/knowledge operating through the concept of student engagement; genealogy 
works to expose where this power resides and how individual subjects (teachers and 
students alike) become embroiled within the political technologies that develop as a result 
of such power/knowledge and themselves become agents that unknowingly act in 
accordance with and perpetuate such power/knowledge.  
The concept of student engagement is no different from other concepts in that it 
exists to achieve a certain goal, and that goal is informed by particular beliefs about how 
the world does and should operate. Even so, the idea of student engagement is both 
ubiquitous and vague. It is difficult to conceive of how a term that has been researched at 
length and taken a prominent place in the educational fore can at once be so revered and 
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offer so little. In sum, this genealogy helps us to understand how we have gotten to such a 
point. In understanding that student engagement is a product of historical contingencies, 
we see that it is a strategy employed to a specific purpose. However, whether or not it 
succeeds in meeting this purpose, there are always potentialities for other means of 
progress, as Foucault suggests in his interview with Simon (1971). I argue that student 
engagement has ultimately fails in achieving its aim—the construction of an engaged 
subject—because over the course of time, as my research indicates, we have lost sight of 
this aim. My genealogy rethinks student engagement as a shibboleth. As such, genealogy 
invites us to move beyond this construction, to reconceive what it might mean to 
“engage” a student, and indeed, to rethink the students’ relationship with education and 
pedagogy in general. Through a deconstruction of the past, we can attempt to build a 
different future.  
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FINDINGS 
 
Part 1: Beginnings of a Compositional Counterhistory 
“Wrong, do it again! If you don’t eat your meat, you can’t have any pudding! 
How can you have any pudding if you don’t eat your meat?! You! Yes, you behind the 
bike shed! Stand still, Laddy!” The schoolmaster, a comically tall and thin creature with 
round glasses, a skinny cane (used more probably for corporal punishment than walking), 
a handsome sports jacket, tie, and slacks, feeds children into a meat grinder. Pink Floyd’s 
representation of the pre-war school teacher, imbued with the authority to control 
children’s bodies and treat them as livestock, follows a history of similar representations 
in literature and art. Mark Twain describes Mr. Dobbins, the schoolmaster in Tom 
Sawyer, as a teacher who will “whip” a student good, whose very gaze “smote even the 
innocent with fear” (p. 169). Twain’s schoolmaster was the inspiration for Rockwell’s 
The Caning, a painting which portrays a screaming child being beaten by a rather lanky 
teacher with thin cane and handsome coat and slacks. Yet another book, Roald Dahl’s 
Danny, The Champion of the World describes Captain Lancaster, a teacher characterized 
as perpetually taking on a pre-World-War-2-era mode of thinking (hence “captain”), who 
whips the protagonist’s palms with a hickory switch.  The principles behind such a 
representation of the teacher are simple: students should be seen and not heard—indeed, 
the well-disciplined schoolhouse should be quiet enough to hear a pin drop (Burton, 
1883). The interest of the teacher defines the interest of the student, and the students’ 
interests should align with the desires of the school teacher. Anything else is a distraction 
or an outburst, one which must be corrected. Such representations suggest that in The 
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West before the war, a student-centered pedagogy had yet to be invented, to say nothing 
of strategies to engage students in their studies.  
Or, in any case, this represents the popular conception of education at the time. It 
may very well be that students’ interests were a pedagogical concern before World War 
2. For instance, it may be argued that such an authoritarian approach was in the students’ 
best interests. Or it might be argued that this prominent artistic characterization is wholly 
untrue—that teachers even in the 19th and early 20th century were sympathetic to 
students, responsive to their desires and interests. After all, this time period is when 
educational reformers/philosophers such as Horace Mann and John Dewey were active, 
and they were certainly concerned with what type of education was in the best interest of 
students—we might even argue that they offered pedagogical foundations that anticipated 
the idea of what is now termed engagement. But we do not need to make this argument. 
Whether or not the artistic representations above are accurate is not the issue. The issue is 
that such art represents a popular opinion, a caricature perhaps, (shall we say “savoir”?) 
of the state of education. They offer a “truth” about education that does not need to 
reflect facticity, one that is based in a shared understanding that public education was 
rooted in controlling, directing, and delimiting activities. 
Certainly it must have been different at the level of the university? It is a fair 
enough proposition: students attending university elect to attend, and thus, there should 
be less need for such disciplinary tactics; students would already “engage” with their 
studies. However, the history of American colleges suggests that this was not the case. 
Geiger (2000) notes that at the turn of the 19th century, the American college was forced 
to contend with a phenomenon never experienced in academia before: student revolt, “the 
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full-fledged defiance of college authority by a significant portion of the student body” (p. 
10). Geiger attributes such revolution to the fact that values in the 19th century were fast 
becoming democratic, while colleges “embodied the previous century’s preoccupation 
with hierarchy and authority” (p. 11). Jackson (2000) has suggested that such revolt may 
have resulted from the “inherently confrontational element within the very structure of 
student life” as well as specific grievances such as “poor food, poor teaching, and 
inadequate curriculum” (p. 47). If this is true, then there was something in the very fabric 
of the relationship between student and professor—in the values held by each respective 
entity, in the ways that student and professor knew how to interact with the world—that 
resulted in conflict, to say nothing of the curriculum that these antiquated professors drew 
from. We might say that students were alienated from academia to the point of revolt, and 
as a result, colleges in the late 1800s were, much like primary and secondary schools, 
forced to implement various disciplinary measures to keep students in line, primarily 
through fines, probations, and expulsion (Geiger).  
The point of these observations is to highlight the disjunction between students, 
their interests, and their desires on one hand, and the academy on the other. However, in 
these historical accounts, when authority figures place blame, the problem is invariably 
with the student. It would seem that it never occurred to those in power to consider why 
such unrest might lie within the student body, in primary school or at the level of the 
academy. Students who did not conform to a rigid code of acceptable conduct, one of 
passivity and subordination, were seen as belligerent and/or lacking. This explains the 
characterization of the schoolmaster as, more than anything else, a mental/corporal 
punisher, one who insists that student behavior, interest, and knowledge align with his 
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(the schoolmaster always seems to be a “he”) own; and this explains why students, even 
at the collegiate level, dissatisfied with their education, were fined. The justification of 
such punishment lies in a deficit model of students to be sure, but the deficit is not 
exactly in knowledge; rather, it lies in the students’ inability to want to submit to the 
academy, to care about the right material in the right ways, to embrace the ways of 
learning that the professor prescribes. Foucault (1997) describes the traditional 
relationship between student and professor: “the traditional teacher first makes his 
audience feel guilty for not knowing a certain number of things they should know; then 
he places the audience under the obligation to learn the things that he, the professor, 
knows” (p. xv-xvi). The professor’s knowledge, and by extension, the professor’s 
interests, take precedence over those of the students, and students should feel both guilty 
and obligated to learn those topics that the professor deems worthy of one’s interest.  
 However, somewhere along the course of the 20th century, our understanding of 
pedagogy changed. Foucault (1997) describes his own experience after taking a position 
at the College de France, focusing on students’ relationship with classroom attendance: 
“if it interests [the student], he comes; if it doesn't interest him, he doesn't come” (xvi). 
Suddenly, a student’s interests—what the student deems worthy of knowing, of investing 
time into—dictates how the student is allowed to behave in the academic environment. 
Allowing students to pursue their own interests in an educational environment is 
something of a game-changer. It first changes the expectations that are placed on both 
student and teacher. It is no longer incumbent upon the student to align his or her interest 
with the teacher’s, and a student is no longer deficient if he or she cannot find the subject 
matter of the classroom interesting; in fact, the deficit now might be upon the teacher for 
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not being interesting enough, for not going to lengths to develop engaging lessons and 
lectures—a fact which is made painfully clear at the end of the 20th century, with an 
influx of “how to” publications laying out different methods for teachers and colleges to 
engage student (e.g. Abernathy & Reardon, 2002; Adams, 1996; Bean, 2001; Beuscher, 
Keuer, Meuhlich, & Tyra, 1997; Harper & Quaye, 2009). Second, this shift redefines the 
ways and reasons that teachers may implement authority over students. Beforehand, a 
disinterested student might be chastised for such disinterest. However, as the focal point 
of pedagogy shifts from the interests of the teacher to that of the student, this 
chastisement is no longer possible as it is no longer reprehensible for the student to 
pursue his or her own interests outside of the teacher’s jurisdiction. It is for this reason 
that when he began teaching at the College de France, Foucault felt that he was no longer 
in a position to “[exercise] a relationship power with respect to [his] audience” (xvi) (a 
fact which Foucault celebrated).  
 Another way to think of this change, I argue, is to say that what we see near the 
end of the 20th century is a change in the conception of how students should both engage 
with and be engaged by their studies. Student engagement, which is generally 
operationalized as how students are behaviorally, cognitively and/or affectively invest in 
their studies (Appleton et al., 2006; Fredericks, Blumenfeld, & Paris, 2004; Reschley & 
Christenson, 2012; Trowler, 2010; Yibing & Lerner, 2013), emerged as a term in the late 
1980s and has since come to the fore in educational research. It has been argued by some 
that engagement is essentially a measure student success (Kuh, 2008; NSSE, 2013; 
Quaye & Harper, 2009), and has become what Quin (2017) has described as an 
“overarching educational ethos” (p. 345). That is, it has becomes a kind of mantra for 
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many educators, a virtue upon which the professoriate may hang their practice. It 
permeates educational theory and practice. “Does this lesson/lecture/activity engage my 
students?” A far cry, certainly, from the image of the pre-war educator as illustrated by 
Pink Floyd, Mark Twain, or Roald Dahl.  
 An area of study that has consistently described students as disengaged is 
composition studies. While I address this is much greater depth later, students have 
consistently been understood as behaviorally, cognitively, and affectively divorced or 
alienated from the writing that they must produce for composition classes (Dubson, 2006; 
Gunner, 2006; Heilker & Vandenberg, 1996), even from the first composition course ever 
taught (Elliot, 2005). Dubson perhaps expressed this view the best, saying that students 
“don’t care enough in the right way about they work they are doing” (p. 93), and as a 
result of not caring in the right way, we are left with “a student who clearly does not 
embrace the writing assignment, does not feel engaged in the work of writing, does not 
care about his or her own writing” (p. 103). His solution, instead of assigning paper 
topics broadly to students, is to “help each and every student find and develop their own 
ideas” (p. 108). These observations, made over the course of a 17 page essay, act as a 
kind of microcosmic history of education and composition studies in general; in the 
beginning, students do not think the right way about their studies and they are disengaged 
as a result. Near the end of the essay, however, he claims that the solution is not to whip 
students (figuratively and literally) into shape, but to try to help them develop their own 
interests in written form. Is this not representative of the history of education in general, 
the one that Foucault (1997) describes? In the beginning, students were seen as not caring 
“in the right way,” and over time, we have decided that to get them to care, we need to 
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allow their interests to permeate (and perhaps even dictate) the classroom in an effort to 
make them more engaged in their work. Not surprisingly, it is around the same time 
Dubson’s essay was published that we see Bean’s (2001) Engaging Ideas become one of 
the most well cited works in compositions studies. There is clearly a move at the turn of 
the millennium toward a student-centered, engaging writing pedagogy.  
 In histories of composition, the time before the 1970s has been described as 
decidedly not student centered, dominated by current-traditional rhetoric, a pedagogical 
model that saw writing as a skill that students could or could not do, a linear activity 
having no connection to student motivations, affections, or interests (Berlin, 1982; Berlin 
& Inkster, 1980; Crowley, 1996; Fleming, 2009; Petraglia, 1999; Pullman 1999; Young, 
1978). Given the influx of literature on engagement in the late 90s and early 2000s, this 
idea seems reasonable enough. If the 90s is the time of engagement, why should we 
expect that any period prior should be preoccupied with the idea? However, if college 
composition has existed since 1885, then there is something suspicious about this reading 
of history. It is overly simple and perhaps naïve, an observation made by Varnum in 
1992, but one that has not yet be adequately addressed: if current histories of composition 
are accurate, this means that it took composition nearly a century to rethink the way that 
it addressed its students’ pedagogical needs. Is this true? Were no tactics deployed in an 
attempt to speak to students and their interests, to get them to, for lack of a better word, 
engage in their writing? Were other tactics employed, perhaps not in the name of 
engagement, but at least in an attempt to move away from the supposed “I say; you do” 
model described in current-traditional rhetoric? 
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 Even in 1952, we see the formation of the Conference on College Composition 
and Communication (CCCC), a conference designed to address both the pedagogical and 
professional needs of teachers of composition. This means that 20 years before historians 
of composition locate a shift away from current-traditional rhetoric, there was a 
conversation occurring about how to best teach composition coursework, a fact that 
seems strange to overlook in composition histories. However, the emergence of a 
conference cannot denote the beginning of a conversation. A conference such as the 
CCCC is designed to meet a need that has already been recognized by practitioners in the 
field. This means that there must have been dialogue regarding pedagogical needs among 
practitioners of composition for some time before 1952, one that was not being addressed 
by the current-traditional rhetoric model, and one which we may locate as far back as the 
first publication of the College English journal in 1939 (Goggin, 2000).  
 This work will shed light on the conversation of composition pedagogy, 
particularly in terms of student engagement before the term “student engagement” 
existed. Using the history of composition as a kind of case study, I show how student 
engagement has been a term that did not simply appear at the beginning of the new 
millennium, but one that has been a longstanding concern for educators since before 
World War 2. This project acts as a kind of tracing of engagement to see how it has 
emerged into our present moment. Further, I explore the implications of this move toward 
such a student centered pedagogy; if it is true that teachers held positions of intense 
authoritarian, perhaps even sovereign power capable of corporal punishment at the end of 
the 19th century, it is naïve to believe that such authority was simply relinquished. A shift 
in pedagogical models does not invert the power dynamic between those who have power 
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and those who do not. If we are to follow Foucault (1976/1978; 1977/1995), thinking 
about power in these terms is reductive. Shifts in power can change relationships, and 
they change how entities within relationships may interact, but shifts in power do not 
necessarily strip authority from one and give it to another. Instead, shifts in power change 
the limits and potentialities of the interactions of those enmeshed in a power dynamic, 
(re)writing their roles within that relationship. Thus, this project also traces the shifting of 
power as pedagogy historically changes to one of engagement, examining what this 
means for the roles and actions of those in authoritative positions (teachers), those who 
are subjects of the pedagogy (students, and those institutions that interface to move 
engagement to the front of educational practice and studies (universities).   
*  * * 
When we look at the ways that power operates within a discipline such as 
composition, we must look at the subjects implicated in, affected by, and affecting such 
power. We might argue that no discourse comes about without a/the subject upon which 
to guide the direction of that discourse. By subject, I mean an individual that is 
subjectified within a system, one that becomes “an object for a discourse with a 
‘scientific’ status” (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 24). Foucault further describes subjects 
within a discursive system:  
There may be a ‘knowledge’ of the body that is not exactly the science of 
its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to conquer 
them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the 
political technology of the body. Of course, this technology is diffuse, rarely 
formulated in continuous, systematic discourse; it is often made up of bits and 
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pieces; it implements a disparate set of tools or methods. In spite of the coherence 
of its results, it is generally no more than a multiform instrumentation. (p. 26) 
The individual becomes a subject under various knowledges about the individual, 
knowledges possessed and developed by the discourses in which the individual is 
enmeshed. Such subjectification allows us to “know” about the individual—to 
understand, to make predictions, to classify, to help or to hinder depending on the 
individuals’ (and the discourse’s) motivations, and perhaps most importantly for 
Foucault, to determine how an individual might productively contribute to the political, 
or the broader values and aims of the discourse itself. Such knowledge is generally not 
dispersed by a single entity, however. The formation of the subject occurs as those within 
the discourse—subjects themselves—continue to observe, to speculate, to tie in 
knowledges from other discourses, to produce new knowledges about themselves and 
others implicated in the discourse. The subject is constantly being refined and specified 
as these knowledges continue to deliberate, define, refine, change.  
 Much has been written on the various subjects in—and their relationship to—
college composition. Crowley (1986) opens an essay that names and characterizes the 
main subjects implicated in college composition, calling composition “a black hole since 
its inception, swallowing up students, teachers, and money without giving much in 
return” (p. 11). In addition to classifying composition as a “black hole,” the two major 
subjects in college composition, students and teachers, are painted as powerless when 
confronted with this composition, more subjected to than subjects within. The metaphor 
of the black hole implies that these subjects have been pulled into it against their will, 
swallowed by it, and once there, they simply must endure. She describes students and 
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teachers of freshman English as both unskilled and unmotivated, and as a result, 
composition imposes a “grinding workload” on those subject to the class. This acts as a 
convenient place to begin a discussion on those subject to/in Freshman English: Crowley 
identifies and provides a portrayal of the subjects in college composition as well as their 
relationship to the discourse in general. But if we are to take Foucault at his word, this is 
a simple narrative. For Foucault, the subject is constructed of bits of knowledge produced 
over various instantiations of discourse. How did Crowley decide that this was the 
appropriate way to characterize these subjects? How reliable is her portrayal? Is it true 
that both teachers and students have, at least until Crowley’s work, been painted as 
unmotivated, untrained, and lacking in compositional knowledge? 
Part 2: Constructing Subjects Within Composition 
 An initial reading of the history of the term “students” in composition seems to 
make this case. Students have been described as “disinterested… formless… 
scatterbrained… failed… niggers” across swaths of composition literature, an observation 
made even a decade after Crowley was writing (Heilker & Vandenberg, 1996, p. 225). 
Students have been “socially and politically imagined as children whose Victorian 
innocence retains a tainted need for civilizing” (Miller, 1991, p. 196). Such a reading for 
teachers of composition is equally bleak, and they are portrayed as “hyperbolically bad 
teacher[s]” who are idiots, lacking in knowledge about the very subject matter they are to 
teach, and as slaves (Heilker & Vandenberg, p. 232). If these readings are accurate—or 
even if this is just how students and teachers have been understood in the broader 
                                                 
 College composition has been named several times over its history. Note that composition and freshman 
English name the same course.  
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discourse of composition, accurate or not—and college composition is serves the purpose 
of teaching students how to write, then the historical reading of current-traditional 
rhetoric and the teachers that used it is reasonable. If students did not care, and teachers 
were unable to teach, then why not take rhetoric, a “potentially rich intellectual 
enterprise” and diminish it “into a truncated and impoverished one” (Goggin, 2000, p. 
33). Students seen in this light needed the disciplinary guidance of the teacher: guidance 
that kept them on track and forced them to practice their studies, one that was allowed to 
implement some degree of punishment should students’ formlessness and disinterest 
cause any sort of distraction from writing correctly. At the same time, these unskilled 
teachers needed an accessible means of teaching the material. Both subjects here could 
benefit from the truncated, overly-simple, easy-to-teach current-traditional approach to 
rhetoric. It would take a rather massive change in the way that students and teachers were 
understood as subjects, perhaps one at the dawn of the millennium, to reimagine the way 
that students should be addressed. And it is easy to say that an emerging discourse of 
student-centeredness, one heralded by the idea of student engagement, has recently 
changed this way of thinking in composition. Suddenly, by the 1990s, students had 
interests that might be leveraged in their writing to foster engagement in composition. As 
this new paradigm emerges, it turns out that students are not formless after all. Instead, 
composition had just not done enough to reach out to students, to make the stakes of 
writing matter enough to them. Heilker and Vandenberg’s reading of the word “student” 
seems to agree with this reading of history. According to them, it was not until the 90s 
that students begin to take on different identifiers: “nascent rhetors… apprentices… 
novitiates” (p. 226).  
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 Of course, any compositionist would balk at this simplified version of history. 
Certainly composition had, at least since the early 70s, made an effort to reach out, to 
make writing “matter” for students. Gage (1996) argues that Kitzhaber’s 1953 
dissertation, Themes, Theories, and Therapy: The Teaching of Writing in College, was 
“one of the first books to explore pedagogical approaches to college composition” (p. 
377) and to break with current-traditional rhetorical practices. It is also worth noting that 
the movement/pedagogy of expressivism which made its mark in the late 60s/early 70s 
asks students to focus on their own interests and their feelings (e.g. Elbow, 1973; Murray, 
1972). Expressivists have been arguing for nearly 50 years that there is a self that 
students can discover and articulate through writing—this self exists, for the most part, 
autonomously, with its own truth and authentic voice (Faigley, 1986; Fulkerson, 1990; 
2005). Writing under this model was designed to address the student on his or her own 
ground, writing about the topic that he or she was most familiar with—to illustrate or 
articulate the authentic self that existed in each student. Under expressivism, students 
should be valued on an individual basis and could be made interested (as well as learn) by 
addressing topics of personal relevance to themselves. This suggests that even in the 70s, 
the construction of student as disinterested, alienated, or divorced was rejected by a major 
movement in composition at least two decades before education began using the term 
“student engagement.” The student was, somehow, worth knowing, and the pedagogy of 
“know thyself” emerged. We might argue that the principles of student engagement are 
present in expressivism in that at its core, it is a strategy to get students to affectively, 
cognitively, and behaviorally embrace writing. It is surprising that the expressivist 
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movement, despite being underpinned by the core tenets of student engagement, seems to 
have dissipated just as the idea of engagement came to the fore (Bryant, 2015).  
It is true that composition is often characterized as coming into existence as a 
cohesive field of study at roughly the same time as expressivism, specifically 1963 
according North (1987). Here, it makes sense to suggest that even though students were 
still being described as formless and disinterested—and they certainly were—some 
conversations were being held about ways to better engage them in their studies. As the 
compositional discourse emerges and takes shape, we would imagine a result of this 
emergence (or perhaps a cause, or both) would be the conversations about those students 
in composition classes: their needs, how to address those needs, the purpose of the course 
for the students, in effect, what to do that had not already been tried with students. This 
was also the time that basic writing emerged at CUNY, a result that Otte and Mlynarczyc 
(2010) attribute to changing attitudes toward students and their abilities. And histories of 
composition generally suggest that this is when any thought of the student experience in 
composition began (e.g. Berlin, 1982; Berlin & Inkster, 1980; Young, 1978). Beforehand, 
states Varnum (1992), “the sixty years between roughly 1900 and 1960 have been 
characterized as a period of stagnation in the history of composition and as a period in 
which ‘current-traditional’ rhetoric, an approach developed in the late nineteenth century, 
operated as a monolithic and increasingly obstructive paradigm” (p. 39) which, in fact, 
retarded and prevented student learning. Under this account, we might draw the 
conclusion that students have until recently been victimized by compositional 
pedagogies: it is not simply disengagement inherent in the student subject that led to poor 
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performance; instead, the student is subject to composition, forced into a classroom that 
the student is rightfully disengaged in. 
We can certainly see how a history of composition that paints students as 
victimized by the field would lead to a pedagogical overhaul, one that attempts to undo 
the victimization and (re)kindle student interest in the subject, whether or not that 
overhaul explicitly names student engagement as a virtue. But Varnum (1992) is not 
critical of current-traditional rhetoric in itself; he is critical of the characterization of the 
first 60 years of composition as being dominated by current-traditional rhetoric. While he 
does not provide a comprehensive overview of those 60 years, he does suggest that it has 
been grossly over-simplified. As such, this means our understanding of “students” and 
“teachers,” as well as the ways that they have been constructed as subjects, is probably 
simplistic. It also means that perhaps we are hasty in suggesting that engagement is the 
way to counter a characterization that may, in fact, have little basis in history or fact. It is 
a solution to a problem that, perhaps, was never a problem in the first place 
There is, of course, something to be said for historical accounts as they stand. In 
the years leading up to the 60s and 70s, analyses of textbooks suggest that what is now 
termed current-traditional rhetoric (and the practices conventionally associated with it) 
was in vogue (Dean, 1999; North, 1987; Kitzhaber, 1953). And there is certainly 
something stuffy about current-traditional rhetoric, both in theory and in practice. 
Kitzhaber noted that under current-traditional rhetoric, “the best sort of education was 
that which offered the best opportunities for rigorous drill” (p. 2). We see this in early 
works that are now considered to be foundational to current-traditional rhetoric, for 
instance Chittenden’s (1891) The Elements of English Composition or Lockwood and 
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Emerson’s (1901) Composition and Rhetoric for Higher Schools, both which act as 
intense grammar primers complete with copying exercises. In Wendell’s (1891) English 
Composition: Eight Lectures Given at the Lowell Institute, he states that good writing 
simply comes about by memorizing “a very simple set of general principles under which 
details readily group themselves” (p. 2). Applying those principles should be 
“painstaking” if we take Genung at his word (1894, p. 1). Rhetoric in all of these works is 
largely driven by monolithic prescriptivist logics: some words are necessarily correct to 
use while others are barbarisms or improprieties; students should be able to identify 
Latinate or Saxon words and use them to a rhetorical end; certain arrangements of words, 
sentences, and paragraphs will necessarily have a specific effect, and students would do 
well to note how arrangement affects various hierarchies of clearness, force, and elegance 
in writing; copying from so called “great” writers can lead students, perhaps by osmosis, 
to develop good writing skills. When we examine these textbooks looking for specific 
ways that pedagogy seemed to be formulaic, boring, a pedagogical disservice to students 
in the composition classroom, it is easy to find such instances and generally to make a 
case against current-traditional rhetoric as history has done. Nearly 40 years after the 
publication of these foundational texts, Campbell (1939) urges us to do away with 
freshman English altogether, a need brought on by the mechanical treatment of writing in 
such classes, one “engendered and grown in a kind of intellectual vacuum” (p. 178). The 
aim of composition under this model was certainly not to engage students. After the first 
composition course at Harvard in 1885, several students were surveyed regarding their 
experience. While one student complained that the course had stifled his creativity, one 
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of the survey reviewers simply responded that the course had taught him to more 
effectively complain (Copeland & Rideout, 1901).  
Such a dismissal of the student’s complaint is telling of the way that students were 
seen at the time, and certainly the construction of the student subject as somehow 
formless, disinterested, or ignorant exists in the early works of current-traditional rhetoric 
as well. Wendell (1891) describes his interactions with students at Harvard: “‘I can’t 
write anyhow’ say students to me year after year; they mean that they won’t think” (p. 
136-137). Genung (1894), in his prologue, compares students to “great writers,” stating 
that great writers’ “thought region is too mature for [the student], too high; [the student] 
cannot interest himself in their lofty principles of political morality or of literary 
criticism.” Lockwood and Emerson (1901) consistently describe students’ failures to 
follow simple patterns in writing, characterizing them as ignorant, wasting time, unable—
or unwilling—to commit serious effort to writing studies. Students are spoken about in 
terms of their deficiency, to be sure. It is easy, then, to see why current histories suggest 
that students have been characterized by their lack until nearly the beginning of the new 
millennium.  
However, while it is possible to paint current-traditional rhetoric in terms of its 
lack of engaging qualities and its conception of students as deficient, such historical 
accounts do not provide a full story of composition pedagogy, the student subject, or 
what now may be termed strategies to engage students during the early years of 
composition. Even some of the defining pieces of current-traditional rhetoric begin to 
speculate about pedagogical approaches, offering advice for engaging those student in the 
course. Genung (1894), for instance, claims that composition is positive and creative 
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work, and notes that it would be a “pity to keep students working exclusively at crooked 
English, without doing something from the outset to foster that desire to contrive, to 
build...” and he attempts within his book to “give the student all along something creative 
to do” (p. vi). Lockwood and Emerson note on the first page of her skills book that in 
addition to being practical and broad in scope, they wanted their book to be interesting 
because “to sentence students to the use of a dull and lifeless text-book is, often, to 
condemn them to a lifelong distaste for the subject of that particular book” (p. v). 
Whether or not these writers succeed is arguable, but the idea of fostering interest, 
creativity, and desire in students around 1900 seems counter to current histories of 
composition and rhetoric: it is a concern better suited for the newer pedagogy of 
engagement than the teacher-centric anathema that has been dubbed current-traditional 
rhetoric. It further suggests that students have not always been cast as the formless, 
clueless, deficient entities as histories of composition suggest they have. While the 
conception of the student subject as deficient exists in many early readings, it represents 
only one way that students have been subjectified in composition, what we might call a 
“strain of subjectification,” and if it was possible even in early years to engage students, 
then other readings, other such strains of subjectification must exist as well.  
The interested student subject. If not only in terms of their deficiencies, then 
how exactly have students been characterized by compositionists during the supposed 
reign of current-traditional rhetoric? One place to turn is Dudley’s (1939) “The Success 
of Freshman English,” arguably one of the first articles in compositions studies that 
seriously addresses pedagogy (Goggin, 2000) by describing Iowa State University’s 
approach the freshman composition course. What he describes is a classroom markedly 
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different from the classroom that we might imagine dominated by current-traditional 
rhetoric, at least as it has been presented in recent histories of composition. Dudley 
describes a pedagogical approach that he claims had been in place at Iowa for at least five 
years, one that begins by “encouraging the student to explore his own experience. 
Autobiography furnishes the models, and personal reminiscence the subject matter, for 
the compositions of the first few weeks. The resulting papers, if not profoundly 
philosophical, are alive and encouraging” (Dudley, 1939, p. 23). The underlying reason 
for this approach, he explains, is for student to discover that “the past is interesting to 
himself, and then, gradually and somewhat to his surprise, that it is interesting to others” 
(p. 23). These lines could easily have been taken from an expressivist piece of the 70s or 
perhaps even as a strategy for engaging students in the new millennium (In fact, Bean 
(2005) suggests autobiography as an engaging alternative to top-down, thesis governed 
essays), despite appearing in the midst of the current-traditional rhetorical movement, a 
movement characterized as decidedly not engaging or student centered. We thus see 
student interest becoming a serious, even central, concern in the question of composition 
pedagogy.   
The changing of a pedagogical approach occurs in tandem with a change in the 
discourse surrounding the student subject; we must now see the student beyond a one that 
cannot think (Wendell, 1891) or consider the lofty principles of the poets (Genung, 
1901). Indeed, Dudley (1939) implies that many students produce profoundly 
philosophical pieces simply through reflective autobiography writing. By 1946, Bond 
suggests that intelligence is no way at all to anticipate or characterize a student’s ability 
to write:  
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Experience with corrective English has disproved the old fallacy that a 
student of average intelligence who cannot meet the usual standards 
required for basic English composition cannot be college material. Even 
though a close correlation has been found between scores on English 
placement tests and intelligence tests, it has been determined that the 
student can raise his mark on the intelligence test for the reason that most 
intelligence tests are highly verbal. It follows that a gain in scholastic 
aptitude will accompany improvement of reading ability and general 
ability in English. (p. 469) 
Such observations upset the way that students have conventionally been 
understood as simply lacking and suggests that even during the time of current-traditional 
rhetoric, some instructors understood students as potentially complicated individuals. 
Students are capable of producing good work now, provided that they are confronted with 
the right kinds of assignments. And by no means did Dudley stand alone on this issue. By 
the early 1940s, College English and The English Journal had published a number of 
pieces addressing different pedagogical concerns, so much so that Ringnalda & 
Ringnalda (1939) open their piece by noting how heartening it is that “so many teachers 
[have been] writing about Freshman English” (p. 135). Many of these pieces directly 
address Campbell’s (1939) “The Failure of Freshman English,” which called for the 
abolition of the course on the grounds that it was reductive and essentially pointless, 
Campbell’s argument amounting to bad writing is the result of a student who cannot think 
well, and the freshman English course cannot teach one to think better. However, the 
bloom of literature in the early 1940s directly refuted Campbell, and much of this writing 
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resituates the relationships between student and their coursework. For instance, Hogrefe 
(1940a), like Dudley, saw value in the potential for writing to lead to self-exploration for 
students. Buckner (1940) described a class designed around “the ideal of trying to make 
the students' English composition classes the most interesting hours of the week for them, 
of making their assignments challenges instead of drudgery, of giving them the 
opportunity to work with their classmates… of giving even the dullest the joy of 
achievement” (p. 280). Digna (1940) described how her students became interested in 
research writing when they are allowed to determine the subject matter for the course. 
Garnett and Griebling (1940) surveyed freshmen literary preferences at Kent State, and 
concluded simply that that “youth has taste” (p. 688). They close their piece by asking for 
a curriculum that allows students the opportunity to appreciate modern works, rather than 
stale literary canon. Inlow (1940) echoes this sentiment, describing what happens when 
students are allowed more choice over their readings for composition:  “many students, 
after reading some of the better books of recent vintage the first semester, become 
interested and wish to read more extensively” (p. 166). These examples represent only a 
portion of the work that was being published in the 1940s that bot cast students as 
capable and attempted to engage their interests as a strategy to improve writing.  As 
students were being cast in a new light—as capable of interest, expression, taste—a new 
pedagogical model had to follow.  
But a new pedagogical model places new kinds of responsibilities on both the 
teacher and the student, including adopting a new way to understand the relationship 
between students and writing. Beforehand, the student was simply seen as incapable. 
Some were meant to be writers; most were not. This shift away from a binary of 
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(in)capability meant that all students had the potential to be skilled writers if the right 
conditions were met, and on the other hand, poor writing was the result of meeting 
certain conditions not yet met—not, as Campbell (1939) or Wendell (1894) argued, an 
inability to think. Fountain (1940), noting that students were often poorly prepared when 
entering Freshman English, argued for research on social factors that might contribute to 
poor preparation. He tellingly begins to refer to poorly prepared students simply as “the 
poor,” suggesting that the issue in poor preparation is socioeconomic rather than 
something inherent to the student, such as IQ or even race, as it had been conceived 
suggested some years earlier (Elliot, 2005). He further suggests that formative years and 
high school curricula may not offer students all that they need to succeed in college 
writing classes. But attributing poor preparation to various social factor and erasing the 
necessity of “student as lacking” means inventing new ways to address this poor 
preparation, to bring out the potential inner writer within each and every student. It 
requires understanding the student at a level that had not yet been conceived, examining 
more meticulously than ever before their social makeup, attributing causes to poor 
preparation beyond an innate laziness, stupidity, or poor taste. Certainly, there had been 
means of assessing student abilities, but they had not been designed with Fountain’s level 
of specificity in mind. While college entrance exams had existed for over 40 years, they 
created a quick snapshot of the student, one that told whether or not a student was skilled 
enough for college study. But in 1944, Marshall recasts the purpose of such 
examinations: “The problem of selecting probable successes and probable failures among 
students in freshman English is of both academic interest and practical administrative 
importance. The more accurately it can be done, the more effectively… counseling, 
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differentiating courses, individualizing instruction, and differentiating time allotment” 
can be carried out (p. 219). If we can discover the cause of poor preparation, we can more 
readily remedy it and bring students into the academic fold, as it were. And if we look 
back at the pedagogical literature from the early 1940s, we see a new word beginning to 
flourish in writing pedagogy, namely the concept of “interest:” an exploration of what 
factors make writing interesting to students and what kinds of assignments allow student 
to produce interesting work. The “ideal student” in freshman English is not defined by 
the knowledge that they do or do not have, but by their willingness to learn, to “read 
ahead from pure affection… the lust for knowledge crying in the blood” (Holmes, 1944, 
p. 393).  
But how is interest operationalized? If interest is now the driving pedagogical 
force, one which leads to better writing, how can one know if the student is interested? 
How can a teacher engage the interest of the student? Interest is necessarily personal, and 
we quickly see that what becomes good, interesting writing for compositionists like 
Dudley (1939), Green (1940), and Hogrefe (1940a) becomes synonymous with 
“unveiling.” Students must now tell something of themselves, whether that unveiling be 
an “intelligible explanation of why he is or is not joining a fraternity, of what he expects 
from his college course, or of how relief activities have affected his home community” 
(Dudley, 1939, p. 25) or simply asking a student “to define as precisely as possible the 
position which her family or her town occupies in the economic order” (Green, 1940, p. 
694). To assess whether or not a student writes or thinks well, the student must articulate 
a defensible position as a political subject. Foucault (1982) suggests that subject positions 
are obtained in two ways: one may be “subject to someone else by control and 
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dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both 
meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to” (p. 781). To 
effectively name (and mold) a student subject in the composition class in the former 
instance of subjectification, we should develop an understanding of the latter instance, 
how the student develops and defines his or her own identity. In the years to come, this 
will become a major theme in the pedagogical work produced by writing studies, and is 
addressed in serious depth by both Alcorn (2002) and Rickert (2007) 60 years later. 
Under this developing pedagogy, one of addressing the subject, it is not enough that the 
student in college should want to join a fraternity or feel a certain way about relief 
efforts. There is a need for the student to do the work of understanding his or her own 
subject position and to turn over that work of self-understanding to the instructor. This 
charge is no more apparent than in the work of Green (1940) who, while explaining how 
to persuade “average” students to produce “significant” theme content, provides an 
example of what he considers to be an ideal assignment: 
You are the product of your environment, of your experience. Discover, 
define, and interpret one of the formative elements in your experience. Get 
down to concrete, tangible things. Tell us what they mean. You may 
describe, you may argue, you may narrate, you may explain, but you are 
required to develop a thesis, that is, to analyze your material into its 
several aspects, and to give it definitive significance. (p. 695) 
It is remarkable how at once this prompt manages to be both innocuous and probing: 
innocuous, perhaps, because we can imagine such an assignment being given in any 
contemporary composition course. It has become normalized in the discourse of writing 
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assignments, and follows the same principles as the critical writing studies movement 
(Berlin, 1996) some 45 years before it became popularized. But at the heart of this 
assignment is a demand to know the student at a level of phenomenal and existential 
being. Students must define the very meaning of their experience, to “get down,” to 
unveil an aspect of their lives that led them to occupy their individual subject positions, 
as the assignment implies, in painstaking detail.  
What makes this move perhaps even more innocuous is the face that it bears in 
implementation. As much as this move begins to unearth and reveal self-identified 
subject positions of students, it is arguably designed to empower students as well as to 
make the coursework of composition palatable for them. No longer skilling and drilling, 
students may write about a topic that, presumably, they know best: themselves. It 
(theoretically) creates an affinity for writing in those that historically had none, and paints 
the students, themselves, as interesting subjects. It humanizes the subject by providing a 
voice and expression, and, if we trust Dudley (1939), it is both effective and productive 
for the aims of the writing course, fostering in “students some desire to communicate 
correctly and effectively their thoughts and feelings” (p. 25). Digna (1940) is similarly 
pleased with the success of student interest and personal experience as pedagogical 
guides. Her students, as a class, were able to produce an entire book of lessons learned as 
freshmen new to college. This book would be given to the next year’s incoming freshman 
cohort, the experiences of the writers given meaning because others may learn from 
them. For Baker, having students articulate their philosophies of life contributes to 
student interest and achievement (1943). After this assertion, most of Baker’s work is 
comprised of student surveys who saw definite value in and enjoyed the work of his 
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course. In sum, according to the literature, students embraced the opportunity to speak 
about themselves and to let their own interests dictate the direction of classes. As interest 
is engaged, meaning that students’ subjectivities are systematically aired, there is a 
willingness to do the work in composition.  
 Thus, pedagogy in composition takes a turn, one underpinned by strategies to 
foster unveiling while drawing upon the interests of and engaging those that unveil 
themselves: “[the task of freshman English] must depend upon the instructor’s ability to 
understand the individual student as fully as he can” (Morrison, 1941, p. 789). Green 
(1941) cautions his readers that it is not always an easy task to discover the highly 
personalized experiences of students. Even so, he notes that is the responsibility of the 
teacher to make this happen: “to get the student to apply reflection to experience, to 
perceive and interpret its meaning, is the hard job and bounden duty of the instructor of 
rhetoric” (p. 594). Thus, assignments should be designed to persuade students to make a 
statement explicitly about themselves and their beliefs. Weisinger (1941), encouraging 
the adoption of a new attitude (pedagogy) on the part of teachers, elaborates why:  
Information takes on significance and liveliness only in so far as it is 
connected with man, his history, his ambitions, and his hopes. Taught 
from this point of view, ideas become real and vivid. If the emphasis is 
placed not on political theories but on how men try to devise ways of 
living… then the freshman can be expected to have an interest in his work, 
no matter how difficult, for that work now has meaning to him as a human 
being with needs, problems, and aspirations. (p. 693) 
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The idea of what is interesting to students is intimately tied to the ways that students view 
themselves, including their hopes, ambitions, and histories. It almost seems that for an 
assignment to be interesting, a student must reveal something of themselves. The student 
must examine him or herself as a subject to access a place of engagement with the writing 
work. 
The teacher subject under a pedagogy of interest. An argument might be made, 
to some degree, that this is true of all writing. Certainly Elbow (2015) would make this 
claim, that anything worth writing necessarily comes with a degree of personal 
investment and subjective reflection. Hogrefe (1940a) also identifies this idea, stating that 
“interesting amateur writing, we think, like nearly all great literature, is in some way 
autobiography, based upon self-exploration and developed with authentic feeling” (p. 
156-57). Important to note for this study, though, is the context within which this writing 
occurs; it cannot be done without the intervention of a teacher. Students, while they may 
now be seen as more complicated human beings with interests, needs, problems, 
aspirations, what have you, still need the context of an assignment to produce 
prescriptively reflective writing, the context of the classroom to motivate them to do so, 
and the critical eye of an authority figure to assess whether or not the writing is 
acceptable (both mechanically and in content). Green (1940; 1941) is quite vocal about 
this point, and it seems that the others who have taken this “interest approach” to writing 
pedagogy would agree: is the teacher’s job to lead students to this kind of self-
understanding. Students, though now seen as harboring potential, are still too lost, too 
ignorant, to do this type of work on their own.  
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It is thus the teachers’ job to lead students. However, with the emerging pedagogy 
of interest, the teacher-leader does so by adopting a new role, that of the performer. 
Garnett and Griebling (1940) as well as Holmes (1944) refer to the Vaudevillian talents 
that make a professor particularly interesting. Haber (1941) suggests that for a student to 
maintain interest in the class, the professor must have a sense of humor. Williams (1940) 
acknowledges that composition students are often not interested in the finer points of 
language, and thus “the professor of language must have dynamite on the brain. He needs 
it for shocking his class into similar interest” (p. 408). Assignments are not sufficient to 
engage students; the professor needs to evince a particular personality and/or become a 
performer. In other words, the professor must be likable. Nothing about this is surprising; 
as the professor takes on a more a pastoral role, acknowledging individual student 
interests and by extension, who they are, there is a need to build trust with those student. 
Indeed, one “means for a student's achieving self-exploration is his teacher's help to the 
recognition of creative values in his material. Here the teacher is a friendly advisor” 
(Hogrefe, 1940a, p. 158). In this case, it is the friendly of the teacher that gives way to the 
self-exploration that also serves as an unveiling of confession to the teacher. The concept 
of professor likability reigns during the period that the pedagogy of interest dominates. 
Even criticism of students’ writing, though sincere, should be delivered in a friendly way 
(Green, 1941; Glicksberg, 1950).  
Thus, the power dynamic between student and teacher changes. Now, to teach in 
an effective way, professors of composition must attempt to absolve, at least to a degree, 
the authoritative lines between student and teacher, to become something of a friend—
and given the nature of probing assignments, something of a confidant. This is not to 
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suggest that the authoritative power vested in the teacher disappears. But it takes a new 
shape. It is now more subtle; the teacher is on the student’s side. If there were any doubt, 
we need only look at the fact that the professor now tries to understand student interests, 
develops assignments not to test the student, but to interest and engage them, and above 
all, entertains. In this way, the professor is beholden to the student; however, the 
professor may ultimately call upon a position of authority should things get out of hand. 
The professor still disciplines as the student has to speak the appropriate discourse, 
occupy the appropriate subject position, to advance. But the role of disciplinarian is less 
apparent when it is combined with the roles of pastor and friend.  
But as the professor is now expected to entertain, so is the student. The engaged 
and interested student should now be able produce engaging and interesting work. An 
underlying message of nearly every piece examined thus far is that the student, once 
interested and stimulated as a writing/written self, should produce work that “says 
something.” Indeed, this may be one of the largest complaints of professors during the 
1940s, that the student, unless stimulated in the right way, has nothing to say (e.g: 
Blackmur, 1941; Campbell, 1939; Green, 1941; Ringnalda & Ringnalda, 1939; Wykoff, 
1940). Green (1941) a strong advocate of autobiographical writing in freshman English, 
provides a series of instructional suggestions designed to “get final papers with original 
theses at least tenable and interesting” (p. 601) that produce something “worth saying” (p. 
596). The balance of student subjectivity, interestedness, and interest production is 
perhaps displayed best by Westerfield (1948). Tired of receiving themes that were boring 
to him, Westerfield began creating specific assignments that he himself thought would be 
interesting to read—but even then, the ideas of student interest and subjectivity helped 
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guide his assignments: I limited the research subjects to studies of a racial or national 
minority in the United States or of a foreign  population problem. I had interest and 
information here; all students should be interested because they were all members of 
minorities or interested in some neighboring minority (p. 42). Others argue that a virtue 
of interesting the student produces interesting work (Dudley, 1939; Hogrefe, 1940a), and 
in fact, one of the requirements for exemption from freshman English at Indian 
University was to write on a topic of personal interest—to pass, the writing itself had to 
have “something to say” and be “interesting; vivid” (Hendricks, 1940, p. 614). There is 
thus an expectation that while the professor performs and entertains through appealing to 
students’ selves and interests, the student returns this consideration in writing.   
* * * 
Thus, a pedagogy of interest provides new ways to assess students and their 
characters. By blurring the authoritarian lines that clearly existed between student and 
teacher in the early 1900s, students are persuaded to share something of themselves so 
that it is not simply their writing that is on display to be judged, but their potential to “fit 
in” with academia, their subjective command and alignment to academic discourses. 
More than ever before, writing is not simply a command of mechanical conventions, but 
it is the ability to say something, to remain interesting, while painting a picture of oneself 
and staying engaged mentally, emotionally, and behaviorally throughout the writing 
process. Students are capable of this as long as their interest is effectively piqued by the 
professor and coursework. This understanding of history stands markedly against the 
conventional understanding of the era before the 1960s. Far from being dominated by the 
top-down, lock-step black age that was current traditional rhetoric, we see a conversation 
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emerging in which the student is the central concern. Under this model, the student is 
understood as deeply complicated, affected by various environmental factors, and the 
pedagogy of interest develops ways to better understand the student subject.  
If we take all of this seriously, it would seem that we have effectively done away 
with the binary of student as inherently capable/incapable. Incapability is now explicable, 
a result of social causes, and to make a student capable, we need only determine what 
those causes are, counter them, and ignite interest within the student. All students are thus 
capable. And yet, from all of this, a new binary emerges. It is no longer the binary of 
students as capable or incapable, as existed at the end of the 19th century, but it is now a 
binary of interested vs. dis-interested: engaged vs. disengaged. When understood as 
inherently incapable or stupid, there was little one could do to blame the student. The 
student simply was, and the university was not the right place for this student. Now, 
however, the disinterested, disengaged student is consciously or unconsciously resistant, 
not willing to be interested in the efforts of the professor. We must dig deeper into this 
students’ subjectivity to find out why, to develop a different strategy to engage this 
student. The pedagogy of interest provides a justification for meticulous analysis; a 
technology that justifies and produces new knowledges about the students in our 
composition classes.  
Part 3: Composed of Various Discourses 
Thus far, I have referred to composition as a field, which is perhaps a misnomer. 
It is, rather, a discourse composed of those other discourses which preceded it. For 
Foucault, a discourse is an irruption of the knowledges that exist (and have existed) 
around a given area of knowledge—a formulation composed of that which has already 
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been said, or at least acknowledged as valid and true within a particular episteme 
(Foucault, 1972). No discipline, or irruption of knowledge, can exist without deriving 
legitimacy from other disciplines already established. Foucault provides an example 
within the schooling institution: “the school has to call in the psychologist when the 
power exercised at school ceases to be a real power, and becomes a both mythical and 
fragile power, the reality of which must consequently be intensified” (2006, p. 190). 
Power ceases to be “real power” when it is no longer viewed as a legitimate or necessary 
practice between individuals. The introduction of another discipline, in this case, 
psychology, and using psychology both to guide and back up the practices in education 
reaffirms the necessity of relationships that exist which we call a school. The introduction 
of scientificity through the means of a discipline like psychology provides legitimacy for 
the practice. In the case of composition, Hawk (2009) has described how this kind of 
legitimizing scientificity can be seen as composition conjoins itself with rhetoric, a 
rational, teachable, and generally scientific approach to argumentation and writing.  
However, college composition, as it began developing its engaging pedagogy of 
interest, was under the influence of various discourses outside of itself. In 1940, Williams 
noted that “because there is academic lightning and thunder and earthquake today, 
college English will be different tomorrow; it may lose individual entity, merging with 
other subjects of the curriculum in one common aim” (p. 406). What type of merging was 
she referring to, and what disciplines did she see as having such sway over College 
English? Examining the literature, we see both direct and indirect references to other 
fields in composition, especially education, psychology, and even, to a degree, medicine.  
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Of course, this is not to say that these discourses had not already influenced 
composition before the 1940s. Even thirty years before we see interest dictating 
composition pedagogy, Palmer (1912) noted that “the proverbial rhetoric instructor is 
breaking away from the staid ways of the dogmatic pedagogue and is beginning to thaw a 
little, to throw life into a subject that was once considered dull but necessary, by imbuing 
his students with the contagion of scientific investigation” (p. 490). Included under the 
heading of scientific investigation are the fields of psychology, philosophy, history, and 
“kindred sciences.” Such openness, he suggested, keeps the field alive, progressing, 
moving. But how exactly did these sciences appear in composition? At the time of his 
writing, psychology was pioneering new means of assessment for writing studies. 
College entrance examinations had recently been developed, introducing psychometrics 
to the college environment. Elliot (2005) identifies 1911 as the point when composition 
began showings signs of psychology’s influence; this is when Thorndike introduced what 
he referred to as a “non-arbitrary” scale for assessing writing skills of college students. At 
this time, psychology was developing statistical measures to pinpoint, compare, and 
express human intelligences, and the ability to assess one’s writing skill as “a perfectly 
definite thing” (Thorndike, 1903, p. 22). As Elliot notes, this reliance on statistics is how 
American psychology began to differ from its German counterpart, which was based on 
more generic observation and theory, rather than statistical measurement. Such 
psychometric measures allowed administrators and teachers to objectively name stronger 
and weaker writers, and this became the model for college entrance and admittance to 
college English classes.  
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Psychology. But these tests did not simply tell university personnel how poorly 
students wrote; psychometrics allowed college personal to make predictions about one’s 
intelligence and general ability to succeed in college, and this is why they were 
considered effective as measures for admissions. Those that could not pass a simple 
written examination simply were not cut out for the rigors of college. At the same time, 
IQ tests were being developed and validated using mass numbers of military recruits, and 
this is the time that eugenics was strongly considered as a result of such tests (Elliot, 
2005). The discipline of psychology and the statistical, empirical measures that it brought 
could tell us everything we needed to know about the individual’s ability to think. Such 
an approach to understanding the individual aligned nicely with the early manifestations 
of current-traditional rhetoric (e.g. Genung, 1894; Lockwood & Emerson, 1901; Wendell, 
1891) at the turn of the century, which was driven by its focus on trying to fill in 
students’ deficiencies (and a lack of focus on individual student subjects). But this 
approach does not match with the pedagogy of interest that was emerging less than thirty 
years later. As I have already established, by the 1940s, one’s intelligence was no longer 
the marker of ability to write. It was one’s individual interest, the possibility of engaging 
students in a lesson by having them write about themselves and their environment 
(Dudley, 1939; Green, 1940; 1941; Hogrefe, 1940; Weisinger, 1941) or metaphorical (or 
literal) dragons (Digna, 1940; Inlow, 1940; Daniels, 1949) that determined one’s success 
in the writing course. This is likely why, even in 1932, Carl Brigham, then the associate 
secretary of the College Board, stated that psychometric testing had become “ridiculous,” 
that “data may be regarded from another viewpoint which is not psychological… a 
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science independent of psychology will emerge from a closer scrutiny of test data” (p. 
28). 
Brigham’s (1932) words suggest an emerging anxiety around typifying students 
based on psychological testing, however he was certainly hasty in suggesting that any 
science emerging from the data would be entirely independent of psychology. Brigham, 
himself a professor of psychology and developer of many such psychometric tests 
(including the SAT), was not clear about what this other viewpoint might be or how it 
would be entirely divorced from psychology. His psychology, based on validated 
instruments produced for mass use, did not account for individual variables, or what 
Berlin (1987) has referred to as subjective rhetorics, which he notes started becoming 
popular in the 1920s and 30s. While Brigham did not account for such subjectivity in his 
version of psychology, this does not mean that composition, as it began to focus more on 
student subjectivity and interest, was void of psychological disciplinary influence 
altogether. As Berlin notes, “the most immediate sources of subjective theories for 
college writing courses during the twenties and thirties are found in the depth psychology 
of Freud's American disciples” (p. 11). It was not a new science apart from psychology 
that composition drew influence from, as Brigham claimed, but a different brand of 
psychology, one designed to better understand the inner workings of the individual 
subject at the level of the individual subject. Even in the 1940s, those in the field of 
English recognized that psychology was breaking into distinct kinds. Muller (1943), 
examining how the sciences might inform literary criticism, suggested that the “literary 
critic can be content with the obvious pertinence of all these psychologies, and can even 
welcome their diversity. In adapting the various provisional findings to his own uses, he 
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can get along well enough with practical wisdom” (p. 81). Psychology as a discipline 
could offer a number of ways of approaching teaching, beyond those offered by just 
psychometric data. By 1945, practitioners and pedagogues were highly skeptical of any 
broad claims that psychology made about human intelligence. Baker (1945) takes 
Thorndike to task (and, in fact, compares him to Adolph Hitler), suggesting that a 
“science of man” could never be accounted for in the science of psychology because of 
its reductionist tendencies. A true science of man considers individual developments, 
morality, truth, and beauty. And when we consider the way that the pedagogy of interest 
manifest—by having students write about themselves, finding personal truths, expressing 
beliefs about beauty—we see how closely composition aligned with a psychoanalytic 
approach by the 1940s rather than Thorndike’s quantitative take on psychology. This 
observation, perhaps, is what led White (1941) to note that “biography—which was ever 
a somewhat spinsterish companion of humane learning—found her true calling with the 
advent of popular psychoanalysis. The poet’s soul was bared” (p. 572). In both college 
composition and psychoanalysis, there is a revealing or “baring” that must occur, a 
therapeutic “talking through” of the self, so that greater enlightenment, either 
psychological or educational, might be attained. What we see emerging, then, is not a 
“science independent of psychology” referred to by Brigham, but a psychology of 
independence, focused on understanding the independent individual.  
Though Brigham expressed concern over the kind of scrutiny given to 
psychometric test data in the early 1930s, but composition had been adopting more 
individualistic psychological approaches since the advent of Thorndike’s writing portion 
of college entrance exams. However, what we see in the early 1900s is not yet Freudian, 
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and it does not call itself psychoanalytic. It is, rather, based on readings of Deweyan 
theories of psychology and education. It appears even in the first publication of The 
English Journal with Abbott (1912), who acknowledged the usefulness of exact standards 
of progress created by Thorndike, but who also encouraged new teachers to acquaint 
themselves with both Dewey and James. He does not explain what, exactly, these new 
teachers will gain from reading Dewey and James beyond the development of broad 
foundational, professional knowledge. Such a sentiment is echoed by Baker (1913), who 
asks the English teachers take “general courses in the theory and practice of teaching 
based on psychology” because with such knowledge, “one escapes many blunders, 
arrives at skill sooner” (p. 339). These two pieces do not speak in great detail about what 
skills, precisely, psychology will help teachers of composition to cultivate. However, 
Dewey is cited well into the 1940s in composition literature, and later works shed light 
upon what Dewey’s psychology may have offered to composition pedagogy. In many 
ways, his version of psychology (or, rater, 1930s and 40s compositionists’ readings of 
Dewey) creates a bridge between the conception of static intelligences put forth in early 
psychometric testing and current-traditional rhetoric, on the one hand, and the 
individualistic pedagogy of interest developing in the 1940s on the other. 
Several pieces suggest that Dewey is useful as his theories help to articulate how 
students should be made to think. Indeed, it is exactly this reasoning that Thompson 
(1916) provides to justify a step-by-step model of paragraph development. His model, he 
claims, is a useful template for helping students think in the right way about topic 
development in writing. For the purposes of this project, the model itself is 
unimportant—what is important to take away is that Dewey’s psychology can be used to 
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both create and justify a specific kind of thinking subject. Similarly, citing both 
Thorndike and Dewey, Hosic (1918) puts forth an outline for the “problem-project 
method,” a “principle” and “natural method of learning” (p. 599) that smacks of the 
problem-based learning of today in that students are encouraged to define a problem and 
work as a group to write through and solve it, often as a group. The point of this method 
for Hosic is that it allows the “occasion for thinking and for organization of knowledge” 
(p. 600). Hosic claims that it is easy to waste time trying to teach children to think, and 
that a reliable method needs to be developed for this purpose. He is quick to acknowledge 
that his method is not aligned with the idea of interest. Rather, it is a means of developing 
correct approaches to thinking through composition work. We see this kind of 
model/thought building into 1936 with Bader, who argues that the goal of composition 
and paper writing should be to have students engage in Dewey’s “reflective thinking,” or 
“a mode of thinking which in any given situation implies the analysis of fact, judgment 
exerted upon that analysis, and the consequent forming of a belief” (p. 668).  In these 
cases, Dewey’s psychology does not support the developing pedagogy of interest that 
will appear so strongly in the 1940s, but it is used as a way to justify a more disciplinary 
approach to composition, one in which student intelligence can be molded through the 
use of writing. Under this model, writing acts as a technology that can be used to examine 
the way that students think, assess whether or not their thinking process is coherent and 
correct, and to (re)shape extant (incorrect) ways of thinking. Under this model, 
psychology moves away from the psychometric understanding of education because 
thinking and intelligence are malleable. However, it does not yet embrace the 
pedagogical approaches outlined in the previous chapter because there is less concern for 
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the differences that exist in each learner. Each student may be taught a model, and the 
good student will adopt that model to form expressions and thought. 
 However, we still see in early work that invokes Dewey an anticipation of a 
pedagogy of interest. Even Thompson (1916), who argued that writing and thought 
building were two sides of the same coin, suggested that such thought building could not 
be done if students were not genuinely interested in their assignments: “the teacher must 
make sure that there is interest in the assignments. If an interest does not exist, he must 
create it; he must, if possible, make the pupils feel that there is a fascination about the 
subjects” (p. 617-618). He does not explain how exactly a teacher might develop this 
interest in students, but Marsh (1916), writing at the same time as Thompson, helps to 
shed light on what might need to be done. She notes that if school is life, as Dewey 
claimed, “then there should be, on the part of the teacher, close study of the needs of the 
individual child. With this carried to its extreme, we can readily see that we should have 
individualism as a result.” (p. 89). Similarly, Breck (1923), addressing the Deweyan 
notion that school is designed to integrate students into the broad community, argues that 
teachers of English need psychological training in student development because “when 
we teachers know as intelligently the students we teach as the material which we present, 
there will be more general and genuine liking there than is today for the subject of 
English” (p. 548). We see Breck anticipating the pedagogy of interest and engagement, as 
her focus is on producing an affinity toward the discipline while studying the needs of the 
student through student psychology. In both Marsh and Breck, there exists the idea that to 
help the student, teachers must know the student. Even as psychometric testing was 
coming into its own, developing ways to understand and categorizes students based on 
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mass measures of intelligence, compositionists were adopting and extending a different 
brand of psychology for the “close study” of their students, one rooted in individualism; 
as Brower (1942) would later claim, coursework in psychology (as well as philosophy 
and methods of education) could be useful for their “humanizing effect” (p. 731) on 
composition teachers’ practices in the classroom. Indeed, there is a humanizing move 
away from psychometrics, however, such a move also requires a more careful scrutiny of 
the student subject; a more sophisticated knowledge about who, exactly, students are; and 
the development of strategies for students to reveal something of themselves within 
writing.  
The stage was thus set to invoke psychology in the pedagogy of interest. 
Psychology had always had roots in composition (or vice versa), and as interest became 
more prevalent an idea in addressing student pedagogy, we see individualizing versions 
of psychology, those that sought to analyze the subject, inextricably linked. Pitkin (1940) 
speaks about interest and psychology together in his The Art of Useful Writing, a book 
designed to give “sound advice to the student and the man in the street on the techniques 
of effective writing… devoted to highly practical exercises in story construction, in logic, 
and in psychology” (NCTE, 1940, p. 304). Under the heading “The Psychology of Useful 
Writing,” Pitkin explains that one of the most effective means of putting forth an 
argument is to make sure one is interesting—begin writing with an interesting story, he 
suggests, and slowly tie that story into the argument being made. It would seem that here, 
Pitkin is describing the psychology and interest of readership rather than author. 
However, as we have seen earlier, having interest and being interesting operate mutually. 
As the student engages interest to complete a paper, so too must the student engage the 
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reader by producing something of interest. This relationship is made clear when Pitkin 
explains how one might engage the interest of a reader: 
Most of us lose the keen edge of wonder all too early. We drag through the 
years taking for granted a million marvels. As the house cat eyes the moon 
in her inane complacence, so most men contemplate their cosmos with 
empty minds. Void calls to void. But a few rare spirits go on itching as 
long as they live… he who lives and dies in the midst of astonishments has 
the scientist’s mind—if not his training. For the elect, then, you may write 
about the wonders of nature, about inventions, about odd facts and queer 
events… The itch to know will bring you readers. (p. 138) 
“Interesting writing” is not simply a matter of discovering what might interest the reader. 
It is a matter of adopting a “scientific mind,” a particular disposition toward the world 
and then sharing that disposition with readership. To be interesting, one must be 
interested, and must unveil those interests. While this may or may not be sound advice, 
we must also keep in mind Pitkin’s readership: his book, according to the NCTE, falls 
into a category of “for students,” which means that his readers’ readership would be the 
college English professor. Useful writing, from a psychological standpoint, means 
adopting an orientation of composing one’s interests for the teacher of English.  
 Pitkin is not the only scholar who suggests that interesting writing is the result of 
one’s psychological orientation. Only a year later, Sailstad (1941) suggests that one must 
approach conversations with “psychological ease” and developed a “conversation lab” (p. 
381) for his writing course. To develop this psychological ease, students were expected to 
take concurrent courses in psychology, including courses titled “Individual Orientation” 
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and “Social Adjustment,” which Sailstad claims were “more concerned with finding 
practical applications to the personal problems of youth than in building up ‘pigeon hole’ 
jargons to make possible the easy construction of smoothly efficient objective 
examinations” (p. 382). Over the course of thirty years, we see what appears to be a 
reaction to the initial uses of psychology in college writing. Sailstad, like Brigham 
(1932), is careful to call attention to how individually oriented this version of psychology 
is, how it does everything but pigeon hole the individual into particular types. Knowing 
oneself, claims Sailstad, allows for a kind of reflection that is not evident in the early 
(psychometric) uses of psychology in writing. Students who have learned to orient 
themselves individually and adjust themselves socially should already be in a state of 
psychological ease. This is because they have the skills to reflect upon themselves and 
make adjustments when they discover “personal problems” within themselves. We see 
how such a way of thinking about student psychology allies itself with the “personal” 
kinds of writing assignments described by Dudley (1939) and Green (1940), the 
psychoanalytic, biographical approach that lays bare the writer’s soul (White, 1941). It is 
through revealing oneself that one is able to find faults with oneself and begin the work 
of reorienting or readjusting. Psychological ease comes when one knows oneself, but in 
the case of “personal problems of youth,” such laying bare must be guided by those that 
decide what counts and the “right” orientation and adjustment, namely, the professors 
overseeing the entire project.  
 At the same time that composition’s use of psychology justified certain 
pedagogical strategies, it also invalidated others. While a pedagogy based on student 
interest began to preclude rote memorization exercises and workbooks, the field of 
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psychology offered justification for doing so. We see this in both Ford (1942) and 
Wykoff (1943), who are particularly critical of textbooks that encourage drilling 
exercises in college English. Ford, whose piece is called “The Menace of the Freshman 
English Workbook,” argues that such exercises are in isolation, divorced from other 
disciplines or meaningful activities, “it creates the psychological attitude in the mind of 
the student that language correctness is a thing apart, a special phenomenon designed 
primarily to give the English teacher something to do” (p. 66). Unlike the psychology of 
Pitkin (1940) and Sailstad (1941), such drill practices lead to bad psychological habits, 
creating associations in the student mind that are unwanted. It comes as no surprise, then, 
that Ford suggests turning to individualistic methods for teaching. As for the grammar 
instruction that workbooks were supposed to provide, Ford suggests that the teacher 
again assume a pastoral role, examining with “generous and painstaking aid” students’ 
writing, helping them to correct grammar mistakes on an individual basis. Wykoff (1943) 
similarly stands against workbooks and drilling exercises, although his rationale differs 
from Fords in that Wykoff invokes a more quantitative, psychometric version of 
psychology as his basis:  
If there is any especially weak point in our teaching of reading according 
to the methods indicated by such books as these, it is the same weakness—
as the psychologists are fond of telling us—of most of our college English 
teaching. We assume, theoretically, that all college freshmen are equally 
well prepared and more or less equally intelligent, that all are capable of 
fulfilling the requirements of our courses. Practically, we know better. In 
composition, for example, many colleges have separate classes for the 
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superior and the inferior students, but the middle group, ranging in test per 
centiles from 20 to 70, is certainly not homogeneous (p. 248).  
Surprisingly, it is through statistical measures that had all but been thrown out by 
composition that Wykoff is able to make his case against textbooks. Psychometric testing 
tells us that students do not all operate on the same level; there are, first, extremes, those 
in need of specialized courses, but there is also a bell curve of disparate ability, to which 
no one textbook can address itself wholly or efficiently. Here, a psychometric model 
becomes justification for those tenets of the pedagogy of interest, rather than the simple 
gatekeeping mechanism that it had been years prior. Students must be dealt with on an 
individual basis, a lesson that seems to be punctuated by both Dewey and Freud. This, 
however, means that there can no longer be catch-all kinds of assignments or assessments 
of the type that current-traditional rhetoric has been accused of harboring for years.  
 Still, many compositionists saw a need for grammar instruction in composition, 
despite the fact that psychological influences suggested that grammar drills were not 
adequate to teach students. Recognizing that sentence building “is the natural, 
psychological approach” to teaching grammar (Salisbury, 1936, p. 358), many 
composition teachers sought to understand what psychology might say about the teaching 
of such a traditionally rote subject, and we begin to see research emerging on grammar 
and language instruction driven by psychological principles, rather than untheoretical 
workbook drills. Flesch (1946), for instance, advocated the use of linguistic and 
psychological rules to teach grammar in his composition classroom. In particular, Flesch 
was concerned with the jargon often taught to students of science, business, and law 
(bureaucrats), and he wanted to teach them to use simpler language. To do so, “the writer 
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has to know something about the structure of language in general. He should know about 
the gradual development of languages… about the place of contemporary English in this 
development; and about the structure of languages that have gone further than English in 
this process of simplification and ‘stream lining’” (p. 471). In this case, psychology can 
be used in such a way as to describe how the mind processes and builds linguistic 
features (anticipating the cognitive movement that would come nearly forty years later). 
This can also be seen in Bryant (1947), who takes a relativistic stance to grammar 
teaching. She claims that grammar is often seen as one of the “last strongholds of the 
logician, the last of the sciences where certainty is thought to reign” (p. 407). However, 
spends much of her time showing where logic does not apply in English grammar, 
provides several examples of where English grammar is “deficient” compared to other 
languages, and explains the “psychology” behind grammar mistakes. She closes by 
noting that grammar is not, in fact, governed by logic, but by social conventions, and 
concludes that “the importance of psychology has come to be recognized in almost all 
activities involving human relationships” and “that psychological principles are at work 
constantly in determining the form and direction of our speech” (p. 412). Such an 
observation plays nicely with those of Wykoff (1943) and Sailstad (1941), and suggests 
that grammar is relative to its purpose—we must consider the various individual stances 
of each student. 
However, derivative of this psychological approach is the ability to more 
meticulously parse out and understand the way one uses language. Before the 1940s, 
students’ use of grammar was simply right or wrong.  By suggesting that grammar is a 
social function connected to one’s individual psychology, we may now say much more 
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about individual types of students: where they are from, familial upbringing, how they 
think. The subjective makeup of the individual becomes an object of study (Foucault, 
1977/1995). Although there was clearly a conscious effort to stray away from typifying 
students using psychometric testing in composition, the move to radical individualism 
still typifies, albeit in a different way. In the same way that biographical writing offers an 
inroad to the students’ subjectivity, psychology becomes both justification for and a 
mode of disciplinary technology. It is justification because approaching students on an 
individual basis is now simply objectively better than other methods of pedagogy. 
Psychology, a rising star of the sciences, dictates it. But it also becomes a disciplinary 
technology in itself in that this individualism allows for correcting student behavior in the 
space of the student’s mind. If something is wrong, if something needs to be changed, it 
is in the psychological processing of the student. But with this observation, we see 
immediately how a pedagogy of interest was able to arise and how much overlap exists 
within the professor’s role as disciplinarian, on the one hand, and pastor, on the other.  
To be an English teacher, notes Fullington (1949), means understanding “the 
nature of man,” and to do so, “we must go to many fields of knowledge: economics, 
political science, psychology, genetics, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, religion” 
(261). The suggestion, it seems, is that the English teacher not invest so much into 
English or writing itself, but that the English teacher become something beyond, a 
studyier of human sciences in general. This sentiment appears several years earlier in 
Wykoff (1943) who states that studying students in composition coursework requires that 
“we should have to depend for considerable assistance on our colleagues in education and 
psychology; indeed, we might make more progress if we make them the principals and 
  
155 
 
ourselves the assistants in preparing such an experimental program (p. 253). With the 
introduction of psychology, we see how pastoral the instructor of composition is to 
become. This instructor not only tends the flock, but must know the habits, desires, and 
subjectivities of those in the flock to anticipate their psychological needs and lead them to 
“greater” heights. Based on the literature produced at the time, we might even suggest 
that college composition was a kind of smokescreen, as it seems that the last concern for 
composition teachers was their ability to teach writing. Rather, the concern was how well 
they could assess, psychologically and socially, the character of the students in their 
classrooms. Composition, under the pedagogy of interest, was no longer about producing 
writing students, but about producing a subject that, incidentally, could write. Students 
must have something interesting to say, they must be able to say the right sort of thing 
under the right conditions, and skilling and drilling was not a way to produce this. 
Instead, students’ psychology must be explored by the composition instructor and 
“tweaked” to produce what was considered to be effective writing. 
Education. It is also clear, even by looking at psychology’s influence on the 
development of composition, that education as a field was also largely invoked. Dewey is 
generally considered to be an educational psychologist, and even in many of the 
quotations above, we see both education and psychology mentioned in the same breath: 
teachers of composition need training in both education and psychology (Brower, 1942; 
Wykoff, 1943), and to be an effective educator for composition studies means giving 
attention to student psychology (Bader, 1936; Breck, 1923; Bryant, 1947; Brower; 
Marsh, 1916). Given this attention to education, it means that like psychology, 
composition was seen as something other than, but potentially governed by, rules existing 
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in the educational discipline. Indeed, Witherspoon (1939) makes it clear that education 
existed agonistically alongside other disciplines in higher education at the beginning of 
the 40s, claiming that “educational theorists have long since proved to their own 
satisfaction that subject-matter and departmental organization are the fleurs du mal of the 
educational flora” (p. 562). Education had been making of itself a kind of meta-
discipline, and other programs of study needed the input of education to be effective. Of 
course, we see pushback to this idea. Witherspoon stands as one example, but in the field 
of composition, perhaps the largest example of such pushback was written by Wykoff 
(1939) in the second issue of College English. Writing an “Open Letter to the 
Educational Experts on Teaching Composition” (although these experts are not 
specifically named), Wykoff expresses his disdain for the claim made by educational 
experts that grammar and spelling have no relation to writing. He asks, in a tongue-in-
cheek manner, for advice on how to teach composition sans grammar instruction, 
hyperbolically deifying educational experts as all-knowers and scientific researchers 
while denigrating his own profession, referring to compositionists as “pedagogic 
pretenders” and “academic proletarians” (p. 146). A year later, Wykoff (1940) articulated 
his grievances with the field of education more thoroughly: in sum, he was largely critical 
of the reductive, statistical methods that educational researchers used to gather 
information on students’ reading and writing abilities, as well as the distance that 
educationalists were able to maintain from the field they were studying. His problems 
with education seem to echo the sentiments of Seely (1930), who ten years earlier made 
similar claims about the field of education, a “pseudoscience” which had gleefully 
adopted and vandalistically manhandled statistical and scientific measures (p. 234).  
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 While Wykoff’s (1939) piece is clearly critical of the educational discipline 
encroaching on composition studies, it suggests that there was a conversation emerging 
between education and composition nonetheless. And when Wykoff ironically and 
sarcastically ends his piece stating that compositionists “look to you [educational 
experts], and to you only, for guidance and assistance in the solution of our compositional 
problems” (p. 146), it is difficult to tell the degree of irony that he employs. Despite the 
standoffish nature of his “open letter,” there is a challenge being issued to education, one 
that almost necessarily asks the discipline to weigh in on compositional affairs; his tone 
demands some sort of response from educational researchers, and wat is more, looking at 
his later work, it would seem that Wykoff is not entirely against education having 
influence over composition. We have already seen that by 1943, he is willing to “depend” 
on those in education for theoretical input. Ten years after his “Open Letter,” he suggests 
that all composition teachers should have some familiarity with “general educational 
theory” and further suggests that compositionists “adopt a more scientific attitude toward 
the details of [their] work” (Wykoff, 1949, p. 320) by adopting the scientific researcher 
identity that he had negatively thrust on educational experts a decade prior.  
And Wykoff is not alone in building a dialogue with the field of education. Many 
saw the issue of pedagogy in composition as one that simply could not be surmounted by 
composition studies itself, that pedagogy was a matter for educational research. 
Ringnalda (1939), for instance, claims that “the whole problem of teaching Freshman 
English lifts itself into a universal problem of college education” (p. 139). Fountain 
(1940) suggests that to improve the state of the English classroom, there must be a 
serious examination of the training that teachers “get in teacher-training institutions and a 
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widespread current theory of what education is” (p. 321). Echoing these sentiments is 
Morrison (1941): “the real need on which required freshman English rests is the need for 
training in language as an instrument of reading, thinking, and writing. This is an 
immense task. It is a task of education in general… not of an English department 
considered as a body of scholars devoted to a particular and specialized field” (p. 787). 
Despite Witherspoon’s (1939) and Wykoff’s (1939; 1940) complaints, it seems that 
education had indeed set itself as a kind of meta-discipline, one that might have 
implications for the teaching of all other disciplines, and many compositionists were 
eager to see what it could do for their own field. 
 The issue—the reason that composition needed to rely on education—was that 
composition as a discourse had not defined for itself a distinct pedagogical approach. 
Until the approach involving student interest had arisen in the late 30s and early 40s, 
composition had been based on the idea that students should simply produce correct 
writing: “instructors were not to make the themes interesting, but, rather, to make them 
correct” (Elliot, 2005, p. 14). However, if this was the only goal articulated for college 
composition from the outset, there was no science behind producing such correct themes. 
As composition became widespread throughout the nation, there was a need to re-
examine the goals of composition—not simply to make students produce correct writing, 
but to determine methods that led to the production of correct writing. Leading up to the 
1940s, we see several scholars lamenting the lack of pedagogical direction in 
composition. The first article ever published in The English Journal, a journal accepting 
essays written on all topics of English at all levels of study, focused on the question of 
teaching college composition. This certainly suggests that the issue of pedagogy in 
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freshman composition was central to English studies shortly after the turn of the century. 
In his article, Hopkins (1912) examines the state of the composition teacher, who has 
been generally pulled from teaching literature courses with no additional training or 
guidance. He calls for a movement beyond “that ignorant or careless dependence upon 
tradition and the merest guesswork” (p. 7) that had been driving composition teaching for 
nearly thirty years. In the same issue of The English Journal, immediately following 
Hopkins’ publication, is another by Lewis (1912), which focuses on various aspects of 
English teaching, including composition studies. Lewis wonders if there is a cohesive aim 
in the English course. He acknowledges that one of the broad goals “is, first, to secure 
power in oral and written expression” (p. 9), but noting that students do not seem to be 
securing this power, queries “have we aimed at the wrong thing?” (p. 11). He concludes 
by asking if all English teachers even agree as to the aims and methods of teaching 
English concerning composition and writing. In short, if having students write correctly 
could be considered a definite aim of composition, despite the broadness of that aim, then 
there was no vision or agreement about how to make this happen; effective teaching of 
composition was, as Hopkins suggested, merely guesswork. 
 This attitude, one proclaiming that the work of teaching composition is poorly 
defined, continues into the next decade. McCaslin (1925) argues that the prospect of 
teaching students to write correctly is “stupidly superficial,” on the grounds that in 
actuality, “there isn't any such thing in itself as the teaching of composition; it is only the 
organon of all subjects” (p. 111). If this is the case, composition exists far beyond themes 
written in a classroom called Freshman English; it is a habit of mind, one that needs 
substantial thought and collaboration across disciplines to attempt to teach. As such, 
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grading criteria vary substantially. Henry (1928) is at odds regarding the fact that 
“objective” standards are beginning to make their way into assessment of freshman 
composition. Such standardization removes teacher autonomy, he believes, and dampens 
the connection between student and teacher. This is in direct contrast to Pooley (1928), 
who wishes that composition standards could be more scientific and precise. Howes 
(1928) is unsure of what topics (if any) should be assigned to freshmen as they develop 
their themes (although he concludes that they should simply write from their own 
experience, anticipating the coming student/interest-centric pedagogical movement). The 
point of rapid-fire summarizations of each of these pieces is to suggest that before 1930, 
composition was lacking in any kind of substantial direction in terms of its aims, 
methods, and by extension, pedagogy. The late 1920s begin to identify a problem of 
pedagogy, one which the 1930s must begin to solve.  
In 1930, Seely, though distrustful of the statistical side of education, recognized a 
need for the English instructor to receive teacher training and articulated a need for 
English instruction and education to overlap. If we take McCaslin seriously, there can be 
no such thing as a pure composition instructor. The compositions instructor must also be 
an educationalist: “simply having a college subject-matter expert will not do” but “neither 
will the educational theorist. Our instructor must be competent in both directions” (Seely, 
p. 241-242). Such an observation about a need for composition and education to overlap 
makes way for similar observations that would come later, many of which are highlighted 
at the beginning of this section (Fountain, 1940; Morrison, 1941; Ringnalda, 1939; 
Wykoff, 1943; Wykoff, 1949). If composition was an organon, a process of thinking that 
spoke to all disciplines, not simply a paper that could be deemed correct or incorrect, then 
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it needed to join forces with another organon, another meta-discipline that could give 
some form and substance to the otherwise elusive and formless field of composition.  
The question that remains as we examine education’s influences on composition, 
however, is how exactly did education influence composition? What did composition 
hope to attain from education? And what exactly counted as a field of education, apart 
from the educational psychologists such as James and Dewey, who were the educational 
experts that Wykoff (1939) addressed in his open letter? Turning to Williams (1940), 
who asks “Who Should Teach English,” we begin to see what qualities the English 
faculty saw as necessary for educators of composition. For Williams, having a 
psychological background is far from enough. Instead, Williams proposes as the ideal 
teacher a scholar “who knows his country, appreciates development and change, and 
forecasts demands of the future; in short, he contributes more to the life of the student” 
(p. 408). It is this final idea, that of contributing to the life of the student, that Williams 
capitalizes on for the rest of her article: “His intention and desire are to help students 
express themselves in written English and through expression to live more largely in at 
least cubical dimensions” (p. 409).  Additionally, this teacher has an eye for relevance in 
student lives. His students will, upon graduation, know how to write a proper business 
letter, and this teacher will not “tie up composition with literature” (p. 412), knowing full 
well that literature does not contribute to student lives. Instead, “life is their province, 
through which they are guided in observation, thought, originality, and joy in expressing 
life” (p. 412).  
 If not directly named, the ties to the developing pedagogy of interest are clear in 
Williams’ (1940) piece. Invoking student life means that the professor must know student 
  
162 
 
life and must craft assignments designed to allow student to tell their lives, an 
observation which I have already made in the previous section of this chapter. What is 
still less clear is how this ties to the field of education. Did the field of education have 
prescriptions to attain the ideal professor as he [sic] existed in Williams’ view? To a 
degree, it would seem so. While Williams loosely invokes educational theory to define 
the ideal professor, Spencer (1940), although taking issue with the prescriptions of 
education, nonetheless provides us a more clear sense of what the field was prescribing at 
the time. In defining the responsibilities of the English composition professors, Spencer 
cautions professors in how they understand the dictum originating in educational studies 
that teachers focus on students’ individual experiences. If understood too liberally, he 
claims, this approach prescribed by education can promote egotism within students, 
making their own interests the most important aspect of their perceptions. They learn to 
care only for themselves. Further, Spencer is concerned that educational theory removes 
autonomy from teachers:  
The educational theorists, who emphasize the interests of the pupil at all 
costs, have given the teacher an inferiority complex which he must 
overcome. But it can be overcome only if the teacher, as an individual, has 
as full a consciousness as possible of what he is doing and avoids that 
concentration on the immediate and practical which the educational 
theorists would have us foster in our pupils. (p. 592)  
We thus begin to see, both in Williams and in Spencer, ideas emerging from educational 
discourse, none of which should be surprising; namely, students must be seen as 
  
163 
 
individuals, their interests must be foregrounded, and the immediate and practical should 
take precedence over any other kind of work.  
 Unfortunately, it is not so simple as to accept, as Williams (1940) does, or reject, 
as Spencer (1940) does, the best practices coming from educational philosophy. Indeed, 
best practices in education would support both Williams acceptance and rejection of 
certain educational approaches because, as Sensabaugh (1943) notes, “conflicting aims of 
education in general tended to obfuscate the specific aims of studies in English” (p. 32). 
On the one hand, an educational system that prescribes training individuals for 
professions or trades requires a particular approach to teaching English. But “a system 
which emphasizes the development of man's human capabilities and potentialities, on the 
other hand, requires a curriculum quite different” (p. 32). The problem, Sensabaugh 
claims, is that educational discourse prescribes both approaches, which leads to confusion 
regarding composition’s place and aims when seen in the service of a broader educational 
project. Sensabaugh’s solution is not particularly illuminating: “composition and speech 
should develop skills in speaking and writing and should develop clarity of thought, 
without which there can be no sound judgement” (p. 34). However, we see how both 
aspects of educational discourse—vocational training as well as development of the mind 
and cultivation of the individual—might be drawn upon by this broad statement about the 
nature of writing. Skills in speaking and writing certainly apply to a vocational end, while 
clarity of thought and sound judgement seem to contribute to the project of developing an 
individual holistically. While Sensabaugh’s solution lacks specificity or deep insight to 
the disjunction appearing in the field of education—vocational training vs. human 
development—it is important that he identifies the disjunction. At this point in history, if 
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composition will allow itself to be guided by educational discourse, it must now 
determine what influences of education it will adopt and how its own aims should be 
guided by the aims of education.   
 In 1946, McDowell attempted to reconcile the various moves and ideas 
developing in educational discourse with the college English curriculum. Acknowledging 
that education was beginning to move to a general model—that is, education was feasibly 
accessible to everyone rather than the elite—he suggested an educational model based in 
self-election, wherein students could determine their own aims, rather than take a series 
of prescribed courses. American education, he states, is fraught with complexity and 
contradiction, much of which stems from the college’s liberal tradition of cultivating the 
human mind, on the one hand, and the needs of the general population to have technical 
and vocational training, on the other. Rather than choose one approach, McDowell 
suggests expanding the curriculum, primarily in the area of “the use of contemporary 
instruments for everyday communication by all students” (p. 354). With an expanding job 
market and expanding student interests, the composition curriculum must offer students 
choices for writing. It becomes “the obligation of higher education to train students in all 
varieties of communication” (p. 355) and the obligation of English departments to begin 
collaborating with other disciplines to determine the various potentials of student needs. 
He concludes by noting that “If English insists on maintaining strict departmental 
autonomy, both general education and we ourselves will lose heavily” (p. 357). It may be 
that some aims of education are irreconcilable with each other, but the concept of a 
general education requires various aims, some of which may be highly disparate, as this 
disparity in aims allows for a diversity of individuals to pursue those aims. A similar 
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observation is made by Perrin (1948) who notes that progress over the course of the 
1940s had led to general social pressures for education, especially to develop more up-to-
date pedagogical and curricular approaches. To keep up with the progress being made 
(and demanded) in education, Perrin suggests consideration of individual needs—
advancement is defined by individual’s aims, not overarching prescriptions from 
disciplines.  
 We see, then, that as composition began borrowing from educational discourse, 
education itself began to experience problems in determining its own aims. Even at the 
beginning of the 1940s, composition was unsure of its relationship with education, seeing 
education as statistically driven, unable to understand the work that composition was 
doing. However, with unclear pedagogical aims itself, over the course of ten years, 
composition could pair with education, and the two disciplines could attempt to 
determine their aims together. What is perhaps unique regarding the place of both 
psychology and education in composition is the fact that composition scholars explicitly 
named these disciplines in their work, making obvious that composition was using them 
to justify its own practices. However, without expressly naming it, composition literature 
in the 1940s begins to adopt terminology from another discipline, namely, medicine, as a 
way to situate problems that were occurring in composition studies and as a way to 
provide medicines, or solutions.   
Medicine. Composition has a history of using medical language and parallels to 
medicine to describe issues in writing. For instance, Hitchcock (1912), during the first 
year of The English Journal’s publication, creates an extended medical metaphor when 
he states that “red ink is to our profession as drugs are to the medical profession” (p. 
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273). He continues to use the medical analogy by suggesting that compositionists need to 
clean out the medicine cabinet (red ink corrections on papers), saving the use of these 
drugs only for ailments that absolutely require them, and he provides a dozen suggestions 
for assignments and classroom practices that might limit the need for intense correction. 
And even here, as early as 1912, Hitchcock briefly suggests that one softer remedy is 
allowing students to choose topics that interest them, although he does not provide the 
suggestions for capturing student interest as we see in later pieces. Moving forward 
nearly thirty years, possibly the strongest example of medical discourse appearing in 
composition studies can be found in Fountain (1940), characterizing weak writing in 
college as a disease. He provides a “diagnosis,” suggesting that it begins in high school, 
although he notes that high school teachers are in a situation making it difficult to prepare 
students from college, being stretched too thin and asked too much. He also notes that 
several “remedies” exist, including remedial, non-credit classes and more exclusive 
enrollment criteria.  
 These metaphors suggest that in addition to the psychological and educational 
discourses, medical discourse could be used to describe the behaviors and habits of both 
students and professors in the composition field. Further, juxtaposing both Hitchcock’s 
(1912) and Fountain’s (1940) metaphors suggests that there were two different ways of 
conceiving of the problematic disease of bad writing. Hitchcock characterizes the burden 
as a kind of malpractice: as doctors rely too heavily on drugs to treat symptoms of rather 
than cure a disease, so too do English professors rely on overcorrection. A drug may 
reduce a fever or suppress a cough, but the disease is still present within the patient. The 
cure is superficial. Just so, students can read editorial notes and change their papers 
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accordingly, but the disease that creates the bad writing still exists inside of them. In this 
case, the problem is not with the disease or the patients per se, but with the professional’s 
approach to treating it. Fountain, on the other hand, would appear to place the problem of 
bad writing more squarely on students, and in sore need of an effective remedy. While 
these readings may seem similar, there is far less consideration of the doctor/English 
professor’s role in treating the disease in Fountain’s piece. While the doctor/English 
professor may be skilled at alleviating the disease, the responsibility lies within the 
student to want a cure. As the pedagogy of interest begins to develop into the 1940s, 
medical terminology continues to be used (admittedly) spottily in composition literature, 
but it remains nonetheless. Throughout the decade of the 1940s, this dichotomy exists 
problematizing either the curriculum or the student.   
 We see bad writing viewed as the root of a disease in pieces such as those written 
by Campbell (1942) and Poley (1944). Campbell describes a scoring rubric which she 
hopes will show a student’s weaknesses in writing, so that “he could easily remedy that 
by conforming to the rules of manuscript and presenting a neat paper” (p. 402).  
Poley (1944) similarly discusses a “remedy” to meaningless and lazy repetition in student 
writing, namely workshopping examples in the classroom with students, allowing them to 
share their thoughts on improved writing. Based on these examples, it is no surprise that 
this is roughly the time period that we see “remedial” English courses becoming 
widespread across colleges (Ritter, 2009). The name itself suggests that the course is able 
to remedy a disease, that it can remedy the writing that the students are afflicted with. 
These classes were designed to help students who are in some way “retarded” readers and 
writers in college (McCallister, 1944), those who have been diagnosed with a disease of 
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the mind. Indeed, these students are characterized as having an ailment (McCloskey & 
Hornstein, 1950) that is curable through intensive sub-freshman courses in English 
writing.  
It is important to note, however, that these “retarded” or “laggard student[s]” 
(McCloskey & Hornstein, p. 331) have not been medically diagnosed as deficient. It is 
purely from their writing that they adopt this diagnosis, seen as medical and/or mental 
patients. The remedial English course is “remedial” in the most literal sense of the word; 
it offers a cure, or remedy, to the disease of bad writing. The very name “remedial 
writing” begins to the blur the metaphor of doctor and instructor in the capacity that 
teachers start to resemble doctors beyond mere analogy. They now may behave 
medically, diagnosing this illness, albeit the illness is limited to one of writing. They are 
also able to remediate, to offer remedies, to this thing seen as a disease. The fact that the 
name of the course bears “remedy” means that instructors literally may function as 
doctors in a limited capacity, and moreover, that this is acceptable, as they may now 
publicly be understood as remedy experts.  
However, as the 1940s progressed, we see that many thought of bad writing as not 
just the problem of an ailing student—rather, it is a symptom of a greater disease, namely 
ill-defined or “bad” pedagogical approaches to English instruction. We see such an 
example in Adler’s (1941) address to the NCTE, for instance, wherein he laments the 
erasure of liberal education in the United States and its connection to English studies. 
This erasure, he claims, is due to too much specialization in English, as well as an overly 
positivistic/scientific approach to teaching. He cites a rising interest in semantics as an 
example of “a wrong or inadequate remedy for bringing [liberal education] back to life” 
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(p. 657, emphasis mine). The same year, Scudder and Webster (1941) suggest that 
historically, freshman English courses “did little or nothing to attack directly the ailment 
which they had in the first place” (p. 494). Ford also (1942) appears in this discussion, 
and again it is possible to highlight his distaste for the Freshman workbook, which 
promotes the “disease” of mass drilling, whose “remedy” is a return to an “individualistic 
methodology” (p. 66) of teaching. Far later into the decade, we still see the idea of 
pedagogy as diseased, in need of medical attention. For instance, Trezevant (1948) notes 
that there exists a lack of coherent direction in the English curriculum, a situation which 
calls for increased conversation about the objectives, activities, and outcomes of the 
writing and literature classrooms, for only then can “we hope to remedy some of these 
deficiencies” (p. 187). In these cases, we see how medical language was being 
operationalized during an influx of critical consideration toward writing pedagogy over 
the course of the 1940s. The curriculum, as well as the way to teach the curriculum, were 
sick, in need of a cure or remedy.  
Although there are two markedly different ways of diagnosing the illness of bad 
writing, the remedy looks similar. There is a clear focus on the students’ wellbeing, and it 
is the teacher/doctor’s job to determine a way to help the student overcome. As part of 
this desideratum, there would need to be a change in the ways that the individual teacher 
approached college English as well as the curriculum as a whole. Even in the first case, 
where the sickness is seen as existing within the student, the cure for the disease of bad 
writing seems to lie in the way that the teacher teaches, including the technology 
(Campbell, 1942) or therapy (Poley, 1944) used to address the disease. We may liken 
remedial English to the creation of a new ward in a hospital, one designed to remedy an 
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emergent ailment identified as plaguing the college campus. In all cases, it becomes the 
job of the teacher/doctor to cure the patient of the malady, and the job of the composition 
curriculum as a whole to guide the teacher/doctor in this practice.  
The emergence of medical terminology in composition reflects, on a number of 
levels, a change in the way that writing was conceived. As an ailment, bad writing is 
capable of being cured; only thirty years before, when intelligence was the indicator of 
writing ability and vice versa, the prescription was much more drastic: the patient would 
either cure him or herself over time, learning how to write well, or die in the process, 
forced to leave school altogether. Now, through some kind of intervention, writing could 
be treated. Additionally, the introduction of medical language suggests something of a 
pandemic quality to the issue of bad writing. The very fact that it could be medicalized 
within the composition assemblage—described pathologically, given prescriptions, that it 
could lead way to new remedial approaches—means that that it was recognized 
nationally as, first, a universal concern, not limited to only some colleges and 
universities, and second, as something that teachers could actively attempt to fix. And 
while this medical discourse marks a change in the way that writing could be thought 
about, it also aggrandizes the problem of bad writing; speaking about writing as a disease 
in need of curing creates an exigency around the issue. A curable disease plaguing the 
discipline to which one is married insists upon consideration and that action be taken to 
rectify the issue, to purify the discourse once again. In this way, the introduction of 
medical discourse to composition both reflects changing ideas about writing pedagogy 
and spreads this way of thinking across the discipline. It is a problem that needs to be 
addressed immediately; but it is a problem that is now capable of being addressed.  
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Part 4: Composed of War 
Even as composition was developing the terminologies and epistemologies it 
should adopt from other disciplines, we see another historical force shaping the 
composition-assemblage. During the entirety of the 1940s (and beyond), it was 
impossible for the discipline to ignore the rise of Nazi Germany and the returning veteran 
students that came after Hitler’s fall from power. Referring to the war, Glicksburg (1942) 
notes that “the question is not whether the war should be allowed to invade the sacred 
precincts of the school; it has already done so. No walls, no locks, no edicts, can keep it 
out. The problem is rather what the English teacher should do for his pupils—the nature 
of the responsibility he must bear” (p. 707-708). And indeed, as the 1940s progressed 
onward, we see a growing discussion in the role that English should or did play during 
the war. Further, in 1944, the United States introduced the Serviceman’s Readjustment 
Act, or the G.I. Bill, which created the possibility for thousands of returning 
servicepeople to attend college that likely would otherwise have not (Thelin, 2011). As 
such, there was a new, specific kind of subject that needed to be specially addressed in 
college writing classes: the veteran. This is all to say that during the 1940s, the events of 
World War 2 greatly shaped the movement of composition. Not surprisingly, given that 
the war occurred concurrently with the rise in the pedagogy of interest, the war also had 
its own influences over the ways that interest (and by extension, engagement) was 
conceived of in the composition classroom.  
Creating a democratic subject. Barring a few minor examples, the first piece of college 
English literature that seriously addresses pre-war Europe appears in a 1935 issue of The 
English Journal, in a publication entitled “National Socialist Youth in Germany.” In this 
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three page article, Brunauer (1935) explains that the youth of Germany has been 
indoctrinated by the Hitler regime, that in Germany, such indoctrination is nearly 
impossible to avoid. Though it is clear that she is not an advocate of Germany’s move to 
national socialism, her piece is not particularly critical of Hitler or the Nazi party, and she 
only briefly mentions education in Germany to note that much of the curriculum had been 
altered for the purpose of advocating national socialism since Hitler’s rise to power. We 
must wonder, what exactly is this piece doing in The English Journal? It does not 
concern literature, writing, or for that matter, an English speaking country—at first face, 
it seems quite out of place. Yet, it was produced with the intent of publication in The 
English Journal, and it was received (and published) without commentary to situate or 
introduce it. What could be its purpose, and why does it appear in this venue?  
If we consider the pedagogical turn that was about to occur in composition, that of 
interest and, though the term was not used, student subjectivity, something about this 
tirade on the Hitler youth begins to make sense. Brunauer’s (1935) point is that many of 
the youth in Germany had no choice in their support of Hitler; they are a product of their 
culture. The developing situation in Europe became a way to voice a position on the 
formation of the subject, one deeply sociocultural in nature, suggesting that one is a 
product of one’s culture rather than a necessarily autonomous agent. It would only be 
approximately five years later that Dudley (1939) Green (1940; 1941), and Weisinger 
(1941) would propose composition assignments both designed to interest and engage 
students on the one hand and cut to the heart of their social makeup on the other (as 
discussed in Part 1 of this chapter). Brunauer’s piece is not in actuality about the war at 
all. The war is simply a backdrop for her writing. Instead, her piece provides the 
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beginnings of an epistemo-pedagogical movement in composition studies that suggests 
students’ knowledges are a product of their cultural and historical backgrounds. The 
takeaway of this observation, one that may be used in composition studies, is that to 
know and understand students, we must find a way to understand their individual 
backgrounds.  
Of course, the war provided more than an occasion to posit foundational beliefs 
about the nature of subjectivity. In the years leading up to the war, we see a marked 
interest in providing a democratic education for all students, and we begin seeing 
discussion around the creation of basic writing courses for those students who were 
struggling in regular composition courses to promote such democratic values (e.g. 
Fountain, 1940; Taylor, 1938; Tilley, 1940; see also Ritter, 2009). Nazism and fascism, 
and the impending war in general, provided a justification for holding these democratic 
values, and this began to guide the English and writing curriculum. The war became a 
rallying cry for teachers of English to unite and fight for democracy. As Rand (1936) 
states “we English teachers justify our existence by trying to think and by teaching others 
to think. We must think harder and straighter, and as we do so we cannot help having 
thoughts that are dangerous to fascism” (p. 218) and later, “if our loyalty to the good 
traditions, to real democracy, is to count, we must become active members of those 
organizations that are working against war and fascism” (p. 219). By adopting these 
human centered and democratic values, by simply harboring democratic thoughts, 
English teachers become a force against those values that would be harmful to 
democracy, in this case, fascism. Thus, only a few years later, as a symposium of 20 
recognized thinkers in English studies (Shattuck et al., 1942) decided when queried about 
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college English’s place in the war, there must be a “tremendous emphasis upon fostering 
our American ideals” (p. 93) in the literature and composition classrooms.  
Indeed, looking at composition literature that appeared during wartime, it would 
seem that English teachers saw themselves as important defenders of democracy from the 
evils of axis powers, even if they were not immediately on the frontlines. This defense 
did not necessarily take the form of actions, but attitudes, particularly those attitudes 
underpinned by a strong humanism— not Foucault’s (1966/1989) understanding of 
humanism which scitentifizes the individual, but a humanism that focuses on human 
rights and dignity. For Rogers (1940), teaching writing in an urban university fulfills a 
responsibility to democracy because “a democracy under present world-conditions cannot 
survive with out persons who can read and write—read and write accurately as a mirror 
of intellectual integrity—and who have the humane values of tolerance, understanding, 
and sympathy” (p. 405). Rogers’ phrasing of “present world-conditions” is almost 
certainly a reference to the events occurring in Europe, for at the time, these events stood 
as the largest threat to democracy. By teaching, understanding, and sympathizing with the 
vocational, heterogeneous masses that comprise the urban university classroom, Rogers 
sees himself (and all English teachers) as upholding an intellectual integrity that can only 
be found in a democratic society, one in direct contrast to the fascist and totalitarian 
powers that were taking hold in Europe. Hogrefe (1940b) similarly sees English teachers 
as defenders of democracy, but to truly defend, she notes that there must be a coherent 
and uniform philosophy adopted by all who take up the cause. She proposes “creativity” 
as a unifying philosophy: “we believe in creative reading, writing, and scholarship; in 
creative teaching; and we may try to teach so as to develop these attitudes in others. If we 
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really believe in a democracy, which must be developed slowly with courage, patience, 
and a willingness to share with others, we are applying a creative philosophy to 
government” (p. 598). This philosophy of creativity she contrasts to “a totalitarian state” 
(p. 595), one which seeks to destroy rather than create. In Hogrefe’s statement, we may 
draw parallels between her wording and Rogers’—where Rogers has “understanding,” 
Hogrefe has “patience;” where Rogers has “sympathy,” Hogrefe has “willingness to share 
with others.” In these two pieces, there is a clear move toward empathizing with students 
as a democratic ideal, all justified by the existence of a separate state that stood against 
both empathy and democracy.  
But perhaps the strongest example of these democratic values directly opposing 
the perceived war-time values of axis power appears in a 1942 statement released by a 
symposium of English teachers addressing the topic of “English in wartime” (Pound et 
al., 1942). In this piece, nine teachers of the college section of NCTE were queried as to 
the responsibilities of the English professor while American was at war. The nine 
responses, each approximately a single page long, purportedly contain a “unified and 
obviously representative character” (p. 495). Echoing Hogrefe (1940b), there is an 
agreement that college teachers of English must begin “concentrating on what should 
constitute our essential work in peace as well as in war” (p. 497), one of those 
concentrations being  a commitment to a “liberal education” (a phrase which appears 
several times throughout the publication). It is not entirely clear what is meant by liberal 
education for the symposium on English in wartime, although we might suppose that it 
appeals to a highly Victorian sentiment of knowledge for its own sake (Arnold, 
1869/2001; Newman, 1852) underpinned by value existing in the capacities of 
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individuals to learn. Beck (1944) suggests that a liberal education is driven by the desire 
“for a broad and integrated view of human nature in all its individually and socially 
creative aspects” (p. 135), and this is in direct contrast to neoliberal tendencies of 
vocational training. Ogden (1944) suggests that a liberal education has six aims, two of 
which are developing knowledge of the “ruling values of Western culture,” (p. 267), 
which Ogden identifies as democratic and Christian, and knowledge of “the possibilities 
of human life” (p. 270), suggesting that  
Whatever a liberal education might be for the English symposium (Pound et al., 
1942), this liberal education is clearly linked to human-centric practices that may be tied 
to college composition. Pound et al. suggest that such a liberal education could entail: 
“composition courses [that] might dwell upon the humane tradition, for by 
studying it we shall arouse enthusiasm for it and thus keep our students' 
minds on the long view and the larger issues. They will have more than 
enough stimulation to hate. We must compete, with a vital, sincere, and 
enthusiastic affirmation of the worth of the individual” (p. 498).  
The war thus simultaneously creates a need for and affirms those values embraced among 
English and composition teachers at the college level; this has less to do with actual 
curriculum (and certainly nothing to do with the frontlines) and more to do with the way 
that teachers saw/valued students. Assisting in the war effort did not require any 
particular action on the part of English teachers. It simply meant adopting democratic 
and/or liberal ideals, embracing those values that were distinctly not totalitarian or fascist. 
And entailed within the adoption (or maintenance) of democratic ideals was the adoption 
of sympathetic, and empathetic attitudes toward students. Being democratic meant seeing 
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value and potential in each individual student. Of course, this is not to say that such an 
attitude was not already being entertained by English professors. We have already seen in 
part 2 of this chapter, for instance, that there was push away from psychometrics and 
beliefs about static intelligences even before concerns over European politics swept the 
United States—although if there were any doubt, in 1945, Baker blatantly states that 
adopting statistical measures, statistically determining students’ intelligences, and 
reducing them to a number was to be no better than Hitler. 
Even as far back as the late 1800s, there was some concern within composition 
studies over how to view students, and pushes were being made to approach the student 
subject holistically and un-deterministically. But In the late 30s and 40s, such beliefs 
came to a head. It became imperative to reaffirm such beliefs, to move them to the 
forefront of pedagogical activity because democracy was compromised by the war in 
Europe: “democracy is a way of thought, a belief in the spirit and worth of man… the 
knowledge that man is a thing of dignity and nobility whose vast potentialities are as yet 
undeveloped must pre vail in our teachers' hearts and minds if democracy is to be 
salvaged from the chaos of today” (Williams et al., 1942, p. 579). We might argue, 
however, that this move was more than just a way of thought to be adopted by teachers. 
Maintaining a democratic attitude toward students means enacting a democratic attitude, 
and in the pieces referenced above, we see prescriptions for interacting with students in a 
democratic way; teachers are told how to value the noble potentialities of man [sic]. 
There was a wide acknowledgement within writing studies that students were entering 
college underprepared (Fountain, 1940). The prescription was to meet these students with 
patience, sympathy, and understanding. The war thus created another kind of subject for 
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the teacher to become: they were to become caregivers that saw all students as learners, 
recognizing that students came from assorted contexts, had unique individual stories, and 
offered a gently had as students tried to climb the ranks of academia. To be or do any less 
was to align with the political beliefs of the developing axis power—devaluing students 
was enough to make one a Nazi.   
And with this caregiving attitude, professors were more than ever prepared to 
enact a pedagogy of interest. To appreciate students in the ways prescribed by democracy 
meant knowing, understanding, and valuing their interests because, as social subjects, 
their interests were a part of them. Looking at Brunauer (1936), we see how this interest 
in interest stood in direct contrast to America’s understanding of then-German pedagogy. 
The picture that Brunauer paints is one of children conforming under the Nazi banner, 
being produced like automata, never able to reflect on the propaganda being fed to them 
because it was all that they knew. The extreme opposite was to develop care for the 
individual student and, as seen in the previous chapter, to act as psychoanalyst, getting to 
the makeup of the individual—. The Nazi model was top-down; therefore, America’s 
model had to be bottom-up. If caring about the individual student was democratic, then so 
was a pedagogy of interest; indeed, one could not happen without the other.   
This is not to say that with a developing interest in interest, there was not some 
degree of propaganda and/or indoctrination occurring in college composition courses. 
With the democratic shift that brought such focused attention to the individual subject, 
we cannot imagine that there were no strategies designed to mold a democratic subject. 
And, as the war offered a call for a democratic approach to teaching English (that is, 
belief in students, care for students, sympathy with students), it also affected the 
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curriculum by insisting upon the promotion of such democratic values in students. This is 
all the easier done if we take Brunauer (1935) seriously, believing that the political 
leanings of students are largely due to the contexts from which they spring. Thus, the 
events in Europe created a backdrop upon which to create not only an interested, 
interesting, and writing subject, but a politically interested, democratic writing subject as 
well.  
Of course, the creation of such a subject must occur before college. We see how a 
pedagogy of interest is activated even at the level of high school, and by 1936 (well 
before America entered the war), this pedagogy is tied into politics and the crafting of a 
democratic subject. Two articles published in The English Journal (Rand, 1936; Rand & 
Fisher, 1936) describe a survey on the reading interests of high school students, in which 
students were instructed to ask questions about topics that interested them. Rand and 
Fisher provide a rationale for the survey:  
The purpose of having the pupils ask questions was to find out what 
interests them. In the wide assortment offered by the newspapers, what do 
high-school pupils choose? Are more of them interested in radios than in 
airplanes? More in economics than in sports? Which are the popular 
sports? It was thought that perhaps a guide might be chartered for the 
makers of curriculums and for those who direct the reading of pupils. (p. 
25) 
The purpose of this exercise seems to be an explicit discovery of student interests, which 
might range to any number of topics. However, the piece becomes quickly political, as 
Rand notes a third of these students were interested in international affairs, politics, and 
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war—in sum, the growing situation overseas. With this observation, we see how Rand 
and Fisher are able to enmesh politics and interest. This creates a sympathetic reason to 
bring the political into the classroom: there must be a focus on students interests, students 
self-report an interest in politics, therefore, there must be a focus on politics in the 
English classroom. In other words, the argument presented in these 1936 pieces is that 
student interests and politics were one in the same—and if teachers are to teach to student 
interests, this means teaching politics, specifically, a version of politics that demonizes 
those political movements that would undermine the political affiliations of America 
(democracy). And we see how quickly a “neutral” examination of student interests 
becomes politicized, leading to the promotion of a certain brand of democratic values: the 
conclusion of Rand’s piece is not a summary of student interests, but a tirade against 
fascism, the “wolf in sheep’s clothing, howling about democracy while destroying it” (p. 
219), which must be identified and ferreted out of the American system of education: 
“We must diagnose fascism in its incipient stages as it manifests itself in our school” (p. 
219). For Rand, fascism takes many forms in school, from teacher pay cuts, to school 
closings, to militarism in schools, but if students are interested in politics, then they must 
necessarily be made aware of these practices, how these practices represent fascism. But 
most importantly, they must be turned into democratic citizens to counter that which is 
undemocratic. 
 Rand (1936) and Rand and Fisher (1936) described the interests of high school 
students, and made a connection between interests, politics, and democracy under the 
backdrop of fascism and Nazism in Europe. However, by the time America entered the 
war, we see how such connections drove curricular creation in college writing classrooms 
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as well. In the first section, we have already examined Green’s (1940) “Significant 
Theme Content,” in which he argued that college essays should focus on student 
experiences. He provides eponymous examples of student essays in which the student 
had little to say, including “The Decay of Democracy” and “The General Staff: Pure 
Fascism.” These are not appropriate for themes, he argues, because freshman do not have 
enough experience with the topics to say anything of import about them. His solution is 
not simply to have students write about themselves, but to write about themselves in a 
way that ties the abstract ideas in the above titles into students’ daily experiences. With 
the backdrop of the war, there is a need for students to identify democratic and fascist 
ideals in their own lives, because “we shall not fill our jobs as instructors in Freshman 
English better than by asking the student, by direct means or indirect, to define his own 
place in the economic, social, and political order… who knows something of himself 
knows something of the world” (p. 699). For Green, student experience was an important 
tool to leverage in composition for two reasons: it provided material that the student 
could be interested in writing about—that is, it created within them a desire to write—but 
with the right pedagogical guidance, it also made them more aware of the political 
happenings of the world. During the war, there was a special interest in the political 
subject in the English classroom, one which could be accessed through student interest. 
Students could examine themselves in relation to fascism and democracy, and begin to 
reflect upon how those ideas might affect/have affected their lives. Thus begins the work 
of forging democratic subjects in the college compositions classroom.  
 We see a similar theme in Boothe (1941), who speaks specifically about the 
typical college student in Iowa, a state where “healthy life… means enjoying the 
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privileges of democracy in a community exceptionally favorable to democracy” (p. 361). 
After a lengthy discussion of the friendly nature and general ambition of the typical Iowa 
student, he provides the pedagogical approach that underlies the Department of English at 
Iowa State Teachers College: “appealing directly to the interests and attitudes of our 
students, such a plan must help them cultivate their imaginative ability, whatever it is 
when they enter college, as much as possible up to the time when they begin their 
advanced courses” (p. 361). However, a major aspect of this curriculum, founded in 
student interest, is teaching students about American democratic idealism and the 
struggles of being an individual in the United States on the grounds that “that such a 
grounding in American idealism and the conflicts of present-day America will prove to 
be immensely valuable to our college students as they grow in understanding” (p. 365-
66). Students “write continually” on literature that highlights the American individual: 
The Prairie Years, Walden, The Red Badge of Courage; each of these stories provides an 
example of the independent and courageous American citizen standing for American 
values. Such an idea is extended by Bellafiore (1942), who, to “mobilize the spirit of 
youth” (p. 318) suggests a reading list of patriotic verses and biographies of American 
heroes, as well as compositions prompted by the topics: "The Meaning of Democracy," 
"What I Can Do To Help in National Defense," and "The Kind of World I'd Like To Live 
in After the War” (p. 319), inspired by readings such as The Bill of Rights and The 
Gettysburg Address. These readings represent the attitude that all democratic subjects 
should have when apprehended by the “conflicts of present-day America” (Boothe, p. 
365). Boothe’s description of the Iowa student—eager to learn, “favorable to 
democracy,” suggests that such a curriculum indeed engages students; they are primed to 
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be democratic subjects, and such a curriculum provides inspiration to be so while 
inspiring them to write on the subject.  
 Yet another example is in the work of Weisinger (1941), who argues that 
composition needed subject matter beyond grammar and the rules of language. He states 
that “the freshman can be expected to have an interest in his work” if the work 
emphasizes “how men try to devise ways of living together more harmonious” (p. 693). 
Stated another way, this means that Weisinger suggests “as the subject matter of a course 
in freshman composition a consideration of the theory of democracy” (p. 689), complete 
with a unit on fascism and communism. And again, Smith (1941) claims that now, more 
than ever, “it is imperative that we give special attention to the proper choice of materials 
for the purposes of influencing human conduct and building interests and habits of 
significance for American life” (p. 109) within students of English (at all levels). While 
this final piece does not explicitly refer to the events occurring in Europe, all of these 
pieces suggest a clear link between student interest and democracy. In the case of Green 
(1940), Boothe (1940), and Weisinger, an interest in democracy is assumed—any 
American student will necessarily be drawn to matters of democracy, and thus this will 
be an engaging subject. However, there would be no need for a curriculum based on 
democracy if students already knew all that there was to know of democracy. This 
interest must be cultivated, as Smith suggests. Further, students must reflect upon and 
know what it is to be a democratic citizen. Hogrefe (1940b) states that “only in a 
democracy, as contrasted with a totalitarian state, are we permitted to train students to 
choose. Only people who learn to choose and to express their choices can be sure of 
keeping a democracy” (p. 595).  
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However, as students are consistently exposed to literature expressing the value 
and nobility of the democratic subject; as they hear about the evils of fascism; as they are 
asked to write about what it means to be a democratic subject under the duress of a 
system that has clearly embraced democracy, how much choice is actually afforded to the 
student? The pre- and early-war composition classroom became a propagandized space, 
one that could only engage, only be used by, a student willing to be molded into a 
democratic subject. We must also keep in mind that this study is limited to a focus on 
freshman composition—it does not address the many pieces that describe the role of the 
English literature classroom and the war, discussions which abound in The English 
Journal and College English during the 1940s, and which, with little doubt, push such a 
democratic agenda.  
Propaganda. And while the compositional space was clearly propagandized 
during this time period, we also see a burgeoning interest in the students’ ability to 
recognize and critically examine propaganda. Between the release of The English Journal 
(1912) and 1938, 140 pieces were published using the word “propaganda.” Only a 
handful of these addressed the idea of propaganda related to the first war, and few of 
them actually addressed the topic of propaganda in depth. Indeed, upon analysis, many of 
these pieces use propaganda to simply refer to targeted, commercial advertisements. 
Between 1938 and 1952, however, 260 pieces were published using the word, and this is 
when we begin seeing “propaganda” regularly appearing as a keyword in the 
publications. This count also excludes pieces in College English that addressed 
propaganda, as College English only offers a post-1939 count. What this suggests is that 
during the time of the war, propaganda becomes a political concern—in 1936, De Boer 
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uses the term synonymously with targeted advertisements, and even as late as 1938, we 
see it defined by Cantril in a fairly innocuous way: “propaganda is expression of opinion 
or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions 
of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined” (p. 217). Cantril does 
mention the widespread use of propaganda during the first World War, but this is only in 
passing. However, by 1941, we see “propaganda” associated with strictly political aims. 
Arnold (1942), in reviewing Rogers, Redinger and Haydn’s (1941) Explorations in 
Living: A Record of the Democratic Spirit, describes their book as a special kind of 
propaganda, meaning “not the ceaseless repetition of slogans intended to deaden the 
critical faculties, but the presentation of varied and rich affirmations of the value of love, 
liberty, the opportunity for unity in diversity, the encouragement of growth and change 
which democracy has for its goal” (p. 424). The astute observer will note that such 
affirmations of democracy, including values of love, liberty, and the opportunity for unity 
in diversity are themselves rather dead and repeated phrases, especially in light of the 
many other English instructors of the time that held such a deep connection to exactly the 
same democratic ideals–precisely the type of propaganda that Rogers, Redinger, and 
Haydn were said to oppose. We see a similar statement in Pound et al. (1942): 
We must not teach hatred, jingoism, or propaganda. We must insist that no 
emergency is so great as to justify abandoning the larger truth. The 
greatest emergency, on the contrary, is the present threat to liberality and 
intellectual freedom. Our task is to preserve and champion the only values 
that can save the world after the present fever has been purged. (p. 498) 
And again: 
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Our first sharp "No" to the question, "Can the teaching of English remain 
unchanged by our entrance into World War II?" must not lead us headlong 
into the office of a ministry of propaganda. We must not forget that we are 
educating young people not for the next three years alone but for their 
entire lives. If students must be quickly conditioned for the war years, let 
the social scientists undertake that job. Our subject must influence 
personality on deeper and more permanent levels. One of our du ties is to 
keep our students, now more than ever before, in the great stream of 
humane Christian culture which comes from the past. (p. 501-502) 
And, from a different symposium on “English in Wartime,” there is yet another mention 
of democratic values contra propaganda:  recognizing the dignity of humanity “is an 
effective means of preserving and extending democratic principles and institutions. In 
making this emphasis we are not stultifying ourselves by becoming propagandists” 
(Williams et al., 1942, p. 581).  
We must wonder what is meant by “propaganda” in these two passages if not the 
indoctrinatory practices which they refer to and celebrate. Would not the most effective 
propaganda be that which instills values into individuals “for their entire lives”? That 
political ideology that does not appear as such, but which instead is seen to represent a 
“larger truth”? Much like Rogers, Redinger, and Haydn, there is no critical reflection on 
these values. As American values, they are simply correct; they are fact. We must thus 
redefine propaganda for the purposes of the English curriculum (and beyond) during 
wartime. Propaganda is, as Brunauer (1935) observes, what Axis powers produce, 
certainly not something that would occur in the United States. Propaganda becomes 
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synonymous with that which promotes beliefs contrary to American values, and therefore 
false. We see, in Taylor’s (1942) definition of propaganda, the idea of falsity: “It is a 
systematic scheme created by one person or a group in an effort to persuade people on 
insufficient grounds to believe what it wants them to believe or to act to its advantage” 
(p. 562). If this is the case, propaganda also becomes anything which threatens “truth” in 
the American way of life, anything which may threaten the building of democratic 
subjects. However, especially in Williams et al. (1942), there is something oddly 
defensive in the way that propaganda is juxtaposed to an American values system. Why 
bother to explain, as they did, that English teachers are not becoming propagandists if 
there is no basis for the suggestion to begin with? In all of these pieces, why do we see, in 
the same breath, mention of both democratic, humane, and diverse values on the one 
hand, as well as the concept of propaganda on the other? In attempting to distance 
themselves from propaganda, these scholars create a discursive proximity, where, within 
the same pages, within the same sentences, democratic values and propaganda cohabitate, 
becoming one in the same. It may very well be that the humanistic and democratic ideals 
that such scholars sought to promote became, ironically, a fascist tendency in themselves.  
  This contradiction explains the sudden interest in propaganda in English during 
wartime. We have seen a sudden interest in the subject, or the individual who can be 
manipulated through the discourses that he or she interacts with. The English curriculum, 
which we have seen tied to democracy and humanization, must produce subjects with the 
same values. But propaganda, that which is proposed to be contrary to those values, is an 
introduction to a different discourse, one which threatens to create a subject different 
from that of the aims of freshman English. Taylor (1942) is quick to point out the power 
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that propaganda “has in shaping the lives of men, their beliefs and their actions” (p. 555). 
Thus, students must be taught to recognize and criticize this propaganda (Cantril, 1938), 
all the while embracing the democratic ideals that are, in their own way, a propaganda 
being uncritically produced by English departments. The goal is to present to students 
one type of propaganda to demonize, all the while naturalizing the propaganda of 
democracy and humanism. 
 This is done by practically introducing specific kinds of propaganda into the 
freshman English curriculum. In an effort to show students different rhetorical situations, 
Hooper (1943) suggests introducing freshmen to examples of “muddled and crooked 
thinking” (p. 306) including propaganda. While he does not state specifically where tis 
propaganda will come from, however given the ways that propaganda was generally 
characterized by English departments negatively as “a systematic scheme created by one 
person or a group in an effort to persuade people on insufficient grounds to believe what 
it wants them to believe or to act to its advantage” (Taylor, 1942, p. 562), we may 
suppose that it is in some way related to the war, likely an example from Axis powers. 
The returning service-student. Out of the war, we see a new kind of student 
subject emerging—one with interests (and therefore) needs different from the average, 
friendly, driven student in Iowa, or indeed, any student that had been on college 
campuses for nearly 30 years: that of the military student. This point is made especially 
clear in Hatfield (1944), who presents the results of a questionnaire created by College 
English, sent to the directors of 225 English programs across the country (95 responded), 
to determine the needs of servicepeople returning from the war. He opens his findings 
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with the question: “are the needs of these servicemen the same as those of peacetime 
freshmen?” (p. 200). His answer:  
Fifty respondents say that they are. For them, within the limits of time and 
special conditions, the problems are just those which we have been trying 
for decades to solve. But their replies to other questions show that their 
"Yes" to this one is only relative—a recognition of the essential humanity 
inside the uniforms and a fear of hasty innovations. Forty-two respondents 
say that these servicemen do have special needs. As we shall see, the 
personnel of the classes differs considerably from that which we usually 
have. Moreover, the men are facing an indefinite period of wholly 
abnormal and crucial activities. (p. 200-201) 
Hatfield is quick to dismiss over half of the responses to this question—that the veteran 
student has the same needs as the typical student—so that he may speak about this 
student as something different, requiring a new or modified pedagogy. Many composition 
scholars of the time also seem to want to differentiate. 
The desire to differentiate should not be surprising. It was a new time in the 
United States for higher education in general, in no small part due to the returning service 
student. Especially after the war, there was an influx of students attending school, 
leveraging the newly minted G.I. Bill. Of course, college campuses had been open to 
military and veteran students during World War 1, and even the first war had driven some 
discussion of composition. Ward, (1918) for instance, claims that basing a composition 
course on the historical events of World War 1 could provide much needed material for 
the course that would lead to “continuity of thought and interest” (p. 207). What follows 
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in Ward’s pieces is a list of potential topics based on the war that students may write 
about, including causes of the war, America’s role in the war, creating and training 
armies and navies, industrialization, and the Red Cross (among others). However, Ward’s 
treatment of World War 1 in the composition course differs drastically from the way the 
next war would be treated nearly 30 years later in composition. Ward’s piece is a 
roundtable topic, a suggestion for material that may interest students given how close 
many of them were to the events of the first war. 
 We may contrast this to White (1944), who considers specifically the needs of 
students returning from the trenches, characterizing them as appearing “at first 
particularly puzzled, confused, and not a few of them rather disillusioned by the turn of 
events abroad since these young persons appeared on the human scene” (p. 444). White 
continues to characterize veterans as holding strong and prejudiced opinions that must be 
curtailed when given written expression. Further, during discussions, “the teacher has 
some obligation to stimulate a sense of values, on a comparative basis, and to draw 
practical lessons from the good and bad thought and speech habits of members of the 
class” (p. 445). They are further short of attention, and as a result, often “it will be 
difficult to confine the trainees to the type of subject specified for a particular day” (p. 
446). What we see now that was not present in Ward (1918), is a consideration of how 
the war produced a new kind of student and how the composition class (and teacher) 
would have to accommodate them. These students, “puzzled” by an academic 
environment, and “keenly conscious of their own academic deficiency” (Dias, 1946, p. 
550) needed to be engaged in a different way than their civilian counterparts because they 
brought different ways of thinking, being, and doing into the classroom. White argues 
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that teachers would have to move more slowly with them, use a gentler hand to guide 
them, and, in many ways, lower expectations. A similar representation exists in Lynde’s 
(1945) “A Plea for the Under-Educated Veteran.” Here, Lynde suggests that those 
veteran students most in need of an education will be unable to reap the benefits of the G. 
I. Bill “for lack of suitable training courses, geared to meet their needs and deficient 
scholastic attainment” (p. 153). And again in Bond (1946), arguing for a need to 
implement formalized remedial English programs in college: “many of the students 
taking advantage of the G.I. Bill of Rights will not make a satisfactory mark on an 
English placement test… since the remedial-English student will be with us for some 
time to come, we may just as well accept him” (p. 466). He further notes that veterans’ 
“greatest weakness is in the field of English” (p. 466). 
 The way of characterizing veteran students is markedly different from the 
characterization of civilian students of the same time period. Whereas a number of 
compositionists in the early 40s were willing to see and expound upon potential in 
civilian students, the discussion of veteran students resembles the deficit model that 
composition saw closer to the turn of the century. But while student engagement at the 
dawn of the millennium has become the catch-all solution for student achievement, we 
see student interest filling a similar role in regards to both the functional civilian student 
and the deficient veteran. White (1944) notes that “the new Army statements for the 
course in English in the Army Specialized Training Program accent reading, expressing 
of views, interpretation, writing, and speaking on topics of common scope and interest” 
(p. 446). Lynde (1945) claims that “steps must be taken by English teachers, both in 
planning courses for men in this category and in developing teaching materials of value 
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and interest to them” (p. 153). Bond (1946) claims that the veteran has greater need than 
civilian freshmen in English for “for interesting and straightforward factual writing” (p. 
469). All of these cases represent literature that paints the veteran as somehow 
intellectually inferior, certainly not ready for postsecondary education; and yet, each of 
these pieces suggests that a way to move beyond this is by engaging veteran’s interests. 
While literature from The English Journal and College English provides the veteran 
student his own category, the way to teach veterans to write does not differ from the 
grander discussion of writing pedagogy that has already existed for nearly a decade. 
 But while interest became a major pedagogical philosophy for veteran students 
just as it had for civilian students, some differences were present—namely, veterans were 
characterized as having different motivations and interests than their civilian 
counterparts. While much of the literature characterizes returning veteran students as 
deficient in various ways, they are also characterized as ingenuitive, practical, mature, 
and driven. Pennington (1945) notes that veterans come to college with a “very definite 
purpose: learn some trade so that they may start again in life on a little higher plane than 
they were when the war interrupted their peacetime way of life” (p. 38). He suggests that 
generally, the trade is a vocational one: mechanical, woodworking, electricity, etc. When 
these topics appear in their writing assignments, veterans can “get right down to 
business” (p. 38), and they accept having to take English courses knowing that 
fundamentals of reading and writing will help them in future vocational endeavors, “so 
they go to work with a will and, sometimes, with real ingenuity” (p. 38).  
 Others make similar observations. Bond (1946), for instance, who insisted that 
veterans needed a specialized class in English remediation, noted that veterans were 
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predisposed to a certain kind of writing. We see, for instance, how Bond combines the 
idea of “interesting” and “straightforward and factual” (p. 469) writing. He does not 
define what exactly this type of writing is, but we might speculate that it is potentially 
technical or journalistic. It is void of any flowery language or extensive metaphor, 
concerned, like the veteran, with getting the job done. If we take him at his word, and this 
reading is correct, it would seem that what interests veterans writing that is both 
concerned with and conveys as efficiently as possible a technical or at least practical end. 
The NCTE provides a vague but similar characterization of veteran writing. A survey 
given to English departments of 35 schools that catered to returning service-students 
found that veterans “expect us in composition and literature to deal with the problems of 
the world we now live” (NCTE, 1945, p. 208). One of the respondents to this survey 
notes that these students are often technically and vocationally inclined, and their 
“interests are low in English as a tool or as a liberalizing course” (p. 211). Shuey (1947) 
provides two examples of what she considers to be successful work written by veterans: 
the first example is “an excellent piece of work on the murder of Robert Potter, secretary 
of the Navy of the Republic of Texas” (p. 106) and the second is a report on Kemp 
Morgan tales as they appeared in oil fields in the Southwest. According to Shuey, the 
latter student travelled to interview workers in the oil fields to develop his theme.  
Given the ways that veterans were characterized at the time, we see how such 
assignments as those described by Shuey (1947) might speak to their interests—in the 
case of the first example assignment, it is easy to see that there is a connection to the 
armed forces, as the content of the assignment refers to the navy. We might also imagine 
it written as a kind of investigative report, providing facts around the murder. In the 
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second, there was clearly a vocational angle, one that might be beneficial for the 
production of “good mechanics, farmers, carpenters, welders” (Clark, 1946, p. 241), 
especially given that the writer might have forged connections with those working in oil 
fields. Similar suggestions appear in Weigle (1944), who proposes that writing 
assignments for those in the air force focus on “how to do something, such as making a 
cot, or saluting correctly, or resuscitating an apparently drowned person. Another 
composition lesson teaches a student how to write a military report on a bombing 
mission” (p. 272). Again, we see how such assignments both concern something that the 
military student is already familiar with and something that invites an uncreative 
approach to writing. The way that these students are largely presented in the literature is 
that they are less likely to produce philosophical or literary work as compared to their 
civilian counterparts, bearing in mind that scholars such as Dudley (1939), Hogrefe 
(1940a), and Buckner (1940) celebrated the creativity and abstract potential of civilian 
students. Instead, veterans’ motivations and interests lie in attaining vocational jobs such 
as those above, and they used college writing courses exclusively for that benefit, as 
opposed to interest in the humanities: as Hatfield (1944) is quick to note, “literary 
description and narration are not required of these boys becoming military specialists” (p. 
201). Given the characterization of returning service students, such topics were outside of 
their interests.  
 And yet, as soon as we lay out the argument that this is the sum of veteran 
students—that despite their deficiencies, their writing is mechanical, direct, and 
vocationally oriented—we find examples to the contrary. Partridge (1945), writing in 
College English, points to the richness of Royal Air Force slang, which he describes as 
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“virile and vigorous, graphic and picturesque, irreverent (for the most part) yet not 
irresponsible, often humorous, occasionally witty… debonair and insouciant. Youthful, it 
is sometimes imitative and sometimes almost truculently original and independent” (p. 
26). Rather than denigrate the language used by veterans, he provides it unique character, 
appreciating its qualities. Others also describe the humorous and intentional affordances 
of veterans’ language in their writing, as well as their potential for emotional and poetic 
expression. Shuey (1947), while providing examples of essays written by veterans clearly 
driven by industrial and vocational interests, also suggests that veteran writing can be 
interesting. Especially when writing from experience, they can produce writing that is “is 
far from the hardy high-school hangover, ‘My Hobby,’ or the perennial ‘My Favorite 
Pet.’ At Centenary College the mass of freshman themes today have vigor, individuality, 
and a maturity that merit careful reading. Most of these come from veterans” (p. 106). 
For Shuey, veterans provide a much needed reprieve from writing that she clearly 
perceives as hackneyed, a drudgery to slog through. Not only do they produce original 
material, but they do so articulately, and it becomes a pleasure to read for both of these 
reasons. Finally, Bishop (1947) also echoes this sentiment, saying of veterans that “their 
compositions show originality both in material and in treatment. Sometimes they write of 
their experiences, but more often they put into words their own thoughts and feelings” (p. 
429). What we see in these observations is a direct contrast to other dominant 
representations of the veteran student at the time. In a few short years, we find a 
discourse built around the veteran fraught with contradiction: they are at once 
intellectually deficient and strong problem solvers; their writing is simple, to-the-point, 
all business, but also rich, engaging, and emotional.  
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What are we to make of these disparate representations of the veteran student and 
writing? The first that veterans are driven by the simple, the technical, the practical, and 
on the other hand, a presentation that celebrates their language and sees them producing 
powerful, even poetic pieces regarding their experiences? The simple answer, it seems, is 
that veteran students provide a kind of representative microcostic trajectory of the 
subjectification of the composition student in general. Characterized initially as deficient, 
a move was made to engage their interests, which in this case was constructed of a certain 
kind of writing, brief and choppy, around issues of mechanics, the technical, and 
vocational. However, many examples existed to thwart that simplified understanding of 
them. This is generally what happened in composition over the course of the late 30s and 
40s regarding all students: a move was made away from the model of intellectual 
deficiency to a model that embraced the interests and potential of students, a model 
which was eventually forced to consider the abstract philosophical merit that students 
held in their experiences and views; and what better topics could exist the engage 
students in their writing? The fact that veteran students experienced a subjectification and 
pedagogical trajectory designed to address their needs that was so similar to civilian 
students (albeit in a significantly compressed timeframe) tells us that ultimately, veterans, 
too, are simply students. The same tools designed to create a kind of student, create the 
needs of that student, and address the needs of that student were also used to create and 
address the veteran student, with very little change in packaging. By the beginning of the 
1950s, we see little discussion of veteran students in the light of a population needing to 
be understood and treated as apart from their civilian counterparts.   
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But what does this observation mean for the idea of interest? In short, Interest 
could not actually account for the veteran student. It was simple enough to envision a 
subject driven by neoliberal ideals of career attainment, and suggest that their writing 
reflected this. However, examples of different veterans exploded this idea—they could 
very well be interested in philosophy, literature, and in general the values in expressed in 
the humanities. We begin to see where a pedagogy of interest fails to be able to subjectify 
or account for the assorted interests of veteran students. During the war, the pedagogy of 
interest was used to anticipate student interests as a whole: interest in democracy, interest 
in the news, interest in political affairs, interest in vocational studies. But if veterans, in 
fact, simply represent the larger student body as a whole, this means that the entire 
pedagogy of interest begins to fall in on itself, unable to withstand the weight of the 
assorted and potentially nuanced interests that all students carried with them.  
Part 5: Where and How is Power? 
A Compositional Dispositif. We have seen various moves in the 1940s to 
foreground a pedagogy of interest, and we have seen some of the effects of this 
foregrounding. This sudden interest in interest occurs concurrently with an interest in the 
knowing and shaping of student subjects through their writing. There is an overt 
recognition within the field of college English that subjects are malleable and 
manipulable, not the product of a static intelligence, but the product of assorted 
discourses speaking both within and without individuals. It is also during this time that 
America felt the need to defend itself from fascist and Nazi camps appearing in Europe. 
There was a need, now, not to shape just an interested academic subject, but a democratic 
one to boot, one that would stand for democracy, pluralism, and humanism. All of this 
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occurs during a backdrop in which psychology, education, and medical 
discourses/disciplines offered advice on how best to educate the subject—if not 
explicitly, they could at least be used to justify practices occurring in writing studies at 
the time in the service of a larger project. 
 Composition exists at the center of a gridwork of discourses, disciplines, political 
affairs, and desires. This begins to anticipate, for Foucault, the dispositif wherein 
composition resides, the junction of disciplines (Foucault, 2006) or the “ensemble of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions” 
(Foucault, 1980., p. 194) that came together to form composition and its 
conceptualization of engagement in the way that it emerged in the 1940s.  By 
determining where and how composition falls in this gridwork, we may begin to do the 
work of understanding power relations within composition. Herein, I examine the ways 
that disciplinary and pastoral power come to be used and justified within composition, 
based on compositions relationship with other disciplines. After examining these types of 
power, I look at broader conceptualizations of power, namely bio-power and 
governmentality, both of which are concerned with the behavior and subjectification of 
larger populations, rather than individual relations.  
Disciplinary and Pastoral Power. Part one of this chapter largely examines the 
shifting conceptualization of pedagogy in composition as student interest begins to take 
center stage. As the discourse of interest emerged, we see the roles of and relationships 
between teacher and student change; with the changing relationships, new kinds of power 
is activated and allowed. Before the 1930s, we might argue that writing instructors took a 
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rather sovereign role in the classroom. Like a Roman emperor, they gave a proverbial 
thumbs up or thumbs down to student work, a summative and total assessment of the 
student’s writing ability. There was no concern for the student-subject beyond the 
subject’s ability to produce writing that followed generally formal conventions and 
portrayed grammatical competency. The teacher’s ability to pass or fail a student was a 
gross display of authority typical of sovereignty, located in one central figure that 
demanded the respect of lower subjects.  
This all begins to change under the model of composition as interesting. When 
interest is synonymous with writing about the self, the instructor occupies a more pastoral 
role, helping students to discover something of themselves while they are learning to be 
more skillful writers. In fact, the figurative religious language of the “pastoral” is invoked 
by Witherspoon (1939), referring to students as “disciples.” Smith (1940), recognizing 
such a change in pedagogy, notes that now the philosophy of education “centers attention 
on the growth of the pupil and not the attainment of standards set from without” (p. 147). 
Fostering this growth, she notes, requires an intense study of pupils, understanding who 
they are and how to best lead them in the classroom. As noted in part one, this is also 
highly pastoral in scope, as it requires students to tell of themselves, or to confess. This 
view of the writing professor as a kind of guide for the not-yet-interested (but they will 
be!) carries into the 1950s, and is expressed well in Osborn (1949): freshmen in 
composition “possess the raw material. What kind of thinking is dormant in it? What can 
be done with it? That is the responsibility of the college teacher… the purpose of college 
composition courses, after all, is not to confirm already acknowledge ability, but to 
develop the interested student into a thoughtful and sensitive human being (p. 105-106). 
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In all of this, the composition teacher becomes a cultivator of the student, a shepherd for 
the flock, preparing them for life beyond the composition course.  
We have seen in part two of this chapter that the telling of the self should not 
seem an interrogation, but a psychologically therapeutic exercise for students. Using 
psychology as a means to justify actions within composition almost necessarily invites 
the understanding of writing as a kind of therapy. In this way, the teacher takes on 
another role that overlaps with the pastor, that of therapist. If we take Green (1940; 1941) 
or Hogrefe (1940a) seriously, and assume that writing about the self is enjoyable; and if, 
as part three of this chapter suggests, the best way of differentiating American education 
from that of the Nazis and fascists was to individualize education for each student, 
allowing each student to feel uniquely important; then the composition instructor must 
design assignments that are at once psychologically probing and revealing, but also 
relieving, allowing students a venue for self-expression. As the pastor-therapist, the 
teacher must navigate the dispositif of composition to develop the kinds of assignments 
that will help prepare students for the next level (life beyond composition) while catering 
to their individual sensibilities, all the while influenced by the various discourses with 
which composition associates, and personal beliefs about what students may need. 
Considering all of this, on a broader level, composition driven by a pedagogy of interest 
and pastoral power insists that the teacher develop a new attitude toward students. Under 
the past model, wherein sovereign power was displayed and a description of which 
begins this chapter, the student had to align his or her interests with those of the 
professor. Under the new model, the opposite is true; professors now must concern 
themselves with the interests of the student, caring about and for the student and the 
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student’s interests, prescribing specific plans of action based on individual student 
interests. The composition professor must now be as interested as the student, in the 
student. 
This change does not necessarily upset the authority vested in the composition 
professor, however, as we also see disciplinary power becoming more pointed within the 
relationship between student and teacher. Fulkerson (2005) notes that under a 
compositional model which is so student centered, “what we come down to is that the 
writing in such a course will be judged by how sophisticated or insightful the teacher 
finds the interpretation of the relevant artifacts to be” (662). While the professor may act 
as pastor, the professor also acts as a judge of character. The “relevant artifacts” under 
investigation are the students themselves. The pastoral leader also becomes an arbiter, 
one that is disciplinary in nature. Regardless of how well a student has articulated and 
justified a particular subject position, the instructor may deny that a student wrote with 
sufficient sophistication or insight. The composition teacher was once guided by a set of 
arbitrary and subjective principles, as Campbell (1939) complained, for assessing the 
quality of writing. But this writing was divorced from any consideration of who was 
writing—the focus of assessment was the writing itself. Now, the writing must be 
interested, interesting, and in some way a representation of the character of the author. 
While the principles of judgement are still largely arbitrary, what is judged is now not 
simply the writing, but the character of the writer, which under the emerging pedagogy of 
interest is necessarily enmeshed in the writing. This makes the once pastoral instructor a 
disciplinarian more than ever before. By asking students to openly express beliefs, goals, 
values, the pastoral instructor, in addition to helping students “begin as freshmen the 
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process of intellectual and psychological maturing” (Baker, 1943, p. 145), is also able to 
safeguard a broader academic Discourse from those subjects that do not fit the aims, 
goals, and values of that Discourse. Under the pedagogy of interest, a model of 
instruction that seems to provide authority to students, we still see a disciplinary 
gatekeeping agenda, even for those teachers who would seem to be most humanely 
oriented toward their student subjects. 
For there is a paranoia among composition teachers about “setting free the 
incapable and maladjusted” (Williams, 1940, p. 406). There is a sense that teachers of 
composition are judged for allowing the “wrong kind” of students progress in academia. 
Morrison (1941), in building a case for required freshman English courses, argues that 
freshman English does not belong to the English department per se, but the school in 
general. It prepares students for what is to come. But, under Williams, preparing the 
student appears in two different ways: on the one hand, students must be capable of 
meeting the needs of the academy through their writing. We see this in Dudley’s (1939) 
piece, wherein one of the goals of freshman English is to reduce “slovenliness and 
illiteracy in the writing of our students for other departments beyond the freshman year” 
(p. 26). At a basic level, students must be able to follow standard conventions of writing, 
lest the teachers of freshman English were not doing their jobs.  On the other hand, 
students must also be adjusted. “Adjustment” is where disciplinary power elides with the 
pastoral. In composition, in addition to learning the mechanics of writing, student must 
learn to articulate “the logic of human emotions, the concept of moral causation” 
(Morrison, 1941, p. 790) but at the same time, these articulations must be “an extension 
of [the student’s] own voice” (p. 791). The composition instructor, through engaging 
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students’ interest in writing, is allowed access to students’ subject-identities, and must 
both judge and shape the character of the writer to fit with a broader discourse of 
academia. It is not enough that students write well; they must now think in the right way 
to move beyond college introductory courses. Through exercises in autobiography, 
creative writing, and theme writing prescribed by the teacher, the student ideally learns to 
adopt habits of thought valued in the academy. We thus come back to Fulkerson’s (2005) 
concern, that the teacher-subject may arbitrarily judge students as adequate or inadequate 
based on the ways that they cast themselves in writing. This is not to say that such 
gatekeeping did not occur beforehand. But what was kept from advancing was very 
different: whereas it was initially the writing itself that might hinder a student, it is now 
the subject written that measures the student worthy of promotion. 
All of this may be seen as disciplinary because the student must perform and 
embody a kind of prescribed behavior. The student, rather than showcasing knowledge 
simply about writing, must showcase knowledge proving that he or she is capable of 
integrating into a larger academic community. Ideally, students will embody the values 
that the instructor attempts to instill them with, taking on a new kind of academic, 
writerly subjectivity, even when the professor is no longer judging. The student learns to 
manage his or her own writing, as the prisoner learns to manage his or her own behavior, 
transforming into a subject under the discipline of writing or good citizenship, 
respectively.  
Interest as a technology of power. To reiterate a definition developed in the 
third chapter, a technology of power is an idea (e.g. punishment, repression), which may 
be met through various techniques, designed to produce behaviors and attitudes within 
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the subjects who are subjected to that particular technology of power. In a genealogical 
analysis such as this, we must ask what kinds of student subjects were desired, and what 
strategies were developed to produce those kinds of subjects? As we look at the evidence, 
the immediate answer seems to be that there was a desire to produce an interested student 
subject. But this answer begs several questions: interested in what, and to what end? 
Upon closer scrutiny, the problem was not that students were not interested in anything—
indeed the pedagogy of interest can only exist if students already have interests that such 
a pedagogy may be exercised upon—but that students were not skilled writers. Interest, 
then, is neither the ends nor exactly the means, to produce skilled writing subjects. 
Interest is a mediating idea that may be used to reach the ends of skilled writers; in itself, 
however, it is not an actual strategy or technique, but an idea used to justify techniques 
used within the writing classroom to make students better at academic writing. In this 
way, interest becomes a segue between writing exercises, assignments, and classroom 
practices on the one hand, and the goal of improving student writing on the other.  
Certainly, during the 1940s, there were practices developed (or justified) through this 
idea of interest.  
 And certainly, we see new strategies emerging to satiate the concept of interest, 
particularly the autobiographical essay (Dudley, 1939; Hogrefe 1940a; Green 1940; 
1941). To be sure, this is an ingenious strategy that allows for the newly developing 
pastoral and disciplinary powers vested in the professor to play out. In the composition 
classroom, students were already expected to write, and students would have been well 
aware of this expectation. Thus, there is nothing at all suspect in asking students to 
produce an essay. When the essay becomes autobiographical, it is in the name of 
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leveraging student interest—this new technology—so that students will now have 
substance to write about, to give them something to say, the absence of which heretofore 
had been seen as a problem in student writing (Blackmur, 1941; Wykoff, 1941). Not only 
that, but under interest, students will want to engage in this writing activity. It is not 
drudgery anymore, but, at least in theory, an enjoyable activity, certainly preferable to the 
earlier sorts of assignments that had students copying from great writers, drilling 
grammar, or writing about topics that they had little to say about. Interest enables this 
strategy to occur while producing writing (and writers) of substance. When we adopt 
interest as the technology that molds the written assignment and produces students who 
are perceived as more competent, the autobiographical assignment appears natural and 
welcome, even if it objectifies and subjectifies students in a way that had never been tried 
in the composition classroom before.  
 Indeed, interest becomes the justification for all of the aforementioned strategies 
developed within composition classes during the 1940s: the writing assignments that 
students are given, the ways in which they are deployed, even the attitudes that teachers 
are now supposed to maintain toward their students. But, as have also seen, this 
technology produces more than students that are invested in their writing. It produces 
students that adopt patriotic mentalities, develop a proclivity for groupwork, and display 
academic behaviors beyond their composition classroom. All of these developments are 
mediated through interest: students are interested (or they should be interested) in the 
state of their nation. Thus, research regarding the war or democracy will allow them to 
write more fluidly, all the while producing more knowledgeable democratic citizens. 
Students should be involved in groupwork as they will feel more interested in the 
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ownership of work that they produce within the group, but it will also acclimate students 
to working with other members. Students must become good writers because through this 
they will develop their interests, and continue deeper into their studies (as skilled writers) 
as they progress through their college careers. Interest becomes the hinge through which 
different strategies may produce a kind of student subject.  
Bio-Power and Governmentality. But why was it necessary to produce such 
student subjects in the first place? After analyzing the ways that pastoral and disciplinary 
power existed in the relationship between students and teachers, as well as the technology 
of interest that justifies the strategies developed to produce such a subject, we must look 
at the rationalities that contributed to the emergence of those kinds of powers—in other 
words governmentality. An analysis of governmentality must examine the compositional 
dispositif at a macro level, looking at what desires shifted the discourses to intersect as 
they did. What forces established the sayable, knowable, and doable in composition 
during the 1940s? What subjects needed to be produced from composition and higher 
education in general, and to what end? One place to begin answering these questions is to 
examine the emergence of the “proministrative state,” or the post-World War 2 state 
driven by “consensual, pragmatic, and expert-driven policy-making” (Balogh, 1991, p. 
23). It is during this time of pragmatic policy-making that the United States government 
began to form partnerships with colleges and universities, placing higher education at 
“the crossroads of state-society relations—between citizens and the state… completely 
beholden to neither party but expected and committed to serve both” (Loss, 2012, p. 15-
16). With this observation, we see a network of political discourses in place, aligning 
their goals to a particular end: in particular, the end of World War 2 saw the emergence 
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of the Cold War, and at this time, more than ever, the United States needed skilled 
experts for manufacture, industry, and invention; in short, the United States needed 
specialists. As a result, higher education received unprecedented governmental funding, 
as well as unprecedented admissions (Lazerson, 1998). In fact, it was not until well after 
the war, in 1947, that the Department of Defense and the Office of Naval Research 
adopted policies to begin paying overhead costs to universities conducting research for 
them (Knezo, 1994). These facts suggest that the government saw a need for research, 
development, and training immediately after the war; the strongest example of this is 
found in the GI Bill, developed as a collaboration of The Veterans Administration, The 
Office of Education, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, which 
created the opportunity for thousands of returning servicepeople to attend college 
(Munsey, 2010; Thelin, 2011).  
 What were the rationalities that saw such a need for this kind of development? 
What allowed higher education, at the beginning of the 1950s, to have a virtual monopoly 
over the creation of specialists (Lazerson, 1998), and why was there such a push to make 
specialists out of servicepeople? While the common historical belief about the GI Bill is 
simply that the United States government wanted to give back to its servicepeople by 
helping them to attain an education, Loss (2005) is skeptical of this view in history. This 
is not to say that veterans did not deserve an education, and certainly many veterans were 
able to advance themselves in the workforce as a result of college accessibility (Loss, 
2005; Lazerson, 1998). However, this is only one potential reason for the GI Bill’s 
inception; Loss (2005; 2011) suggests that certain beliefs about the nature of war, the 
veteran, and needs of the United States created problems that could be solved by the 
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introduction of the GI Bill. Perhaps the strongest example of this was concern over 
veterans’ psychological adjustment to society after the war (Loss, 2005; Rose; 1989; 
Watson, 1978), particularly “problem reactions” troops may exhibit toward the end of the 
war and reorientation into civilian normalcy (Stouffer et al., 1949, p. 552).  After World 
War 1, it was common practice to provide a pension to shell shocked soldiers as a way to 
help them reintegrate, but by 1925 “psychiatrists began to doubt the wisdom of providing 
pensions, because they believed pensions reinforced disability” (Pols & Oak, 2007, p. 
2136). After World War 2, the emerging belief was that to reintegrate in a healthily 
psychological way, veterans needed busy themselves with various projects and to engage 
in regular social interaction (Loss, 2005; Loss 2011; Pols & Oak, 2007; Stouffer et al., 
1949). The GI Bill, in providing ease of access to college programs for veterans, followed 
psychological prescriptions for dealing with returning soldiers and their mental health.  
Another consideration that led to the GI Bill was the fact that it was difficult to 
predict what servicepeople would actually do upon returning home (Stouffer et al., 1949). 
Many soldiers indicated that they were unsure of their postwar plans, which was 
problematic for the individual veterans, but the state as well. What might veterans do 
with their time? As noted by Stouffer et al., there was concern over soldiers becoming 
less disciplined after returning from the frontlines, identifying with enemy sentiments, 
and in general, feeling that the got a “raw deal” from the Army (p. 565). There was a 
need, then, not to produce a loyal democratic subject in the veteran, but to maintain one. 
Allowing veterans to do as they please while embracing a laissez faire attitude toward 
them could, in fact, be harmful to the United States as it might breed an un-American 
subject. The GI Bill was thus not so much a gift to returning soldiers as it was a means of 
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sating them, of keeping resentment to a low. Preoccupation was not only important to 
helping veterans psychologically readjust, but to psychologically readjust as American 
citizens. It was also theorized that a greater education could help soldiers rationalize the 
war that they were a part of. According to Loss (2012), “failure to provide adequate 
knowledge about the war was cited as a key explanation for the significant increase in 
soldier neuropsychiatric breakdowns, which according to one report, were running 60 
percent higher than during World War I” (p. 104). An education could help them to 
understand why they had engaged in the conflict that they had been a part of, again a 
strategy to minimize resentment on the part of soldiers. By making education more 
accessible for veterans, it was easier to determine where veterans would go, how they 
would spend their time, generally to keep tabs on them, all the while creating productive 
middle class specialists that could be proud of their previous war efforts while continuing 
to contribute to the Cold War efforts. In this way, veterans remained soldiers fighting in a 
war long after World War 2 was over.  
Herein, we see how bio-power is active within the relationship that existed 
between the American post-war state and veterans. Mass education becomes a medically 
viable solution to insanity, helping soldiers overcome shellshock and reintegrate into 
society. It is a bio-power rooted in a kind of disciplinary power, to be sure: soldiers must 
remain committed to American beliefs in democracy, and they must engage in a specific 
kind of training to do so, namely, that of college education. This will create a well-
behaved subject, in the same way that the panopticon might create a well-behaved 
prisoner, embodying the behavioral codes of the society in which they exist. In 
Psychiatric Power, Foucault (2006) describes disciplinary power in the military as “the 
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general confiscation of the body, time, and life; it is no longer a levy on the individual's 
activity but an occupation of his body, life, and time. Every disciplinary system tends… 
to be an occupation of the individual's time, life, and body” (p. 47). We certainly see this 
sort of power in play as we examine the reasons for the GI Bill’s creation. It seeks to 
occupy the veteran’s time by prescribing a way of life and habits of mind. But it moves 
beyond disciplinary power in its scope. The GI Bill is no longer about the “individual’s 
time, life and body;” this power reaches into the broader realm of bio-power, as education 
is now specifically about the management of all soldiers’ bodies, examining at all times 
where they are, what they are doing, how they are acting, rooted in a generalized 
prescription for psychological health. The role of education is now to produce a citizen 
that is healthy both for the citizen’s self and for the nation.  
 The same sentiment—that of creating a healthy and productive democratic 
citizen—drove education for civilians as well. In general, as Schlessinger (1949) notes, 
during the cold war years, the United States was engaged in a war over “the minds and 
hearts of men” (p. 9) so that it could “defend and strengthen free society” (p. 10). 
Certainly, the GI Bill was designed with this goal in mind, but this war for the minds and 
hearts of men went beyond veterans. All citizens, even non-US citizens, were valuable 
soldiers in this postwar America, and institutions of higher education became middle 
class corals (Loss, 2012), sites where great numbers of U.S. citizens could be reached. To 
this end government, provided unprecedented funding for university expansion (Boland, 
1969; Lazerson, 1998). While this led to more enrollment in the university setting, it was 
not necessarily for citizen’s individual advancement, unless that advancement in some 
way benefitted the overall goals of the U.S. government. As Boland (1969) notes:  
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The focus of federal interest on the uses of higher education for national 
development meant a concentration of support on specialized areas of 
training and research --largely within the physical sciences--with little 
effort to develop a more comprehensive higher education program. The 
government did not, that is, concern itself with the welfare of higher 
education as a whole; it did not have a specifically "educational mission." 
Rather, individual government agencies utilized the expertise and facilities 
of higher education institutions in the pursuit of their own programs… (p. 
19). 
Two of these programs were the Surplus Property Act (1946) and the Information and 
Education Exchange Act (1948). In both cases, money was generated to allow U.S. 
citizens to travel abroad as well as to educate foreign citizens under the U. S. model of 
education. William Fulbright, a supporter of these acts, stated that they existed “for 
increasing our understanding of others and their understanding of us” (Loss, 2012, p. 
125). As the Cold War developed, it became more important than ever that those outside 
the U.S. “understand us.” Through such globalized education, the U.S. government could 
attempt to build sympathies with individuals in other countries, ensuring the perpetuation 
of democratic, rather than communist, ideals. 
As we might expect, these desires, knowledges, and regulations affected the 
writing and composition curriculum. Within America, the government began constructing 
beliefs and knowledges around what it meant to be a good citizen as well as how these 
good citizens should be educated. It is this knowledge that began to guide education and 
composition curricula. Turning again to veterans as an example, Loss (2005; 2012) 
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describes literacy programs for returning servicepeople, many taught by college and 
university professors. For instance, the government developed a literacy program around 
Meet Private Pete: A Soldier’s Reader, a literacy workbook designed to engage soldiers, 
justified through the idea that it spoke to their own experiences as soldiers (Sticht, 2009). 
Such material was assumed to be, as has been the theme of this entire chapter, interesting 
to them. While this reader as well as the entire program was a military “fly by night” 
project (Loss, 2005, p. 878), it was thought that this approach would make material more 
accessible to soldiers. Despite the fact that this reader was designed to teach functional 
literacy skills to soldiers operating at roughly a first grade reading level, the idea of 
speaking to soldiers’ experiences was adopted by the college composition classroom. In 
this example, we begin to see how composition was influenced not only by disciplines 
such as education and psychology, but by perpetuations, needs, constructions, and 
prescriptions of the state. If, as noted in section two of this chapter, education was at odds 
with itself, unsure of whether the end-goal of schooling should be students’ vocational 
training or holistic cultivation; and if college composition was also plagued by this 
disagreement, unsure of what assignments would best prepare students for a future 
beyond college; it was not because these disciplines were speaking only to one another, 
essentially in a vacuum. This disparity arises from the fact that the United States needed 
to produce cultivated citizens that could at once be loyal to democratic ideals as well as 
vocational specialists, out-producing enemies overseas. The writing curriculum, as well 
as the conversation around the curriculum—that which was thinkable and sayable about 
the curriculum—was formed from concerns about a globalizing world in which new 
kinds of wars, enemies, and politics were emerging.  
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We may begin to see how all of this is tied to the larger concept of capitalism. 
Foucault (1978) has suggested that the guiding knowledge of governmentality is the 
political economy. This rings true within the analysis of interest/engagement in 
composition studies. If student engagement was a means to differentiate the United States 
agenda from Nazism and fascism, then specialization and creating a need to attend 
college was a means to differentiate the dominant ideology in the United States from that 
of the Soviets, namely communism. At the end of part 2 in the section on educational 
influences, education was developing conflicting philosophies, with apparently disparate 
aims: cultivate the individual and the mind in the mode of liberal education, on the one 
hand, or construct a productive and vocationally oriented subject, on the other. The 
resolution to this, as suggested by compositionists (Sensabaugh, 1943; Mcdowell, 1946; 
Perrin, 1948), was that students should be responsible for their own interests—they 
needed to determine how to cultivate themselves. This concept of self-direction rings true 
with the concept of capitalism: students should be personally accountable for their 
education. Providing students choice would appear to provide them assorted possibilities 
in self-development and is a student-centric model. However, this places a new burden on 
students, one embraced by the concept of capitalism, that of personal responsibility. 
Should students not cultivate themselves correctly—that is, if they do not make the 
choices to become the kinds of individuals they hoped or to secure the kinds of jobs they 
desired—it is their own fault. Whether or not this approach to individuals is just is not of 
interest to this study. What is important to note is that, provided with opportunities to 
succeed, students make their own decisions, which, especially in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, is a uniquely American institution.  
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 It is in this way that college composition, at the end of the war, was complicit 
with the larger capitalist enterprise that was the United States, and this helps to shed light 
on the ways that governmentality functions. In general, there existed a discursive 
construction of that which was anti-American: fascism, and later, communism. 
Americans at all levels needed to be democratic subjects standing against these values. 
What was knowable, sayable, and doable within higher education, within even 
composition classes, was that which rang true of an American subjectivity, one 
democratically and capitalistically driven. Here was a knowledge (savoir) that existed in 
all facets of American political technology, underlying the educational discipline, laws 
that were soon to be put into place under McCarthyism, the (re)formation of higher 
education, the desire for all citizens to become specialists and the driving force to admit 
more college students than ever before (including and especially veterans), and even 
military funding to research: America needed to outpace, outdo, and differentiate itself 
from communist forces in Eastern Europe, to define itself through capitalistic production. 
In this way, governmentality represents an ethos, the beliefs of a state that allowed for the 
practices in one small facet of it, namely, composition, to follow certain practices. Within 
the purview of these practices was a manifestation of a pedagogy based on student 
interest, or engagement, which, as we have seen, allowed for the creation of an 
interested/engaged democratic subject, a subject that exposes his or her social and 
cultural backgrounds and beliefs to the writing instructor, one acted upon by psychology 
and education, typified by medicine, and ultimately deemed to be a subject operating 
within or without the bounds of the established priorities and necessities of the state.  
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CONCLUSION 
While this analysis of the 1940s tells a story of student interest in composition—as 
well as the myriad discourses and forces that allowed it to emerge as it did—it is not 
yet clear how this is a genealogy of engagement per se. For Foucault (1977/1995), a 
genealogy is a history of the present, as well as a history of emergence and descent. 
As such, it is important to  consider the ways that the past appears in and shapes the 
present concept of student engagement. We have descended into a time before 
engagement was called engagement. How, then, has this concept of interest emerged 
into the present and shaped itself into engagement? We have studied the discourses 
and disciplines that incubated the concept of interest, and allowed it to hatch into, 
what may be contested, is that current concept of engagement. Further, if it is the 
case that engagement, like interest, is not simply a humane matter, but one derived 
of various institutional and social needs, various prescriptions from various 
discourses, and powers that may be underlain with less than humane aims, we must 
consider what is to be done with student engagement as we move forward. Making 
the Past Present—and Vice Versa 
Bean (2005) provides four primary indicators of student engagement: critical 
thinking, making writing personal writing, writing wherein the teacher acts as a coach or 
guide, and groupwork and audience considerations. While published long after the 1940s, 
we see how each of these indicators of engagement begin to appear in the pedagogy of 
interest. To strengthen this point, I show how each indicator appears in several works 
over the period of the 1940s, both in the beginning of and later into the decade, and then 
compare these early pieces to a contemporary work that may be described as ascribing to 
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a pedagogy of engagement. Each contemporary work comes from the more recent 
College Composition and Communication journal. Further, each contemporary piece was 
chosen for its public, representative function: each piece is a convention address or 
conversation among composition scholars that may be said to represent the larger state of 
the field. This is designed to show how the pedagogy of interest is intimately tied to what 
we now call engagement and to suggest that far from being a simplified, un-pedagogical 
period of current-traditional rhetoric, the 1940s represents a shift in pedagogy that even 
contemporary engagement scholars may be proud of.  
This is not to suggest that any sort of progress has been made as far as pedagogy 
is concerned. The emergence of engagement, as I argue below, is simply an extension—
or even the renaming—of an already existent concept, one which has been in play since 
the 1930s, namely interest. Rather than progress, this implies stagnation. But was the 
concept of interest itself, when it first emerged, a progressive move to something better 
than what had been? The analysis above suggests that it was not. It does not build upon a 
past, or show a linear trajectory from/to. Instead, it emerges from unexpected needs, what 
we might call a series of accidents: dispositions brought on by a war, fear of fascism and 
communism, the prescriptions (and resistance to) of a brand of psychology, a sudden 
need for specialist training, an influx of new bodies in desks. Interest becomes a strategy, 
as we have already explored, a technology of power that helps to regulate, control, and 
produce subjects, far from the notion of betterment that seems to drive research on 
engagement now. But if this is the case, it is necessary to first show how engagement is 
simply a rebranding of interest as it appeared many years ago.  
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Critical thinking. Bean (2005) describes critical thinking as an engaging activity 
in which students think through a problem and learn to clarify their ideas in writing when 
attempting to solve that problem. The idea of developing clearer, organized, and critical 
thinking appears in many of the pieces addressed in chapter four of this piece, and we 
may conclude that even in the 1940s, instructors of writing wanted students to think 
critically. Developing clear writing was both an indicator that students were developing 
these critical thinking skills as well as a means of practicing to sharpen these skills. 
Wykoff (1940), for instance, notes that although “there is constant adjustment of the 
content of the various compositional courses to suit changing needs… somewhere along 
the way compositional students learn how to use the power of thinking and to organize 
thought” (p. 434). Here, Wykoff suggests that whatever composition does, it is designed 
to help students sharpen their tinking, perhaps to even develop a meta-awareness of the 
ways that they think. Like Bean, Hogrefe (1940b) ties the idea of problem solving to the 
idea of thinking as she describes a composition class at Iowa state college, which “aims 
to give students skill in thinking about issues which involve controversy” including the 
skills “to detect vague language or a need for definition, to recognize emotional appeals 
(including the writer's bias and his own bias), to analyze unstated assumptions, and recall 
and use facts in thinking about a problem” (p. 602-603). In these early pieces, we see 
how instructors of composition were thinking about thinking—specifically, how to foster 
critical thinking in their classes, especially around the idea of problem solving.  
While Wykoff (1940) and Hogrefe (1940b) seem suggest that critical thinking and 
problem solving need to appear in the composition curriculum, later pieces attempt to 
create a model for the teaching of problem solving. Salisbury (1942), for instance, 
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suggests that critical thinking and problem solving typically begins in writing: the student 
“merely follows the writer's thinking. He performs the first step in thinking… The 
subsequent steps of clarifying the problem, collecting additional data, grouping these data 
around the problem, making comparisons, and drawing conclusions, he carries on also 
through the medium of language” (p. 186-187). What begins in reading becomes a 
process of problem solving as the student begins to think about, articulate, and write 
through the problem. Four years later, Smith (1946) claims that the teacher’s role in the 
composition curriculum is to “make habitual with their students certain methods of 
approach to the problems of expression and certain processes of thinking common to 
many types of communication” (p. 336). To this end, she proposes using Tyler’s logical 
model of problem solving in the composition classroom. She does not provide citations 
that clearly indicate what work of Tyler’s she is referring to, however in 1949, Tyler’s 
landmark Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction was published, and this 
provides us a sense of what Smith may be referring to in her own piece; it is, incidentally, 
remarkably similar to the model that Salisbury suggests near the beginning of the decade. 
Tyler provides steps to help students develop problem solving skills, including “sensing a 
difficulty or question that cannot be answered at the present, identifying the problem 
more clearly by analysis, collecting relevant facts, formulating possible hypotheses… 
testing the hypotheses by appropriate means, [and] drawing conclusions” (p. 69). In this 
case, the understanding is that problem solving can be approached scientifically; there are 
steps to make a student a good problem solver, and they are deeply tied to the scientific 
method. It should also be noted that in all of these pieces, the authors at some point 
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mention the need to attend to students’ interests as well. Critical thinking/problem 
solving is not isolated, but intimately tied to the concept of interest. 
 Based on these examples and the fact that composition scholars in the 1940s were 
attempting to create a science of problem solving, it is possible to see how the “engaging 
idea” of critical thinking as described by Bean (2005) was a deep concern for those 
practicing composition even then. Further, as these examples show an alignment with the 
concept of activating students’ interests, we see how interest and critical 
thinking/problem solving are deeply connected. Moving forward to the current decade, 
we see how such ideas are explicitly used in the service of “student engagement.” Artze-
Vega et al. (2013) for instance, refer to Bean’s text as a “perennial favorite” for 
composition pedagogy and suggest that it should be “required reading for all faculty, 
especially those challenged to explain how engaged learning and critical thinking can be 
activated” (p. 180, emphasis in original). In this piece, each of seven authors describes 
their individual perspectives on faculty development, both in the field of composition and 
outside. One of the authors, Gerald Nelms, describes making coursework more active and 
engaging by having students write through problems. I do not mean to exhaustively cover 
all contemporary pieces that address critical thinking in college composition—indeed, 
that is easily too large a project for any one person to surmount. Rather, Atrze-Vega et al. 
represent a group of thinkers in the composition field of composition for whom it seems 
the idea of problem solving as described by Bean is necessary for all faculty development 
as well as promoting student engagement.  
 If this is the case, it means that critical thinking/problem solving did not appear 
near the end of the millennium as a sudden means of making students engage in their 
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writing work. Instead, it simply took 75 years for Artze-Vega et al.’s (2013) to be 
published, addressing critical thinking as a central concern for professional faculty 
development in composition work, despite the fact that critical thinking was a 
pedagogical concern from some of the earliest publications of College English. During a 
time that has historically been written off as bereft of pedagogical theory in composition, 
we see the seeds of this idea being planted. Students must be taught how to think 
critically, so much so that over the course of the 1940s, we see step-by-step methods to 
problem solving being proposed by Salisbury (1942), Smith (1946), and Tyler (1949). 
What is more, critical thinking is only one indicator of student engagement under Bean’s 
model; the other three appear just as strongly in composition literature across the 1940s.  
Making writing personal. For Bean (2005), one means of engaging students in 
writing is to provide them opportunities for expression as well as “linking course 
concepts to students’ personal experience of previously existing knowledge” (p. 123). 
Students will engage in writing when they have a personal stake in the topic that they are 
writing about. This attitude is adopted by many early pedagogues who advocate a place 
for student interest in the composition classroom. Nowhere is this stronger than in Green 
(1940), who describes the two hypothetical situations, one of a student writing an 
“objective” economy paper versus an economy paper that is rooted in personal 
experience:  
That term paper on marginal utility for Econ. 52 may turn out to show a 
very imperfect understanding of economic principles, and considerable 
confusion in thinking, if the student roams at will over the continent or 
becomes lost in a bog of abstraction and theory. But if Richard Johnson, 
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Jr., applies it to an analysis of the fortunes of Johnson's Drug Store, corner 
Grand River and La Salle, both he and his instructor may come to see that 
even the principle of marginal utility does not operate in a vacuum; and 
Richard, at least, will see that every economic principle stands in some 
direct ratio to human weal or woe. (p. 697) 
For Green as well as Bean, making writing personal can lead to a greater understanding 
of material as students are able to see something of themselves in the contents that they 
write about. Indeed, in the previous chapter, there were explicit links made to the concept 
of personal writing and the concept of student interest, such as autobiography in Dudley 
(1939), Digna (1940), and Baker (1943). In these pieces, students become interested in 
writing when they are allowed to write about that which they know.  
 In the later 1940s, the concept of personalization remains strong in composition 
literature. We have seen it, for instance, in literature addressing returning service persons 
as a way of keeping them interested in writing and English studies (e.g. Pennington, 
1945; Shuey, 1947). But even outside of the militarized student, the concept of interest 
and personalization continue to abound in the literature (indeed, it is hard to think of an 
interest that is not, in some way, personal). Again, Smith (1946) appears in this 
conversation, claiming that “the need for each student to express himself in ways that are 
original and satisfying to him personally must be provided by the curriculum” (p. 340). 
Wykoff (1946) links the idea of interest to the personal, describing a grammar correction 
assignment in which he has students, as a group, workshop sentences from their own 
papers on the grounds that “the correction of such a series of sentences is more 
interesting and effective than the correction of a similar number of impersonal exercises 
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from the handbook” (p. 139). Hotchner (1949) describes a classroom approach that 
“combines a personal essay with the simple elements of research” (p. 339), which he 
describes as accessible to students due to its personal elements while introducing them to 
the new concept of performing research. The purpose of these examples is to suggest that 
the concepts of personalization and self-expression are familiar pedagogical tools in 
teaching college composition across the decade of the 1940s.  
 As we move into the post-millennial period, we see the idea of personalization 
playing out in an address from Tinberg (2014) at the Conference on College Composition 
and Communication. He suggests that it is through personal writing that individuals can 
formulate and discover something of who they are. Specifically, he describes Paul, a 
returning veteran, who was hesitant to write about his experiences for fear of being 
judged: 
 I saw an inventive, if still developing, writer attempting "self-
determination" while at the same time engaging his private experience for 
public purposes. Who was I - who have never seen war except through the 
mediated imagery of book and film - to prohibit a veteran, for whom the 
"creature" was not lost but rather whole and tangible, from conveying his 
rich experience? The fact is that Paul needed to write and write and write 
and to do so from his vantage point as a returning, wounded vet - as if 
under a moral imperative. His goal was not to make himself feel better. 
Rather, he was busily working to make a self. (p. 336) 
We see Paul “engaging” his private life as a way of creating what Tinberg all but states is 
interesting writing, and it is through this relevant, personal experience that Paul is able to 
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learn—in particular, he learns about himself. Much of this seems to be what composition 
scholars of the 1940s were getting at. In fact, we see it suggested on more than one 
occasion that returning veterans write about what they know, in particular, warfare, as a 
way to keep them interested in their studies and to progress through college. It is true that 
Tinberg shifts the conversation forward to a degree—instead of learning about course 
content such as economics, as Green (1940) suggests, the purpose is to reflect and 
personally construct a subjectivity for a public to read. Still, the purpose that Tinburg 
identifies in his address is not entirely new. Dudley (1939) suggests autobiographical 
writing because the student will discover that “the past is interesting to himself, and then, 
gradually and somewhat to his surprise, that it is interesting to others” (p. 23).  
We see, then, that even at the beginning of the 1940s, the idea of personal writing 
was at the pedagogical forefront, to keep students “interested” in their work, rather than 
“engaged” in it, although at this point it is becoming clear that based on Bean’s 
conceptualization of engagement, the two are nearly synonymous. We also see how 
audience plays into the concept of interest/engagement over the course of years—Dudley 
(1939) notes that what is interesting to the student may become interesting to others, and 
(Tinberg) suggests that there is always presentation in writing, and one must consult with 
oneself for the purpose public address. The concept of audience is also a marker of 
writing engagement for Bean (2005), and in the 1940s, we see more scholars than Dudley 
attempting to use the concept of an audience and group writing for the purpose of 
keeping student interested in their writing. 
Groupwork and audience. Several composition scholars of the 1940s write 
about the merits of workshops, writing groups, and authentic audiences as a means of 
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raising interest in writing. Just so, the concept of groups in the writing classroom is 
another of Bean’s (2005) engaging ideas. Essentially, writing is a social activity; we do 
not write simply to create a product, but to have that product read by others. We see the 
idea of socialization in/through writing appear in Drennan’s (1940) “Workshop Methods 
in Freshman English.” Drennan describes her first assignment of the course, a personal 
theme, however students are “told beforehand that they will be asked to read their themes 
in class for criticism by the class” (Drennan, p. 532). Here, the stakes are raised as soon 
as the assignment is given; students are made aware that their writing will be critiqued by 
their peers, and thus they must tailor their writing not simply for a teacher giving a grade, 
but for others that may judge them. To maintain a helpful and constructive attitude within 
the classroom, she tries “to make them see that we are all good friends working together” 
and attempts to build what she refers to as a “social unit” (p. 533). The rest of her piece 
describes how groupwork can be used in grammar instruction, outlining activities, and 
vocabulary building. On the other hand, groupwork can also be productive for research 
based writing. Digna (1940) describes having students vote on a research topic together 
(on that interests them) in her writing course. These students are then able to help each 
other develop research questions, find research materials, and talk through difficulties 
with one another. Between these two early composition scholars, we see that groups both 
create a support network and an audience that can keep the student interested and 
engaged in writing activity.  
 Later in the decade, the ideas of having students work in groups and considering 
audience when writing remain. For Perrin (1947), audience considerations in composition 
are a “maximum essential.” He states that “most of the time our pupils should be engaged 
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in actual communication… Teachers of written composition should develop a 
corresponding ‘reader contact’ and relentlessly fail papers that seem to be written in a 
vacuum” (p. 357). What topics should students then communicate about? The simple 
answer, according to Perrin, is that students will “have plenty to say to their own group” 
provided that the “matters [are] of interest or concern to them” (p. 356). In the 1947 
meeting of the National Council of Teachers of English, it was made clear that students 
will improve in their writing and critical thinking “if English teachers provide them with 
normal situations for genuine communication, if we give them a better understanding of 
language as a social institution and a psychological process” (NCTE, 1947, p. 272). Both 
McKee (1947) and Magalaner (1948) entreat composition instructors to “give them an 
audience” in their eponymously named article, and Magalaner notes that it is only when 
students consider the interests of their audience (“neighbors”) that they will produce 
interesting work. Similarly, Angus (1948) notes that when a student feels “that a local 
group might be interested in reading [his paper]… he will attack his research problem 
with industry and enthusiasm” (p. 193). Finally, McGaughey (1950) sees groupwork as a 
psychologically sound practice, one in which students can feel greater pride and 
accountability for their work. While she varies the means of creating small groups in her 
classroom, one of the primary ways of grouping students together is via shared interest. 
Based on all of these examples, we see how audience considerations and groupwork were 
widely discussed pedagogical constructs, largely intermingled with the concept of 
interest.  
 And as we move forward in time, we see that groupwork/audience concerns still 
have a prime spot in composition pedagogy. In his exemplar award acceptance speech, 
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Winterowd (2010) notes that while writing is an excellent mode of self-expression, in the 
academy writing “has a public function that binds us to an ethical ‘contract’ with 
readers… we'll provide all of the information that readers need to understand and critique 
the writing… and our writing will be as readable as we can possibly make it in 
accordance with our purposes” (p. 502-503). He continues to suggest that it is the writing 
teacher’s job to help students see the joy in critically thinking about their writing 
purposes and creatively developing a means to meet that purpose. This joy, he concludes, 
is often found in writer workshops. Given that the award that occasioned Winterowd’s 
speech “represents the highest ideals of scholarship, teaching, and service to the entire 
[composition] profession” (CCCC, 2018), we may surmise that the concept of expressing 
oneself to readership, or an audience, still holds significant weight in the field. 
Winterowd does not actually refer to engagement per se in his speech, however the 
concept of enjoyment in writing seems to get at a similar idea. It is the teacher’s job to 
foster this attitude in students, and it can be done through both workshops and simply 
allowing students to envision an audience during writing activities. Such activities are 
designed to make students value and even want to write, to captivate them, we may even 
say, to engage them. 
 Thus, audiences, groupwork, and the social aspect of writing have been 
pedagogical practices throughout the last 80 years of composition, and continues into the 
current age. During the 1940s, writing for others increases students’ accountability and 
encourages them to write pieces that may be interesting to others. In this case, the 
concept of interest becomes a product of the subject, rather than a means to create or 
determine a subject, but it is still a device that drive the pedagogical approach. Moving 
  
227 
 
forward, at least based on Winterowd’s piece, social aspects of writing should increase 
enjoyment in the activity. In both cases, the idea exists that an audience changes how 
students engage with their work, producing greater motivation to write and better writing 
as an end result.  
Teacher as coach/mentor. The final marker of engagement is perhaps more 
difficult to identify in pedagogy as it refers to an attitude that teachers should have 
toward their profession and students. In the engaged classroom, the instructor’s feedback 
should be constructive rather than critical, and the instructor must take an active interest 
in students as well as display a demeanor congruent with that interest. Most of the pieces 
examined in this project touch on the “teacher as coach” concept in one way or another, 
however in this brief section, I explicitly point to instances where literature in both the 
1940s and now address the idea of teacher attitude and, for lack of a better term, 
“coaching” of writing.  
The concept of teacher as coach appears rather explicitly in the second issue of 
College English, in Oakes’ (1939) piece on the student-teacher writing conference. She 
notes that in the writing conference for students of freshman English, often the instructor 
simply shows students what needs to be corrected in a paper without teaching the student 
why. The student may sit back while the instructor does the work on the paper. Wanting 
this to end, Oakes advised her students to keep a notebook of errors which they saw 
appearing on their papers regularly, and come to her with questions about those errors as 
well as ideas for how to absolve these issues in their papers. Despite the fact that the 
student was to take the lead in these conferences, “the teacher was by no means passive. 
Besides listening, she confirmed, checked, advised and… explained new writing puzzles 
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as they appeared” (157). After taking notes based on the instructor’s feedback, the 
students might consult these notes “as guide and mentor” (p. 157). Oakes suggests that 
such a method is empowering to students, for as a result of these conferences “there 
arises for all students a keener interest in their own abilities” (p. 159, emphasis mine). In 
this early example, the teacher is not a corrector or a disciplinarian per se, but a mentor, 
one helping students to see that they are capable. And in this example, the word “interest” 
takes on a motivational aura, wherein students become aware of their abilities and want 
to push themselves to full capacity.  Oakes (1939) provides a practical example for a 
teacher that may want to become more coach-like. Other pieces written around this time 
period also encourage teachers to make themselves more human to students, but do not 
provide specific examples of ways to do this—rather, they suggest a kind of attitude that 
the teacher must convey.  
Williams (1940), for instance, describes qualities of the professor who seeks to 
capture the genuine interest of students:  
Alertness to changing style, the result of changing life; appreciation of 
vitality; accuracy and spontaneity in his own word hoard; a sense of 
humor; an eye on the flying ball that is the student-with a pretty sound 
prophecy of its ultimate landing place-finding the spirit back of each face, 
and freeing that spirit to grow through expression--these are 
indispensable… entire pattern. He will demand and he will get the best, 
rejecting what he knows to be, at first glance, nonacceptable scrip and 
mechanics. (p. 410-411). 
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Williams’ list continues, taking several pages. Haber (1941) provides a similar, if shorter 
list than Williams. For Haber, the freshman composition teacher should “be well-
informed, sympathetic, fair, endowed with a sense of humor” (p. 292), not to mention 
have “good will and a wholesome spirit of co-operation” (p. 293), all in the service of 
“the most important person on our college campus—the one-day-old college freshman” 
(p. 293). In both cases, the composition teacher has an awareness of students’ desires, 
needs, and what is needed so that they may succeed. This professor is not a drill sergeant, 
however; in both cases, the professor meets the student with a sense of humor. Despite a 
sympathetic understanding of student culture, the professor must be fair, must still 
demand the best work from students. If the professor is to know students and their needs, 
however, there is a sense that professor must approach each student individualistically. It 
is certainly for this reason that Gates (1941) suggests English professors adopt the view 
of the “progressive educationist” (p. 67) by applying a more individualistic approach to 
education in composition.  In all of these cases, it seems that the English professor moves 
into a role that would be considered engaging by Bean’s (2005) standards, both firm but 
relatable, always attempting to connect lessons with students’ motivations.  
 As might be expected, we see examples of this appearing in the later 1940s as 
well. We see this idea appearing again in Perrin (1947), when he states that “our position 
is more that of a coach than that of a teacher” (p. 355). This is because the writing teacher 
“deals with the whole mind of the student” (p. 355), whereas the more traditional teacher 
simply fills the mind of the student with facts. The coach-teacher, on the other hand, must 
show students how their past and present experiences, both inside and outside of school, 
as well as their beliefs, creativity, and imagination all may be used to write an effective 
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paper. Creating this sensibility in students requires an attitude on the part of the teacher 
that transcends that of “teacher,” placing the teaching in a position of “coach” or mentor. 
Similarly, Pollock (1948) uses a metaphor of the football coach to describe the teacher of 
English. He states that coaching “is concerned with teaching the student to develop 
personal skills which he may use in his own way in a certain pattern of social activity” (p. 
76), whether that activity be running and tackling or writing and speaking. If this is the 
case, then “teachers of English need not merely to encourage students to speak and to 
write, but to teach them the devices which are likely to prove useful in speaking and 
writing well” (p. 76). In this way, the teacher again moves beyond the role of the 
traditional teacher, concerned with the correct/incorrect binary, but becomes something 
of a coach, showing why certain actions may be correct or incorrect, rather than telling 
that certain actions are correct or incorrect; this kind of instruction introduces and induct 
students into a particular discourse, helping them internalize the material, and it is this 
approach that seems to make a teacher a kind of mentor or coach, both in the decade of 
the 1940s and in Bean’s (2005) own presentation of student engagement.  
 In the 2013 chair’s address to the Conference on College Composition and 
Communication, Anson (2013) speaks of the changing climate of college in general, 
addressing the rise of alternative platforms to the traditional, on-site, four-year university 
that students may use to receive a postsecondary education. In this address, he presents a 
fictional dialogue between two professors, one an art historian, the other a director of a 
first-year writing program. They discuss reasons that students might want to pay full 
tuition and living costs to a four-year university when commuter schools, online 
programs, and MOOCs are becoming more available. They conclude that the four-year, 
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on-site university is particularly good at fostering within students “critical capacities. 
Habits of mind. Being curious, reflective, imaginative. Appreciating a wide range of 
ideas, traditions, ways of thinking, ways of being in the world” (p. 336). However, this 
cannot be done through traditional lecture approaches. Instead, the classroom must 
include all of the indicators of engagement mentioned above, as well as “the negotiation 
of revisions in students' drafts, the attempt to enact a constructivist ideology of 
development, with more time actively scaffolding new knowledge” (p. 337) through one-
on-one instruction, as well as providing students agency in their writing, and helping 
them see how certain kinds of writing may be relevant to the futures that they see 
themselves occupying. With these principles, it is possible to begin thinking about “about 
… students' experiences and the level of their engagement” (p. 341) and not blame 
students for a lack of engagement. In this contemporary piece, the teacher plays a definite 
role in fostering engagement, interest, and motivation to learn through a particular 
disposition, helping students to be imaginative and creative while helping them to 
understand the rules of writing within the disciplines that they hope to become a part of. 
It is not difficult to see parallels between this contemporary address and the works of 
Perrin (1947) and Pollock (1948), all who speak about the writing teacher’s role in 
coaching students in social conventions of writing, keeping writing lively for students, 
and acting, generally, as initiators, inductors, and mentors into the writing field for 
students.  
 In the conversation between Anson’s (2013) fictional educators, the writing 
director suggests that writing studies—not to mention the college campus as we 
recognize it—cannot survive “if we keep doing the same old same old—the tired lectures, 
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the boring assignments, the lack of attention to students’ development” (p. 337). 
However, as the analysis in this chapter shows, it is exactly what this hypothetical 
professor advocates that is the “same old same old.” Since the early 1940s, the same 
criteria that are now identified markers of student engagement are replete in pedagogical 
discussions within composition. Even during a time when current-traditional rhetoric 
reigned, a time supposedly bereft of pedagogical considerations, we see a discussion 
almost identical to the discussion now, based on factors that are now generally be 
considered best practices in composition pedagogy. We see that student engagement, 
though perhaps named differently, has existed for approximately eighty years in 
composition studies, far before Bean (2005) articulated its underlying principles. In short, 
we have been previously engaged with engagement, building a pedagogy around those 
tenets that are engaging. If this is the case, and if student engagement still takes a 
prominent role in composition studies, it means that assignments, attitudes, and 
pedagogical strategies that may be considered progressive are, in fact, the same old same 
old. The implication: if we have criticized the past for using unsound pedagogy, if we 
have accused instructors of writing of narrowly conceiving teaching and learning, if we 
acknowledge that past practices have not produced the type of student-writing subject 
that we may hope for—then we must say the same of contemporary practices in 
composition, as the practices and rationales behind both the past and the present are 
nearly identical.  
Student Engagement Moving Forward 
 Student engagement is a term that, although problematized for its loose 
definitions and unclear meanings (Baron & Corbin, 2012; Christenson, Reschly & Wylie 
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2012; Fredericks et al., 2004; Quin, 2017; Trowler, 2010), has been generally regarded as 
a recent, student-centered, perhaps even virtuous force in education. An examination of 
our history, however, shows that student engagement may be none of these things: it has 
operated under a different name for approximately 80 years; it exists to meet national, 
governmental, and military needs/desires rather than those of the students that it targets; it 
allows for new kinds of surveillance and exclusion on the part of instructors. This 
genealogical project effectively flips the idea of student engagement on its head. A theory 
of student engagement, seen from this perspective, does virtually nothing for the 
education of the student or to further the students’ goals, and everything for the creation 
of a kind of student subject, the concept of which exists within academic and political 
desires. Engagement may still engage the student, and it may seem that the concept of 
student engagement bends the teacher, the curriculum, even the academic institution to 
the benefit of the student; to a degree, perhaps it does. However, while engaging, it also 
entangles the student within a network of discourses and desires that will unabashedly 
bend the student any which way for its/their own purposes.  
 But engagement is here, and it is a popular idea in educational and composition 
studies. What, then, should we do with this term? In light of the information presented in 
this genealogy, how should we come to understand student engagement? Despite the 
bleak paragraph above, we must not be too hasty in criticism. Engagement is certainly 
productive in that it allows instructors to produce a certain kind of subject. The fact that 
this occurs is neither necessarily good nor bad. Under a pedagogy of engagement, 
students may be able to complete college more easily. Studies suggest that under a model 
of engagement, students are less likely to drop out of school (Astin, 1999; Christenson, 
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Reschly, & Wylie 2008; Nguyen, 2011) and it has been suggested that student 
engagement is a useful model to employ when working with minority students (Kuh et 
al., 2006; Quaye & Harper; Zhang & Kelly, 2011). Engagement may be criticized in the 
same way that Foucault criticized hospitals, prisons, asylums, etc., but these institutions 
are now embedded into the fabric of most Western societies, and they serve a purpose 
that many agree is needed, despite motivations and practices that may, upon closer 
examination, seem to be dark or manipulative.  
 Perhaps one direction, then, is to suggest a new form of student engagement that 
has only been hinted at by engagement scholars, for instance Mann (2001) and Lester and 
Harris (2015), who take a post-structural approach to engaging students, considering the 
student as an historical subject. This evolving understanding of engagement would 
encompass behavior, cognition, and affect, as well as motivation and interest, and as well 
as acknowledge some of the more hidden implications and consequences that come with 
the concept of engagement. We might thus employ the term “subjective engagement” to 
better capture what is happening when employing the construct of student engagement to 
guide writing practices. In this case, we would acknowledge that engagement is not 
strictly student-centric—that being engaging requires surveillance of students, as well as 
the manipulation of students into particular kinds of subjects. In fact, critical/cultural 
approaches to composition already acknowledge the latter (to an extent), a process which 
Berlin (1996) has referred to as liberation. However, critical approaches to composition 
generally imply that this is in the students’ best interest, rather than addressing the fact 
that the subject which teachers attempt to mold comes, itself, from a place of political 
desires and ideology (Fulkerson, 2005). A subjective engagement would confront itself, 
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as both potentially productive and dangerous, as helpful to students but also ideologically 
driven.  
Even as we build a theory of student engagements based on student subjectivity, 
this must be done with caution for two reasons. First, it is difficult to account for 
individual subjectivities. The pedagogy of interest was developed around broad 
statements about student interests: students are interested in writing about themselves; 
they are interested in politics; they are interested in practical application of skills. A 
theory of subjective engagement would suggest that to effectively be engaging, each 
student must be known and must be educated on an absolutely individual basis. This 
would require surveillance techniques that surpass what is likely for any teacher to 
achieve, and further would require a teacher to occupy a pastoral and disciplinary role so 
exaggerated that the teacher would have to learn literally every aspect of each students’ 
life. Then, each assignment would need to be tailored to each student, to speak to that 
particular student’s interests. Certainly, this model may still include critical thinking, 
personal writing, and groupwork, but the combination of these elements would have to be 
tailored in a predictive way, a way that would lead to the transformation of a student into 
a particular kind of writing subject. All of this requires more calculation and work than an 
instructor of writing could produce. Second, as Alcorn (2002), Berlin (1996), and Rickert 
(2007) note, subjectivities are not so easily engaged even when a teacher attempts to 
employ engagement. A subjectivity, comprised of one’s historical makeup, cannot be 
superficially and simply changed into a different subject. Subjects are imbued with 
strongly held beliefs which can be next to immovable, and there is always a (likely) 
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potential for resistance on the part of those who are being apprehended by new 
discourses.  
But what if we were to do away with the term “student engagement”? Despite its 
prevalence in education and composition studies, it certainly does not occupy quite the 
same place that hospitals and prisons do in the western world, and although its principles 
have existed for some time, the term itself is a relatively recent invention. Can we move 
away from it, or shall we say, move beyond it? This is not to suggest that we forego every 
practice that was once an indicator of engagement. It does suggest a reframing of those 
practices. Perhaps we need not be as concerned as we seem to be with forging a 
behavioral, cognitive, or affective link between students and their work. Perhaps students 
may elect to guide their coursework more than we currently allow, determining what 
kinds of assignments will be relevant to them, perhaps even letting them self-select a 
course of study in conjunction with a mentor that helps them to determine such a course.  
In this way, students become responsible for their own engagement (if we choose to call 
it that), and while a kind of surveillance must play out in this scenario, it will not be the 
instructor’s job to survey through course assignments. Further, if engagement actually 
contributes to the construction of kinds of subjects, perhaps moving beyond engagement 
would place some degree of agency back into students’ hands, allowing them to engage 
in greater self-fashioning. Of course, such a move may change the dynamic of the 
university altogether. It could be students under a model other than engagement would 
not be compelled to learn in traditional institutional settings, and thus there would have to 
be more internships or apprenticeships. I suspect that in such environments, engagement 
looks very different—depending on the kind of internship, engagement may not even be 
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the core concern. As students are given more agency in an educational world outside of 
engagement, they may opt for online work or even free tutorials, perhaps even 
legitimately authentic learning experiences, completely sans the college environment. 
Whatever the case, engagement has existed in some form for at least 80 years, and it 
difficult to imagine the university without it—but perhaps now is a time to engage our 
imaginations and see what we may produce.  
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